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THE LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL MARKET 
At the seventh session of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (La Paz, Bolivia, 15-29 May 1957), the 
member Governments adopted a resolution (116(Vn)) 
on the Latin American regional market, recommending 
to the secretariat that it should expedite the implementa-
tion, within the shortest possible time, of the relevant 
resolutions of the Trade Committee,^ "with a view to 
taking a more decisive step towards their underlying 
objective". 
In compliance with these instructions from June 1957 
onwards the secretariat concentrated on organizing the 
first session of the Working Group on the Regional Mar-
ket, which was held at the headquarters of the Commis-
sion at Santiago, Chile, from 3 to 11 February 1958. For 
this purpose, the secretariat invited seven prominent 
Latin Americans to attend the session in their personal 
capacity and to give it support of their practical experi-
ence and of the prestige they enjoy in public and private 
affairs not only in their respective countries but through-
out Latin America. The Group consisted of the following 
members: 
Mr. José Garrido Torres, President of the National 
Council of Economy of Brazil; 
Mr. Rodrigo Gómez, Director-General of the Banco 
Mexico, S.A., Mexico; 
Mr. Flavián Levine, Professor at the University of 
Chile and Executive Vice-President of the Compañía de 
Acero del Pacífico (Huachipato); 
Mr. Eustaquio Méndez Delfino, President of the 
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange and former President of 
the Honorary National Commission of Economy and 
Finance of Argentina; 
Mr. Juan Pardo Heeren, former Minister of Finance 
of Peru; 
Mr. Galo Plaza, former President of the Republic of 
Ecuador; 
Mr. Joaquin Vallejo, former Minister of Development 
of Colombia. 
After electing Mr. Galo Plaza Chairman and Mr. 
Joaquin Vallejo Rapporteur, the Group met in camera 
so as to be able to discuss more freely the background 
1 See resolutions 2 (I) and 3 (I ) in the Report of the Committee 
reproduced in the study entitled Inter-Latin American Trade: 
Current Problems (E/CN.12/423) , United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 1957.II.G.5. 
docimients presented by the Secretariat^ and the mem-
bers' individual points of view on the problems raised. 
In preparing its programmes of work, the Group bore 
in mind not only the resolutions of the Trade Committee 
and the Commission to which reference has been made, 
but also that adopted by the Economic Conference of the 
Organization of American States (Buenos Aires, August 
1957), recommending that OAS should co-operate in the 
work of ECLA and declaring that it was desirable grad-
ually and progressively to establish a Latin American 
regional market on multilateral and competitive bases. 
The Working Group concentrated on defining clearly 
the principles and bases upon which the procedures and 
institutions of a regional market could be established. 
Its findings were set forth in the report entitled Bases 
for the formation of the Latin American regional market, 
which it adopted on 11 February 1958.® 
2 The following were the background documents considered by 
the Group in its discussions: (1) Study of Inter-Latin American 
Trade (E /CN.12 /369 /Rev . l ) , United Nations publication, Sales 
No.: 1956.II.G.3; (2) Imer-Latin American trade: current prob-
lems (E/CN.12/4Z3) , United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
1957.II.5; with special reference to the account of proceedings of 
the first session of the Trade Committee (pages 7 to 14), and to 
part II, section 3, "Payments and the regional market in inter-
Latin American trade" (pages 93 to 105) ; (3) resolutions 116 
(VII) and 121 (VII) of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, given in Annual Report {15 May 1956-29 May 1957) 
(E/CN.12/451) , pages 105 to 108 and 113 to 115; (4) ECLA ac-
tivities relating to payments and the regional market in Latin 
America ( E / C N / 1 2 / 4 8 3 ) ; (5) Final Act of the Economic Con-
ference of the Organization of American States (Buenos Aires, 
Republic of Argentina, 15 August-4 September 1957), with special 
reference to resolution XI, "Recommendation on a Latin American 
regional market"; (6) Liberalización del comercio interlatino-
americano (document 3.1957 of the Organization of American 
States)*; ( 7 ) ' Planteamiento de los problemas del mercado 
regional (E /CN.12 /C .1 /WG.2 /1 ) * ; (8) Algunos problemas del 
mercado regional latinoamericano (E /CnM.12 /C. l /WG.2 /2 ) ' ; 
(9) Pierre Uri, Sugestiones sobre el mercado regional latino-
americano ( E / C N . 1 2 / C . 1 / W G . 2 / 3 ) * ; (10) Principales ante-
cedentes del Grupo de Trabajo del mercado regional latinoameri-
cano (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/4) * ; (11) Hollis B. Chenery, Alter-
native approaches to economic integration in Latin America 
(E / ( :N .12 /C .1 /WG.2 /5 ) ; and (12) El movimiento de integración 
económica centroamericana (Information Document).* 
Note: The English text of the above-mentioned documents which 
bear an asterisk ( * ) is not yet available. 
3 The report was qriginally issued on the date mentioned as a 
document for "limited" distribution ( E / ( J i . l 2 / C . l / W G . 2 / 6 ) . 
The full text, which was subsequently reissued for "general" 
distribution, is appended to the Progress report on inter-Latin 
American trade and the regional market, covering the period June 
1957 to April 1958 (E /CN.12/AC.40/3) presented to the ECLA 
Committee of the Whole at its sixth session. 
There ia no need to stress the importance of this to be the essence of the report—are reproduced here, 
document, since it has already produced wide repercus- The three parts concerned are presented in the following 
sions in Latin America and provides a new p i d e for the ^^e fourth part is omitted, because it deals with 
secretariat s work in this held. Ihe actual bases for the .v j i i x • ^ i i 
formation of the regional market, the relevant comments other recommendations largely of an internal nature and 
and recommendations, and the preamble in which the contams two annexes consisting of resolutions of the 
Working Group analyses the considerations underlying Commission which may easily be found in other 
their formulation—in other words, what is considered documents. 
B A S E S F O R T H E F O R M A T I O N O F T H E L A T I N A M E R I C A N R E G I O N A L M A R K E T 
L INTRODUCTION 
The social need to develop the Latin American coun-
tries makes it a matter of increasing urgency to devise 
effective ways and means of accelerating the rate of 
growth of their real per capita income. It is now fully 
recognized that such ways and means must necessarily 
be based on the technical improvements in agriculture 
and the progressive industrialization of the countries in 
question. Modern technology offers an almost unlimited 
potential for the attainment of these ends, as is testified 
by the experiments of paramount historical importance 
which are being carried out before our eyes. Will Latin 
America be able to take full advantage of this potential? 
A formidable obstacle stands in the way. Industrializa-
tion calls for an extensive market without which the 
countries of the region will be imable to achieve the high 
level of productivity characteristic of the great industrial 
centres. Such a market could be available to Latin 
America, but it has been broken up into twenty watertight 
compartments. Now that a common market has been 
formed in Western Europe, that the Scandinavian peoples 
are making efforts in the same direction and that the 
countries of Eastern Europe are apparently engaged in 
a process of integration, Latin America constitutes the 
only large population group in the world which, in a 
vast territory endowed with a wealth of natural resources, 
is wasting for want of economic integration the immense 
potential represented by modem technology. 
In 1955, the population of Latin America numbered 
_some 175 million persons, and it is estimated that it will 
have increased by a further 100 million by 1975. The 
share of the active population in this increment should 
amount to approximately 38 million. If the trends reg-
istered in the last twenty years continue, out of this sub-
stantial addition to the region's labour force only 5 mil-
lion will be absorbed by agricultural activities, or fewer 
still if, as is greatly to be desired, technical progress in 
agriculture is expedited. Thus about 33 million persona 
will be left to seek productive employment in other sec-
tors; and of these a considerable proportion will have to 
be absorbed by the process of industrialization and under 
conditions of continuous technological progress. There 
will be a very serious waste of resources if the Latin 
American countries continue to pursue a policy of indus-
trialization in watertight compartments. 
ECLA has viewed this problem in a clear light, and 
the member Governments agreed in principle upon the 
need to set up a regional market, first at the initial session 
of the Trade Committee, held in November 1956, and 
subsequently, in May 1957, at the seventh session of the 
Commission in La Paz. Likewise, at the recent inter-
American economic conference in Buenos Aires (August 
.1957), the Governments categorically endorsed the pro-
posal to create a Latin American regional market. 
In compliance with the instructions issued to it at the 
La Paz session, the secretariat has invited the present 
Working Group to co-operate in the preparatory work 
for putting this vitally important project into effect. For 
this purpose the Group has had a series of prior studies 
at its disposal. The concept of the economic integration 
of Latin America, which found early expression in 
ECLA's Economic Survey of Latin America 1949, has 
been progressively developed in subsequent documents. 
In this connexion, it should be pointed out that definite 
ideas on the regional market's structure first appear in 
the study entitled Payments and the regional market in 
inter-Latin American trade.^ All this material has been 
very useful to the Working Group, as have also the 
additional reports presented by the secretariat before and 
during the meetings of the Group. 
Thus, the concept of the Latin American regional 
market has long been gradually taking shape, and the 
Group deems it a privilege to have had 3ie present oppor-
tunity of giving it new impetus by formulating what 
should, in the Group's opinion, constitute the market's 
essential bases. The establishment of the European com-
mon market has rendered the creation of a Latin Ameri-
can regional market a more pressing need; in the first 
place because it shows how an idea that some years ago 
might have been considered Utopian quickly gains ground 
when enlightened statesmen give it the support of their 
prestige and define it with conviction; and, secondly, 
because the European common market, undeniable as are 
its advantages for its six member countries and beneficial 
as its indirect repercussions may prove for Latin America, 
will produce in addition some adverse effects, mainly as 
a result of the preferential measures introduced in favour 
of the members' overseas territories. However much con-
certed action on the part of the Latin American countries 
1 Note by the secretariat. The report in question was published 
under this title by the secretariat in 1956 and was prepared by the 
economists Mr. José Garrido Torres (Brazil) and Mr. Eusebio 
Campos (Argentina) in their capacity as consultants, after they 
had carried out a survey in various South American countries with 
the co-operation of the secretariat. The following were among the 
recommendations with which the report closed: 
"It is considered that agreements should be concluded with a 
view to promoting — by means of collaboration amongst several 
countries, and on a basis of financial contributions from both 
regional and foreign sources — the establishment or development 
of industries that require substantial capital and wide markets... 
"It is felt to be expedient that in the field of trade policy steps 
should be taken to establish general principles and certain specific 
procedures conducive to the gradual building up of a regional mar-
ket on multilateral and competitive bases. This regional market 
would permit the intensification of those Latin American lines 
of industrial production in which a reduction in costs and future 
expansion basically depend upon an increase in consumer capacity. 
"At this level, and as a preliminary phase, the drawing up of an 
industrial map of Latin America is suggested, mainly with a view 
to the determination of possible and advisable action." 
may mitigate such effects, it would not be feasible to 
imagine that they can be entirely averted. Furthermore, 
the European common market will powerfully stimulate 
the technological revolution which is already taking place 
in the agriculture of the countries concerned, as well as 
in their production of synthetic raw materiak; and all 
this is bound to have unfavourable consequences for the 
producer countries of Latin America. 
A negative reaction, however, is not enough. Latin 
America's positive reaction must be the creation of the 
regional market. The time is ripe to take this step reso-
lutely and without detriment to the region's advantageous 
trade relations with the great industrial centres. Latin 
America will continue to buy from them in so far as they 
absorb its exports, which the countries of the region will 
have to promote to the fullest possible extent. But the 
composition of Latin American imports must be further 
modified and brought into line with the capacity for 
external payments. If this process is carried out within 
the broad framework of the regional market, Latin 
American industry will be vigorously spurred on towards 
new and more efficacious forms of expansion, with fa-
vourable consequences for the economk development of 
the region. In the course of this task of substituting 
domestic production for imports, the sooner Latin 
America speeds up its production of capital goods, which 
at present are imported because their manufacture in 
watertight compartments is anti-economic, the sooner 
will the region be able to counter such foreign trade 
setbacks as may accompany the advantages attendant 
upon the European common market. 
From another point of view, it would be a mistake to 
consider that the main justification of the common mar-
ket lies in the incentives it will afford to the production 
of capital goods and intermediate products that require 
complex processing. This applies especially to the more 
advanced of the Latin American countries, where con-
ditions have been becoming increasingly favourable for 
the establishment of such activities; but the Vast possi-
bilities for expansion, consolidation and specialization 
among existing consumer goods industries, as well as 
those others which will undoubtedly come into being by 
virtue of the regional market, must not be overlooked. 
The situation of the less advanced countries is also of 
vital importance. The system of watertight compartments 
has virtually cut them off from the favourable effects of 
industrialization in the more highly developed countries. 
The significance of this problem is obvious, and the re-
gional market must provide the indispensable conditions 
for its solution. The less developed countries of the region 
will have to find the decisive stimulus to their own in-
dustrialization in rising levels of consumption in those 
that have reached a higher stage of development. This 
calls for special treatment. If the treatment accorded in 
the regional market were to be exactly the same for 
countries at different stages of the industrialization 
process, the inequalities would tend to be perpetuated. 
To reduce and finally eliminate them, special incentives 
to the industrial development of the less advanced coun-
tries will have to be provided, for the mutual benefit of 
both groups. 
Bearing in mind these considerations and others which 
will be discussed later, and in conformity with its terms 
of reference, the Group presents the following bases on 
which the Latin American regional market may be estab-
lished. In formulating them, the Group has been guided 
first and foremost by the idea that such bases will be 
effective only in so far as they offer ariiple opportunities 
to private enterprise and its achievements. The Govern-
ments will plan the structure of the regional market, but 
it will be for private enterprise to give it life; and in the 
pursuit of this aim, the countries concerned will have to 
take special care that their legitimate efforts towards 
industrialization do not deprive agriculture and the infra-
structure of essential resources, thus jeopardizing the 
balanced development of their economy and, in the final 
issue, weakening their rate of growth. 
On these foundations it will be possible to build up 
the specific projects which the Governments members of 
the Commission have requested this Working Group to 
recommend. To this end a series of analyses will have to 
be carried out on the lines suggested to the secretariat 
in the third part of the present document, in which com-
ments are presented concerning the bases enumerated 
below. 
I I . ENUMERATION OF THE BASES 
1. Universality of membership in the regional market 
Membership in the regional market must be open to all 
the Latin American countries, for which reason it is 
essential that conditions acceptable to all of them be 
established from the outset. 
The universal nature of the regional market agree-
ment does not, however, imply that countries closely 
linked by geographical proximity or common economic 
interests shall not be empowered to enter into negotia-
tions among themselves. But it is essential that these 
negotiations be effected within the framework of a gen-
eral agreement, and along such lines that the reciprocal 
concessions involved are not exclusive and are automati-
cally extended to other member countries, or to such 
countries as may become members in the future if all do 
not accede to the initial agreement. 
2. Range of the regional market in respect 
of commodities 
The ultimate aim of the regional market must be the 
inclusion of all goods produced within its area. This 
concept does not mean, however, that the regional mar-
ket must become effective immediately for all such goods. 
It only implies that the agreement will have to establish 
procedures and time-limits for the progressive abolition 
of those customs duties and restrictions which nowadays 
hamper or prevent inter-Latin American trade. In other 
words, the agreement must be immediate but its im-
plementation gradual. 
Once this principle is established, various ways of 
putting it into practice are conceivable, which must be 
carefully examined before final recommendations are 
made. 
3. Development of the less advanced countries 
The less advanced countries must be accorded special 
treatment to enable them, through progressive industrial-
ization and the over-all strengthening of their economies, 
to share fully in the benefits of the regional market. 
With this end in view, their import duties and restric-
tions must be reduced more slowly than in the more 
advanced countries, in accordance with formulae to be 
studied; and such formulae must further establish facili-
ties for exports from the countries in question, and 
especially for goods produced by their new industries 
and other activities, so as to ensure equitable trade reci-
procity. In addition, other measures must be devised, 
especially of a financial nature, conducive to the more 
rapid development of the less advanced countries. 
4. The tariff system vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
One implication of the regional market is that it will 
be desirable eventually to establish a single customs tariff 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world. But in some coimtries the 
tariff has been deprived of its protectionist role, and has 
been superseded by restrictive measures of various kinds. 
Until these are replaced by a new tariff, an interim system 
will have to be established to ensure the progressive 
abolition of such restrictions in the countries in question 
to an extent equivalent to the tariff reductions effected by 
other member countries. 
5. Specialization in industries and other activities 
The specialization in industries and other activities 
which is one of the objectives of the regional market must 
be the outcome of the free interplay of economic forces 
within the over-all conditions established by the agree-
ment, and without precluding the pursuance of an in-
vestment policy calculated to further as effectively as 
possible the aims of the said agreement. 
It is inconsistent with this principle to accord specific 
countries the exclusive right to install certain industries 
or activities, or to impose restrictions on free com-
petition, except as regards the special features of the 
integration programme of the Central American coun-
tries, which in this context must be considered as a single 
unit, if such is the form of membership they desire. 
6. The payments system 
In the interest of greater efficiency, the regional market 
must have a special system of multilateral payments con-
ducive to maximum inter-Latin American trade reci-
procity, and not detrimental to the possible participation 
of Latin America in the re-establishment of a more gen-
eral multilateralism. It is essential that, under the system 
established, the member countries be protected against 
all exchange risks. 
7. Temporary import restrictions 
Member countries must have the right to impose tem-
porary import restrictions, in accordance with regula-
tions to be laid down in the agreement, and provided 
that basic remedial measures of monetary, fiscal and 
economic policy are also adopted, when such a step is 
rendered necessary by: 
(а) The magnitude and persistence of the disequi-
librium in their balance of payments with the other 
member countries; and 
(б) The need to facilitate reabsorption of manpower, 
in the course of the readjustments consequent upon the 
changing industrial structure. 
8. Safeguards for agriculture 
Member countries must have the right to restrict im-
ports of agricultural commodities, limiting them to given 
iroportions of the increment in consumption, should this 
)e indispensable for the normal maintenance of agri-
cultural activities. 
9. Rules of competition 
To promote the smooth functioning of the regional 
market, steps must be taken to prevent the export trade 
of a member country from prejudicing, by means of un-
fair competitive practices, the activities of other member 
countries, either through competitive currency deprecia-
tion or by any other method. 
Member countries must also refrain from discrimina-
tory practices, so that export prices may be the same for 
any given commodity, irrespective of the market of 
destination. 
10. Credit and technical assistance 
The regional market must be provided with an effec-
tive system of credit and technical assistance, both in 
order to stimulate intra-regional exports and with a view 
to furthering the installation and development of the 
industries concerned. 
11. The advisory body 
The problems that the fimctioning of the regional 
market will involve call for the creation of an advisory 
body constituted by the member Governments, and the 
establishment of a system of arbitration. 
12. Role of private enterprise 
For the formation of the regional market the agree-
ment of the respective Governments is required. But the 
making of such a market a going concern will depend to 
a large extent on private enterprise, on its understanding 
of the problem and on its ability to turn to account the 
immense advantages offered by the regional market for 
industrialization, for the introduction of more advanced 
agricultural techniques and for over-all economic de-
velopment. 
It is, therefore, deemed highly desirable to enlist the 
active co-operation of the organizations representing pri-
vate enterprise, in both the national and the inter-
national field, for the study and discussion of these 
problems. 
I I I . COMMENTS ON THE BASES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Bases 1 and 2. Universality of membership in the 
regional market 
The greater the number of countries and the wider the 
range of commodities included in the regional market, the 
greater will be the possibilities of reciprocal trade and 
the more flexible the market's operations, inasmuch as 
the liquidation of balances among member countries will 
be facilitated. 
It therefore appears desirable that the agreement should 
be open for accession to all the Latin American coun-
tries and, at the same time, that formulae should be 
evolved flexible enough to allow countries in close geo-
graphical proximity or with specific interest in common 
to make mutual concessions. While such concessions may 
originally be designed to promote the mutual interests of 
the countries concerned, they should be extended to other 
member countries without any intent of exclusiveness. 
As regards the commodities, a careful examination will 
have to be made of ways and means of gradually and 
progressively reducing duties and restrictions. Because 
of their complementarity or the fact that they have not 
yet been produced or are produced in only one country, 
in the case of certain commodities—for example, some 
traditional items of trade and also, to a large extent, 
capital goods and durable consumer goods, as well as 
some important intermediate products—^the reduction of 
duties and restrictions could be embarked upon without 
any limitations. At the other extreme are the industries 
producing goods for current consumption. Here, reduc-
tion must be gradual and progressive in order to allow 
for adjustments and increased specialization in the vari-
ous sectors and to avoid the serious maladjustments 
which would otherwise occur. 
In considering this aspect of the regional market, the 
secretariat should take into account various methods of 
reduction, whether they refer to all commodities, to 
groups of similar or related commodities or to indi-
vidual trade items. 
Basis 3. Development of the less advanced countries 
It is essential for the success of the regional market 
that the less advanced countries should find in it incen-
tives, lacking at present, for vigorous industrialization. 
However, if such countries acceded to the agreement on 
the same terms as the more advanced countries, this ob-
jective would not be achieved because of the greater 
industrial productivity of the latter. To prevent this, 
various procedures must be studied. For example, it 
might be possible to maintain for a judicious period the 
reasonable amount of protection required by the indus-
tries of the less advanced countries which are working 
for their own internal market, while the duties and re-
strictions for the same and other industries in the more 
advanced countries are gradually eliminated. Another 
possibility would be to promote the establishment of 
export industries in the less advanced countries and to 
grant the necessary facilities for importing the products 
of these industries to the more advanced countries. AU 
these alternatives must be considered. 
At the same time, an analysis will have to be made of 
the manner in which credit facilities could be granted to 
these countries to help them finance their export indus-
tries. Furthermore, it is to be hoped that foreign capital 
might well find in the countries in question the incen-
tives for industrial investment which are lacking today, 
since such investment would have at its disposal an 
extensive regional market instead of the narrow range 
of markets at present available. 
This does not mean that the more advanced countries 
should make a sacrifice in favour of the others. Quite 
clearly, the interests involved are reciprocal. Under the 
preferential trade system which the regional market im-
plies, the exports made by the less developed to the more 
developed countries will give the former a purchasing 
power that will largely be used to buy the manufactured 
products of the latter, particularly when the countries 
concerned succeed in establishing a multilateral system of 
payments which will encourage the utilization of credit 
balances within the regional market itself and which will 
reduce to a minimum the outflow of dollars or other 
freely convertible currencies to the rest of the world. 
Without these special arrangements, the more ad-
vanced countries would have great difficulty in selling 
their capital goods and other goods whose costs are 
higher than those in other parts of the world. Certainly, 
the enlargement of the market and the consequent in-
crease in productivity will gradually bring costs closer 
to world levels. In the meanwhile, it would be logical 
to expect that the less developed countries will be un-
willing to grant preferences in respect of such goods if 
they have to spend their hard currencies in order to pur-
chase them, but if they are able to pay for them with 
additional exports, especially of manufactured goods, a 
wide field of mutual interest will be opened for both 
groups of countries. 
Basis 4. The tariff system vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
, There are two ways of tackling the problem of a pref-
erential policy: that of the free trade zone and that of 
adopting a single customs tariff vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world. The first method would have the advantage of not 
requiring any readjustment of existing tariffs vis-a-vis 
third countries: each country would maintain or establish 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world the duties which it desired 
— subject to the limitations imposed by the treaties in 
force — and would undertake only to grant those pro-
gressive reductions which the agreement required for the 
other countries operating within the same system. How-
ever, in certain circumstances, the lack of a common 
tariff for certain commodities imported from third 
countries would have serious disadvantages. 
On the other hand, it is no easy task to work out a 
common tariff. In particular, there are countries where 
the tariff' has disappeared as the result of inflation and 
has been replaced by restrictions of a different kind. It 
might take time to re-establish the tariff, but there is no 
need to wait for this to happen before the common mar-
ket agreement is concluded. Intermediate stages may be 
envisaged at once. The progressive reduction of duties 
and restrictions could be started within a free trade zone, 
while the decisive steps were being taken for the establish-
ment of a common tariff. It would be advisable for the 
secretariat to analyse the various alternatives in this field. 
including that for which provision is made in article 
XXV of the GATT, and at the same time, to devise 
suitable ways and means of gauging the magnitude of 
both the restrictions and the customs duties introduced 
for the purposes of reductions contemplated in this 
report. 
Basis 5. Specialization in industries and other activities 
Many consumer goods industries in the Latin Ameri-
can countries may possibly have attained an apparently 
satisfactory size in comparison with their counterparts 
in the advanced industrial centres. However, a close 
examination will reveal that the smallness of the market 
in Latin America compels factories to produce an exces-
sive variety of articles, while factories in the more 
advanced centres have reached a high degree of special-
ization. The regional market will stimulate such special-
ization in Latin America. The time required for the 
reduction of duties and restrictions will allow the grad-
ual introduction of the necessary readjustments and may 
possibly encourage the merger of industrial interests 
between firms of different countries or the conclusion of 
mutual agreements to attain the necessary specialization 
in this and other cases. 
All this should come about as the result of the free 
interplay of interests, which is not incompatible with 
effective guidance through financial agencies. But in no 
case should it lead to exclusive arrangements which pre-
vent competition or the entry of new enterprises. 
Basis 6. The payments system 
In the abstract, a regional market without a special 
payments system is conceivable but, in practice, the full 
potential of the market will not be realized without it. 
A system in which any credit balance in favour of one 
country might give rise to an immediate outflow of for-
eign exchange to the rest of the world would mean a sub-
stantial weakening of the regional market. It is therefore 
necessary to create incentives to ensure that such balances 
are used within the market itself. 
For this purpose, it will be necessary to examine the 
possibility of organizing a credit system at the same time 
as the multilateral payments system. 
The group noted with satisfaction that the meeting of 
representatives of some of the Central Banks in Monte-
video, convened by ECLA, recommended parity for units 
of account in bilateral agreements and laid the founda-
tions for the voluntary transfer of balances. It is to be 
hoped that the second meeting, to which all the Latin 
American Central Banks should be invited, will work 
out wider formulae for multilateral compensation and 
that an immediate programme for the elimination of 
certain restrictions which interfere with trade will open 
the way for the automatic transferability of intra-regional 
balances. 
Basis 7. Temporary import restrictions 
The incentive to use balances within the regional 
market itself referred to in the preceding section (Basis 
VI) will be a powerful stabilizing factor. But it is possible 
that certain transitory factors or inflationary pressure 
may produce desequilibria which, because of their nature 
and magnitude, cannot be remedied by additional credits. 
Such a situation may compel the debtor countries to im-
pose restrictions on imports from the regional market. 
However, it is essential that such restrictions should con-
form to certain norms and that they should be applied 
for a limited time, since other measures must be adopted 
to attack the disequilibrium at its source. In this respect, 
the bodies to be established under the agreement could 
provide useful advice and guidance. 
Consideration must also be given to cases in which 
the disequilibrium is of a structural character, or, in 
other words, when a country has not succeeded in attain-
ing a rate of economic development similar to that of 
others without a persistent trend towards external dis-
equilibrium. In this instance, firm action must be taken 
to stimulate exports and replace imports by domestic 
production. Monetary readjustment in accordance with 
the provisions and practices of the International Mone-
tary Fund is one possible method. But some thought 
should be given to protective measures of limited scope 
which could be introduced only after the views of the 
bodies concerned had been heard. These are delicate 
matters which require careful consideration. 
There is another type of disequilibrium which will 
have to be taken into account. The regional market will 
tend to accelerate the rate of growth of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. This fact and the more or less prolonged 
period of time which will have to be allowwl for the 
reduction of duties and restrictions will facilitate the 
readjustment of the economic activities of a country when 
it is faced with competition from other member countries. 
Cases may arise, however, where, because of the nature 
of an activity or its geographical position, it is not easy 
to transfer labour no longer required by that activity to 
others in process of development. In these cases, it is 
logical that a country should be able to impose temporary 
restrictions on imports which give rise to such difficulties. 
Basis 8. Safeguards for agriculture 
From the point of view of the foregoing comments 
agriculture is in a special position. In certain cases, safe-
guards have been necessary to protect it against com-
petition f^om other Latin American countries. This is a 
fact towards which no hard-and-fast attitude can be 
adopted. On the one hand the introduction of advanced 
techniques in agricultural in the countries concerned may 
enable them to face such competition on favourable terms. 
On the other hand it must not be forgotten that with the 
passage of time a marked increase in consumption may 
require that those activities now enjoying protection be 
maintained and stimulated, because the surplus of the ex-
porting countries may gradually be reduced through the 
growth of their own consumption. 
In the light of these possible changes it is necessary 
to proceed with caution and to accord special treatment 
to agricultural activities, without losing sight of the need 
to draw up programmes for the gradual replacement of 
certain costly lines of production by others in which pro-
ductivity is higher, both for the benefit of the consumer 
and in order to promote the more efficient utilization of 
available productive resources. 
Basis 9. Rules of competition 
The essence of a regional market lies in its competitive 
character. But the success of such competition must be 
the result of better productive ability and not of arbitrary 
factors. These factors may be of different kinds. If the 
external depreciation of a country's currency is con-
tinually higher then internal depreciation, export prices 
might fall to the detriment of other countries competing 
on the market. 
In other cases unfair competition might be rather the 
result of deliberate procedures, taking the form of ap-
parent or concealed subsidies. These practices are not 
compatible with the regional market. 
Basis 10. Credit and technical assistance 
In this field also it is necessary to proceed with cau-
tion for, while the accelerated development brought about 
by the regional market will give rise to greater need for 
investment resources, there is the risk of embarking on 
over-ambitious projects which, however well conceived, 
may prove difficult to carry out in practice. A beginning 
should be made with modest undertakings which could 
extend their field of action as they proved to be reliable 
and efficient. 
The credit requirements inherent in the regional mar-
ket are of two types: first, the financing of exports and, 
secondly, the financing of industries which produce these 
exports. So far as the former is concerned, a system of 
medium-term credits designed specifically to encourage 
exports of capital goods will have to be organized. Con-
sideration should be given to the possibility of entrust-
ing these credit operations to the same body which is 
responsible for the system of multilateral payments, with-
out precluding the appropriate use of existing financial 
organizations, both domestic and foreign. 
As regards the financing of industries, particularly 
those producing for exports, the enlargement of the mar-
ket will undoubtedly provide private domestic and for-
eign capital with more powerful incentives than at pres-
ent. These incentives will encourage the pooling of capital 
from different countries for the development of industries 
which serve the regional market, and other forms of 
financial co-operation. Yet national resources will clearly 
be insufficient and recourse will have to be had to inter-
national credit resources. It will therefore be necessary 
to consider the possibility of establishing a special devel-
opment agency to carry out these financing operations, 
which should be supplemented by measures of technical 
assistance in regard to which international organizations 
could provide very valuable support. 
The secretariat should study the possible repercussions 
on the regional market of the different kinds of treatment 
now accorded by the Latin American countries to in-
vestors. 
Basis 11. The advisory body 
The Group does not consider that the Latin American 
countries are yet ready to establish at the outset an execu-
tive authority for the regional market although this might 
constitute an objective for the future. Accordingly, it 
would prefer an organization of an advisory type but 
whose influence might in time become decisive if its 
efficiency and impartiality conferred upon it an un-
questionable moral authority. This report has dealt with 
various circumstances in which a country has to take 
emergency measures which run counter to the aims of 
the agreement and which might cause harm to third 
countries. The advisory body would intervene in all such 
cases. What is more, its opinion should first be sought 
so that the country which considers itself prejudiced by 
measures taken by other countries may apply for a ruling. 
For this purpose, it would suffice to establish a procedure 
for appointing arbitrators in the specific cases which 
may arise. 
Besides these functions, the advisory body should be 
responsible for following the development of the regional 
market, giving guidance to the organization previously 
referred to and fostering increasing co-ordination be-
tween the economic policies of the various countries, in 
order to ensure the efficient operation of the market itself. 
Basis 12. Role of private enterprise 
A perusal of the text in which the basis is described 
will suffice to show the desirability of requesting the sec-
retariat that, in carrying out the studies and research 
entrusted to it in connexion with the regional market, it 
should explore the views of the private sector on this 
problem and seek the necessary ways and means of ob-
taining its active co-operation, both in the national and 
in the international field. 
L A T Í N A M E R I C A ' S T R A D E W I T H T H E C O M M O N M A R K E T C O U N T R I E S 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The signing in Rome, on 25 March 1957, of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community^ con-
sisting of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands aroused 
considerable interest in Latin America for two main rea-
sons: first, because of the possible effect which the Com-
mon Market might have on trade between the six member 
countries and Latin America. Since exports from EEC 
dependent territories, mainly from French and Belgian 
possessions in Africa, will have duty-free entry into the 
six countries, the possibility that this preferential treat-
ment might displace imports from other areas, including 
those from Latin America, has aroused concern. The 
second reason is the stimulus that the European initiative 
has given to Latin America to go forward more rapidly 
with economic integration which has for some years been 
a part of economic thinking in this region. 
Underlying this interest is the sheer magnitude, in 
population and economic potential, of the EEC which can 
be succinctly expressed in a few statistics (see table 1 ) . 
Table 1 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EEC COUNTRIES IN 
RELATION TO WESTERN EUROPE AS A WHOLE," 1953-55 






Population (millions) 161.0 57 
Mining'' 3.4 60 
45.4 60 
16.5 63.5 
Investment in machinery and equipment^ 11.2 62 
Imports® 16.0 50 
16.2 54 
Source: Statistics published by OEEC and the United Nations, 
and compiled by GATT in Trade Intelligence Paper No. 6, Table 
(Geneva, Decraiber 1957). 
® Western Europe means the metropolitan countries of OEEC. 
•> Value added at 1953 prices. 
= Value of production at current prices. 
« A t 1954 prices. 
® F.o.b. at current prices. 
No less important is the fact that, in recent years, the six 
member countries have absorbed about one-seventh of 
Latin America's total exports and have supplied a simi-
lar proportion of Latin American imports. 
It was in response to this early interest that the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) decided to include the possible repercussions 
of the proposed European Common Market on Latin 
American trade as an item in the agenda of its seventh 
session, held at La Paz, Bolivia, in May 1957. A back-
ground document prepared by the secretariat was used 
for this purpose.^ During the seventh session, ECLA 
adopted resolution 121 (VII) in which it recommended 
to the secretariat, that, among other things, "it continue 
to observe closely the economic integration of Europe 
and other areas, and that it keep the member Govern-
ments supplied with the relevant information". 
The present study is published in response to this 
recommendation. The ratification of the Rome Treaty by 
the parliaments of the signatory countries and its entry 
into force, on 1 January 1958, make the study all the 
more timely. 
Only some of the possible economic consequences of 
the creation of the EEC are dealt with in the following 
sections. Its institutional aspects have been briefly de-
scribed in the secretariat Note mentioned above and in 
nimierous other sources. Moreover, the full text of the 
Rome Treaty and annexes are also generally available. 
The possibility of including the European Economic 
Community in a broader free-trade area which would in-
clude the other members of the OEEC is still in the stage 
of negotiation and consequently has not been taken into 
account in this study.® 
1 Generally the European Economic Community is subsequently 
referred to as "the EEC" or "the Common Market". 
^Note by the secretariat on the possible repercussions of the 
European Common Market on Latin American exports (E/CÑ.12/ 
449 and Add . l ) . 
3 A comprehensive treatment of the issues involved, mainly 
from the standpoint of the United Kingdom, is given in Britain 
and Europe (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., London. 
December 1957). 
I I . SUMMARY 
1. Some important trends in European-Latin 
American trade 
(a) Long-term. During the course of the past half 
century, two main developments stand out in the area 
distribution of Latin America's foreign trade. First, 
Europe and the United States have long been the pre-
dominant regions influencing the level and growth of such 
trade; together they accounted for over Táne-tenths of 
Latin America's overseas purchases and sales at the be-
ginning of the century, and they still represent about 
three quarters. Secondly, there has been a fairly con-
tinuous redirection of Latin America's overseas trade 
from Europe towards the United States during the same 
period. Five decades ago, for instance, some two thirds 
of Latin America's exports and imports were effected 
with Europe and only about a quarter with the United 
States, whereas, in recent years, the United States share 
of Latin America's much higher level of trade has risen 
to approximately half, while Europe's share has fallen to 
less than a third of the total. 
(b) Short-term. Since the Second World War there 
has been a substantial revival in trade between Europe 
and the twenty Latin American republics. Regardless of 
whether this implies some reversal of the longer-term area 
redirection mentioned above, Latin American-European 
trade is both high in absolute terms and has also been 
recording a noticeable upward trend in recent years. The 
analyses which follow therefore begin with a recognition 
of the reciprocal importance of Latin American-European 
trade for both areas, and assess the extent to which the 
creation' of the European Common Market might affect 
subsequent growth prospects for certain commodities. 
2. Coverage limitations 
Threé coverage limitations to these £inalyses must be 
specified at the outset. First, only trade flows into the 
six EEC countries, and not those in the reverse direction, 
are examined. Secondly, Latin American exports of only 
six primary commodities are studied separately, namely, 
coffee, cacao, bananas, cotton, sugar and copper. Thirdly, 
these are examined almost exclusively in order to assess 
how the future foodstuff and industrial requirements of 
the EEC countries for imports of such commodities 
from Latin America and elsewhere might be affected 
after the Common Market has been in existence for some 
time. 
3. Prospects of future growth for Latin 
American exports 
In the future, as in the past, Latin America will be 
preoccupied with the growth potential in both its domestic 
and external trade sectors. As regards the latter, the 
twenty republics as a whole will necessarily continue to 
rely heavily on export prospects in the United States and 
European markets for the financing of their imports. 
Such prospects in turn will be determined primarily by 
future growth in levels of real income, manufacturing 
production and population in the two industrial areas 
concerned. 
(a) Post-war growth in the industrial centres and fu-
ture expectations. Since the Second World War, economic 
expansion in the United States and Europe has con-
tributed directly to the large and growing volume of 
Latin America's export trade. The average annual in-
crease (3.75 per cent) in the real product of the United 
States is comparable to that of the boom years in the 
1920s, while the rate of 5.3 per cent per annum in West-
ern Europe has surpassed the record of that period. In 
fact, post-war income growth in both areas has proceeded 
at a strikingly quicker pace than the average for the past 
80 or 100 years. A number of special factors have stimu-
lated growth recently, however, and according to some 
projections by OEEC, the rate of growth is likely to be 
about 3 per cent in the near future. The effects of the 
creation of the Common Market are unpredictable, but, 
if it is successful, the results will show themselves in 
somewhat faster rates of growth than would otherwise 
occur. 
(b) Anticipated growth in Western European imports. 
The growth in the gross national product of the industrial 
areas should be reflected in the volume of their primary 
commodity imports. According to recent GATT estimates, 
these should increase by 50-60 per cent from 1953-55 to 
1973-75.^ This in turn would further accentuate the pres-
ent predominance of Western Europe among world im-
porters of primary commodities. Generally speaking, the 
European trade categories most likely to increase by 
1973-75 include petroleum (despite the creation of 
EURATOM), followed by minerals and, finally, tropical 
beverages. Prospects for natural fibres are uncertain, 
mainly due to competition from synthetics and those for 
temperate zone commodities seem least favourable of all, 
depending upon the agricultural policy of the Common 
Market as finally formulated. The inclusion, in the Com-
mon Market structure, of French and Belgian depend-
encies in Africa need not however necessarily reduce the 
volume of Latin American exports of tropical commodi-
ties to EEC countries. Even shifts in their relative shares 
could be of a minor nature so long as EEC import demand 
grows, for past experience indicates that preferential 
arrangements lead to major shifts only for commodities 
facing a declining demand. Conversely, Latin American 
temperate zone commodities might be more vulnerable in 
view of the possibility that Western Europe may achieve 
greater self-sufficiency in foodstuff production. 
4. The African supply potential 
In addition to the demand originating from the Com-
mon Market countries, Latin America's future exports of 
coffee, cacao, bananas, cotton, sugar and copper will also 
depend on the extent to which supplies are available for 
export from EEC dependencies in Africa.® Within these 
dependencies, various factors may limit the degree to 
which primary production can be expanded. Although 
extensive areas of land exist, most are of medium or low 
fertility and receive only irregular amounts of annual 
rainfall. Many of the indigenous peoples have a high 
incidence of illiteracy and illness and a shifting and primi-
tive system of land tenure and cultivation that often yields 
little or no surplus production for trade. Finally, taken 
as a whole, the region is deficient in basic facilities rang-
ing from education and medical services to transport and 
power networks. In recent years, however, active steps 
have been taken to increase output and consumption in 
Africa by providing both social capital and directly pro-
ductive investments as well as by stimulating local tech-
nical proficiency. Thus, while topographical, sociological, 
financial and technical shortcomings have obstructed 
African primary production in the past, there is consider-
able scope for expansion in the future. 
4 GATT estimates that, on optimistic assumptions concerning 
the effects of the Common Market, inputs may reach a level 50 
percent higher than otherwise. 
5 Tropical cane sugar is an exception, not only because of 
Europe's domestic beet industry, but also since the African de-
pendencies as a whole are net importers of sugar. 
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In so far as this will increase Africa's output of the 
six commodities mentioned above, Latin America is un-
derstandably concerned for two reasons. Firstly, these 
commodities represented about one-half of all Latin 
American primary exports during 1952-56, yielding ap-
proximately $3,600 million annually during those five 
years. Secondly, if a larger share of EEC imports of 
primary commodities comes from Africa in the future, 
Latin America's share will thereby be reduced. During 
1952-56, for instance, 18 per cent of Latin America's 
exports of these six primary commodities were purchased 
by the EEC countries, averaging $630 million annually. 
5. Commodity prospects 
In view of the above circumstances, the six individual 
commodity analyses conclude with the following general 
and specific findings. 
(a) General. Rising levels of income in the EEC coun-
tries, in both aggregate and per capita terms, will stimu-
late demand for the commodities under review. In general, 
a larger share of this demand will tend to be met by the 
EEC dependencies in Africa and a smaller share by Latin 
America. This conclusion seems warranted on two broad 
grounds. First, production of most of these commodities 
in the African dependencies has increased substantially 
since the Second World War, and further expansion will 
undoubtedly continue in the future. Secondly, to the 
extent that common tariffs are introduced, the African 
dependencies will receive preferential treatment over 
Latin America. Of course production trends and tariff 
preferences will vary in magnitude as between com-
modities and countries. Furthermore, depending upon 
future trends of income and manufacturing production, 
it is possible that EEC imports from the twenty republics 
will be higher in absolute even though lower in relative 
terms than if the Common Market were not created. To 
the extent that a growing volimie of exports from the 
African dependencies moves to Europe, a greater propor-
tion of Latin American exports could move to the United 
States market (though this would mean still greater re-
liance on a single market and frustrate plans for geo-
graphical diversification). 
(b) Specific. In the specific cases of coffee, cacao, and 
bananas, production in the EEC African dependencies 
has increased considerably in the post-war decade, and 
there are many indications that this will continue. In all 
three cases, moreover, preferential tariff treatment may 
modify existing trade patterns in such a way that an 
increased proportion of EEC imports will eventually come 
from the African dependencies.® In any event, while such 
production and tariff factors might reduce the proportion 
which Latin America now provides of EEC coffee, cacao 
and banana imports, considerable prospects exist for an 
increase in the aggregate EEC import volume of all three 
items, including the volume originating from Latin 
America. 
In the cases of cotton and copper, future Common 
market tariff rates will be nil or negligible, and Latin 
® The final impact of tariff levies on consumption will be af-
fected, however, by internal taxes or subsidies which are not gov-
erned specifically by the Rome Treaty. 
American countries should therefore face no institutional 
disadvantages as compared with producers in the African 
dependencies, Latin America's principal concern will be 
rather the prospective production developments in Africa 
and the important technological trends that have already 
been taking place in connexion with synthetic fibres, on 
the one hand, and aluminum substitutes, on the other. 
As regards sugar, the EEC tropical dependencies in 
Africa are now net importers rather than exporters. Even 
though competition from Africa will not be a factor, the 
prospects for increased EEC sugar imports are uncertain 
due both to continued high levies and to the fact that the 
EEC countries produce most of their own sugar. 
Latin America will, it seems, be affected as much, if 
not more, by future levels of African production as by the 
prospective Common Market tariff structure. Of course, 
in addition to the EEC dependencies, account must also 
be taken of the products of other parts of the world 
which will be competing with those of Latin America 
within the EEC tariff area. Reference to such commodities 
is made in section IV, but a more detailed analysis of 
the over-all competitive position of Latin America's ex-
ports is outside the scope of this study. 
In order to maintain its competitive status, Latin 
America will find it progressively more important to keep 
production costs low while simultaneously maintaining 
the highest possible standards of quality. 
6. Significance of future EEC agricultural policies 
Since the Second World War, agriculture in Western 
Europe has been undergoing a technological revolution 
similar in form to that which occurred in the United 
States just before and after the war. European crop yields, 
for example, are rising through the use of better seed, 
improved cultivation techniques, stricter control of disease 
and pests, and by the increased application of fertilizers. 
In addition, there has been a marked shift to mechanical 
power, the number of tractors on farms having increased 
more than eightfold since before the war in the EEC area. 
Not only has this permitted a reduction in farm labour, 
but, by shifting feed formerly eaten by work animals to 
cattle, hogs and poultry, the necessity for certain tradi-
tional imports has been reduced. Although such improve-
ments in European farm technology occurred prior to 
the creation of the Common Market, the removal of EEC 
trade barriers will encourage further readjustments and 
the output of specialized farm products. Furthermore, the 
unification of EEC agricultural agencies should speed up 
research and extension, and the centralized agricultural 
marketing and purchasing agencies foreshadowed in the 
Rome Treaty could strongly influence the future com-
position of European agricuhural imports. Indeed, in-
creased agricultural production in Europe has already 
played an important role in curtailing imports. This 
readjustment is by no means complete. Depending on the 
evolving pattern of EEC agricidtural policies and prac-
tices, Latin American exports of temperate zone com-
modities may well be affected. Therefore, it becomes ever 
more important that the republics concerned should give 
closer attention to rationalizing their production and to 
reducing their costs. 
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I I I . THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
1. Post-war economic growth of Western Europe'' 
The high level and general upward trend in Latin 
American exports in the post-war years must be attributed 
mainly to developments in the great industrial areas of 
the world. It can be assumed that this causal relationship 
will continue to be of paramount importance to Latin 
America. 
Throughout this study, and unless otherwise specified, the 
term "Western Europe" means the metropolitan member countries 
of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) , 
namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal 
Republic) , Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. 
Historically, the post-war growth of production in the 
industrial countries has been exceptional in its magni-
tude, particularly if account is taken of the fact that by 
now the upswing has lasted for more than a decade. Even 
on the basis of statistics starting after production on the 
European continent had generally regained the pre-war 
level, it appears that post-war economic growth has been 
nearly everywhere more intense than during the boom of 
the 1920s. This expansion is strikingly greater than the 
average rate of growth of the last 80 or 100 years when 
the bulk of the productive plant of Western Europe and 
North America® was created (see table 2 ) . 
8 Comprising the United States and Canada. 
Table 2 
ANNUAL CUMULATIVE RATE OF GROWTH OF REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
IN SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
(Perceniages) 




Germany (post-war Federal 
RepubUc) 1860-1913 
1913-1954 
Italy ; 1860-1900 
1901-1953 
Netherlands 1900-1954 




United Kingdom 1870-1954 
North America 
Canada 1870-1952 
United States 1869/78-1953 
Growth 
in the mOs 
Growth since 
















1924-29 3.5 1949-55 4.8 
1927-29 2.0 1950-55 9.3 
1918-28 4.0 1950-55 5.5 
1919-29 4.1 1948-55 4.5 
1921-29 2.6 1948-55 2.6 
1925-30 5.1 1947-55 3.5 
1920-29 2.25 1948-55 4.3 
1920-29 1.25 1948-55 2.9 
1919-29 2.4 1948-56 5.0 
1920-29 3.9 1948-55 3.7£ 
Source: International Bank, Economic Staff, Statistical Tables on Economic Growth, 8 March 
1956, on the basis of published sources indicated therein, and subsequent revision. 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate rough estimates. 
It is for this reason that, referring to the economic 
advance of Western Europe in recent years, the OEEC 
notes that "comparable rates of growth have probably 
never been sustained in the past by developed economies 
starting from high levels of economy activity".® As a 
gauge, it may be noted that a 3 per cent cumulative rate 
of growth, if not interrupted, should lead to a doubling 
of the national product every 23 years. 
During 1949-1955, Western Europe as a whole ex-
panded its output of goods and services at an annual rate 
of 5.3 per cent, which is more rapid than the post-war 
growth in the United States (average 3.75 per cent in 
1948-55). Europe's advance was comparable to that of 
Latin America (5.9 per cent yearly in 1946-55) even 
though its production base was considerably broader than 
that of the latter area.^" 
Manufacturing production was responsible to a very 
large extent for Üie post-war rise in the net national 
product in Western Europe. In some countries such as 
the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and Italy, manufacturing accounted for more than half 
of the increase of the net national product (see table 3) . 
It is precisely this activity which, through its demand for 
raw materials and fuels, constitutes the main factor de-
termining the volume of Europe's imports from non-
industrial areas.^ ^ Moreover, the level of manufacturing 
output, through its efifect on incomes, has an important 
bearing on food imports. 
^Eighth Report of the OEEC: Europe Today and in 1960, 
Vol. II, page 126 (Paris, 1957). 
1® Area averages from Statistical Tables on Economic Growth, 
op. cit., and subsequent revision. 
11 The yearly average in 1953-55 for Western Europe's net im-
ports of primary commodities from non-industrial areas was 3,980 
million dollars for foodstuffs, 4,000 million for raw materials and 
1,330 million for fuels (see GATT, International Trade 1956, 
table 6, Geneva, 1957). 
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Table 11 
INCREASE IN NET NATIONAL PRODUCT IN SELECTED 
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SINCE PRE-WAR» 
Index number 
for 1955 






Belgium 129»> 34.0 
26.0 
France 138» 30.4 
Germany (Federal Republic) . . . 178 50.2 
Italy 150 51.2 
Norway . 159 39.5" 
United Kingdom ,. 134 56.6 
Source: ECE, Economic Survey of Europe in 1956, chapter VII, 
tables 3 and 5 (Geneva, 1957). 
«1938, except for the United Kingdom, 1937; Germany, 1936; 
Belgium, 1936-38. 
b in 1954. 
° Includes electricity, gas and water. 
Western Europe's economic expansion since its reco-
very must be attributed in part to a fuller utilization of 
its productive resources. Thus, idle plant capacity has 
largely disappeared, new capacity has been added and 
labour resources, except for a substantial residue in Italy, 
have been absorbed. TTie expansion has also been due in 
part to the absorption of wartime technical advances. 
Consequently, even if adequate demand is maintained in 
the future, it is difficult to anticipate that production can 
continue to increase at the same rate as in recent years. 
It should be emphasized that the six EEC coimtries 
have been growing in recent years at a substantially more 
rapid rate than the rest of Western Europe. The more 
dynamic role of the EEC countries taken as a whole is 
indicated by the following percentage increases during 
the period 1950-56. 
'Rest of Western WesteTti Europe 
Mining production 
Manufacturing 
Agricultural production® . . 
Value of imports, c.i.f. . . . 
Value of exports, f.o.b. 
EEC countries Europe as 0 whole 
36 16 28 
72 26 51 
18 11 15 
99 55 76 
116 57 85 
Source: OEEC and United Nations publications; data compiled 
by GATT in Trade Intelligence Paper No. 6, table 1 (Geneva, 
December 1957). 
a Until 1955/56. 
2. Long-term projections of economic growth 
in the industrial areas 
In order to project future developments in various 
economic sectors, particularly in the foreign trade of the 
world's two main industrial areas, certain assumptions 
relating to economic and population growth have been 
made by various national and international bodies.^^ The 
The projections in question include the so-called "Paley Re-
port" dealing with the United States economy (Resources for 
Freedom, A Report to the President by the President's Materials 
Policy Commission, June 1952) ; the so-called "Gordon Report" 
{Preliminary Report, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic 
Prospects, December 1956); two OEEC studies dealing with 
Europe's prospects: Europe's Growing Needs of Energy—How Can 
They Be Met? (May 1956) and Europe Today and in 1960 (Vol-
ume II of the Eighth Report of the OEEC, April 1957); and one 
by the European Steel and Coal Community, Memorandum sur la 
long-term assumptions cover a period of 20 to 25 years 
and are based on a "reasonable" rate of economic grovrth. 
These correspond to a cumulative annual increase of 3 
per cent of the gross national product in Western Europe 
and 3.25 per cent in North America. 
The projections in question have one common feature: 
the economies of both Western Europe and North America 
have been assumed to grow at a rate faster than their 
average over the past 80 or 100 years, but clearly less 
than the exceptionally high rate which has prevailed since 
the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, it is 
anticipated that output in North America will increase 
somewhat more than in Western Europe, but so will popu-
lation in the former, with the result that the gap in per 
capita income between the two areas will remain, in 
relative terms, practically the same. These projections are 
summarized in table 4, 
Table 4 
ASSUMED RATES OF ECONOMIC AND POPULATION 
GROWTH IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 
1953-55 TO 1973-75 




Gross national product (1,000 mil-
lions of dollars) 203 
Population (millions) 282 
Per capita income (dollars) 720 
North America 
Gross national product (1,000 mil-
lions of dollars) 400 
Population (millions) 177 

















Source: GATT, International Trade 1956, op. cit., table 7. 
Note: GATT notes that the gross national product of Western 
Europe is underestimated by being converted into United States 
dollars at official exchange rates. If expressed in comparable pur-
chasing power, European per capita income would be equivalent 
to 40-50 per cent of the North American figure for 1953-55, instead 
of about 32 per cent as is implied in the table. Thus, in terms 
of comparable purchasing power, the projection assumes that the 
Western European per capita income might reach about three-
fourths of the present North American level within about twenty 
years. 
The difficulty of maintaining the same rate of expansion 
after a fuller degree of utilization of resources has been 
attained is illustrated in the case of Western Europe. 
In the OEEC countries, the 26.5 per cent increase in the 
gross national product in 1951-55 was accounted for by 
an 8.5 per cent increase in the labour supply and by a 
16.6 per cent increase in productivity. During 1956-60, 
mainly due to the previous absorption of unemployment 
and to the anticipated changes in the age structure of the 
population, the labour supply is expected to increase by 
definition des objectifs généraux de la Communauté, in its 
Journal Ofjiciel, 20 May 1957. These projections have been re-
examined and collated by GATT in an analysis of the long-term 
market prospects for primary commodities in Western Europe and 
North America, contained in its annual report International Trade 
1956 (June 1956), which has been used here. The import projec-
tions were subsequently revised by GATT in Trade IrUelligence 
Paper No. 6 (December 1957) which distinguishes between the 
Common Market countries and the rest of Western Europe. 
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only 2.8 per cent. The anticipated increase in productivity 
will have to depend mainly on new investment and is 
expected to be about 14 per cent. As a result of these two 
factors, the increase in the gross national product is ex-
pected to be only 17.4 per cent.^ ® 
Western Europe's post-war growth of production has, 
been appreciably stimulated by international action which 
in some countries and during some years proved to be 
decisive. This took the form of United States economic 
aid and of a concerted effort, undertaken by the European 
nations themselves, to reduce the obstacles to intra-
European payments and trade. By now external economic 
assistance has practically come to an end, but the pro-
moters of the European Economic Community hope to 
replace the impulse from abroad by the advantages of 
large-scale production and other internal stimuli to eco-
nomic development. Qne of the non-quantifiable factors, 
which undoubtedly has played an important role in the 
expansion of Western European manufacturing since the 
end of the reconstruction phase, has been the backlog of 
technical innovations in production for civilian use which 
had been accumulating for nearly a decade. The intro-
duction of technical innovations in a number of countries 
is now being increasingly hampered by the limited size 
of the domestic market. Large-scale production, which is 
expected to be encouraged by the creation of the Com-
munity, would expand again the scope for the assimila-
tion of technological innovations and, in turn, would 
stimulate the latter. 
Under these circiunstances it may be that the antici-
pated rate of Western Europe's economic development, 
conceived as the aggregate of projections of the various 
national economies in question, will be exceeded when 
the institutional machinery of the Community begins to 
operate. A fuller utilization of the factors of production 
(frequently to be achieved by redistributing them) would 
be facilitated by a further strengthening of the economic 
co-operation among the Western European countries and 
particularly by such arrangements as the creation of the 
Common Market and a free-trade area.^^ 
The higher rate of growth of the six countries of EEC, 
as compared with the rest of Western Europe, has been 
taken into account in the long-term projection given in 
table 4. The 80 per cent increase in the gross national 
product of Western Europe as a whole over a period of 
twenty years implies an increase of 90 per cent for the 
EEC countries and of only 67 per cent for the rest of the 
area. The GATT secretariat has worked out alternative 
projections on the assumption that the creation of the 
Common Market will accelerate the already rather in-
tensive growth anticipated for the six countries taken 
separately. These countries show, over two decades, an 
increase in their total gross national product of 120 and 
even as much as 150 per cent.^ ® 
3. The changing pattern of trade between 
Latin America and Europe 
The creation of the European Economic Community 
may be expected to have certain effects upon the future 
course of Latin American exports to Western Europe 
13 Eighth Repon of the OEEC, op. cit., Vol. II, table 6, and 
technical note in the Annex, page l37. 
it Ibid., page 126. 
IS GATT, Trade Intelligence Paper No. 6, op. cit., page 33 
et seq. 
which should be seen against the background of past 
changes. 
During the course of the present half century there has 
been a progressive loosening of Latin America's trade 
ties with Europe, a development that has contrasted 
sharply with the steadily growing importance of United 
States trade with the twenty American Republics. In 
1901-05, for instance, the value of Latin America's total 
trade turnover (i.e., exports plus imports) with Europe 
was approximately 140 per cent higher than with the 
United States. In 1928, it was still almost 45 per cent 
higher, but, by the mid-1950s, it was about 40 per cent 
lower. 
This fundamental shift in area shares has been equally 
evident in both Latin America's export and in its import 
trade. At the turn of the century, about two-thirds of 
Latin American imports and almost the same proportion 
of its exports were being transacted with Europe, whereas 
fifty years later less than a third of its trade in each 
direction was with Europe. United States-Latin American 
trade flows during these five decades showed almost 
diametrically opposite changes. Thus, in 1901-05 approxi-
mately one-quarter of Latin American imports came from 
the United States and a slightly higher share of its exports 
went to the United States. Fifty years later both these 
proportions had doubled. 
As might be expected, there have been equally striking 
contrasting movements in the volume of Latin America's 
trade with Europe and the United States over the long 
term. As recently as 1951 for example, Latin American 
exports and imports with Europe, in terms of volume, 
were both well below those existing in 1913. Both exports 
to and imports from the United States, on the other 
hand, were far in excess of the volume levels prevailing 
before the First World War . " 
The most pronounced shifts in the relative trade posi-
tion of Western Europe and Latin America took place as 
a result of the Second World War, Europe absorbed 
slightly more than half of Latin America's aggregate 
exports in 1928 and in 1937-38, whereas it has been 
absorbing about 30 per cent in recent years. Looking at 
the same trade from the opposite point of view, Latin 
America provided slightly more than 10 per cent of total 
Western European imports (including intra-European 
trade) in 1928, some 9 per cent in 1937-38, and between 
6 and 8 per cent from 1950 to the present (see table 5) . 
This was accompanied by an increase in the share of 
Latin American exports absorbed by North America 
(from 30 per cent in 1938 to 51 per cent in 1951-55). 
The manifold reasons underlying such pronounced 
changes in the levels and direction of Latin America's 
foreign trade have been comprehensively studied in other 
publications^^ which also provide a detailed analysis of 
the specific commodities and countries involved. These 
extensive commentaries will therefore not be repeated 
here. To some extent the relative decline of Latin 
i «See the joint ECLA, ECE and FAO publication entitled A 
Study of Trade Between Latin America and Europe, Sales No.: 
1952. 11, Geneva, 1953, tables 3 and 4, page 2. Comparable volume 
series are not available for European-Latin American trade sub-
sequent to 1951. 
IT See especially A Study of Trade Between Latin America and 
Europe, op. cit., and the Economic Surveys of Latin America and 
of Europe, as published by the secretariats of ECLA and ECE, 
respectively. 
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America's exports to Europe is only one facet of the gen-
eral phenomenon of the decreasing share of primary com-
modities in world trade. Thus, despite increasing current 
values (from $16,460 million in 1950 to $22,200 million 
in 1956), exports from the non-industrial to the industrial 
areas of the world constitute a declining share (from 
28.9 per cent to 24.0 per cent) of world exports. This 
relative decline is mainly due to the increase of trade 
among industrial areas which rose from 34.3 per cent to 
40.3 per cent of world exports.i® It is probable that both 
these trends will continue. 
Table 5 
WESTERN EUROPE: TOTAL IMPORTS AND IMPORTS 
FROM LATIN AMERICA 
(Milions of dollars) 
From Latin Latin America as 
Year Total America per cent of total 
1928 17,206.6 1,766.5 10.3 
1937 13,972.3 1,388.0 9.9 
1938 12,740.4 1,044.3 8.2 
1946 14,025.3 1,347.3 9.6 
1947 21,412.0 2,139.7 10.0 
1948 24,836.7 2,387.4 9.6 
1949 24,899.7 1,728.8 6.9 
1950 24,228.9 1,918.3 7.9 
1951 33,514.8 2,493.5 7.4 
1952 32,032.4 1,895.4 5.9 
1953 . . . . 31,204.4 2,099.6 6.7 
1954 33,687.3 2,344.0 7.0 
1955 38,684.4 2,408.8 6.2 
1956 42,586.4 2,848.4 6.7 
Source: OEEC, Foreign Trade by Areas, Series 1, selected issues. 
Note: Total imports include trade among Western European 
countries. 
The decline, relative to the world aggregate, of exports 
from non-industrialized to industrialized areas is only 
partly due to the secular increase in the share of manu-
factured goods entering world trade and to the growing 
significance of synthetic raw materials. An additional 
factor has been the relatively greater increase in the vol-
ume of raw materials in international trade supplied by 
the industrialized countries as compared with those sup-
plied by the non-industrialized areas. Thus, before the 
Second World War the non-industrialized countries sup-
plied 58-59 per cent of the primary commodities imported 
Ijy the industrialized countries and by 1956 their share 
had declined to 56 per cent.^ ® Probably this is the result 
of a more rapid assimilation of technological innovations 
in primary commodity production, mainly in agriculture, 
in the industrial countries as well as of governmental 
measures in such countries in support of agricultural 
incomes. This slow shift in world trade may continue for 
some time, depending particularly on the relative share 
that temperate zone foodstuffs, wool and cotton will have 
in world primary commodity trade. For some individual 
commodities, of course, the share supplied by the indus-
trial countries may increase fairly rapidly. 
The reduced role of the non-industrialized countries, 
taken together, as world suppliers of primary commodi-
ties conceals substantial differences between countries 
which have reached a stage of semi-industrialization and 
those that are still distinctly non-industrialized.^® Partly 
because of the stagnation in demand, and also as a result 
of imbalances in their development process, the semi-
industrialized countries increased the output of their 
main primary commodities entering world trade by only 
12 per cent between the pre-war period and 1954-55, 
while, in the other non-industrialized coimtries, the in-
crease was about 53 per cent, mainly due to a greater 
output of metals and petroleum. Under these circum-
stances greater domestic demand meant that the volume 
of the principal primary commodities exported by the 
semi-industrialized countries actually decreased by 5 per 
cent during the period in question, while that of the other 
non-industrialized countries rose by 58 per cent.^^ Fur-
thermore, the net primary commodity export position of 
some semi-industrialized countries may be greatly weak-
ened by rapidly growing petroleum imports. In Latin 
America this has been particularly true of Brazil and 
Argentina. 
It is also worth noting that only an improvement in 
the terms of trade of the primary producers prevented the 
decline in the volume of exports of the semi-industrial-
ized countries from critically impairing their capacity to 
import manufactured goods; in fact, this capacity in-
creased by some 30 per cent between 1937-38 and 1954-
55. A combination of higher export volumes and im-
proved terms of trade enabled the other non-industrialized 
nations of the world to double the volume of imported 
manufactures during the same period.^^ 
A more specific cause of the relative decline in Latin 
America's exports to Western Europe has been the in-
creased volume of exports from other primary producing 
areas. As indicated above, this was partly due to a 
greater increase in production in other continents. The 
decline was also hastened by preferential arrangements, 
particularly in the 1930s. Such measures were fre-
quently accompanied by policies designed to increase 
self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and certain raw materials. 
Finally, Latin America's trade dependence on North 
America during two world wars, the effects of the ex-
panding network of United States direct investments, and 
the need for financing dollar imports of capital goods and 
other manufactiu-es available from the United States, 
have all facilitated a steadily rising level of exports to 
North America, part of which might otherwise have been 
directed to Europe. 
In recent years, however, there has been a notable 
increase in Latin American exports to Europe, a develop-
ment of considerable importance if it implies a departure 
from the long-term geographical concentration of Latin 
American exports mentioned above. From 1949-50 to 
18 GATT, International Trade, 1956, op. cit., table 2. In Western 
Europe, imports of primary commodities rose from $22,100 million 
in 1951 to $25,000 million in 1956, but their share in the total 
dropped from 66 per cent to 59 per cent. (OEEC, Foreign Trade 
by Areas, series 1, selected issues.) 
i9 /6!¿ . , page 9. 
^^  20 In its examination of the problem, GATT included among the 
"semi-industrialized" countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Aus-
tralia, India, Union of South Africa, Finland, and Yugoslavia, 
which together account for about 80 per cent of manufacturing 
activity outside the industrial area proper. See International Trade, 
1956, op. cit., p. 11. Eastern Europe, the USSR, and the People's 
Republic of China have not been taken into account. 
21 Ibid., table 4. 
22 Ibid., page 13 
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1955-56, for example, the value of exports from the 
twenty Latin American republics to Europe increased at 
a more rapid rate (44 per cent) than did Latin American 
sales to the United States (35 per cent) 
This recovery in Latin American exports to Western 
Europe reflected the area's growing requirements of pri-
mary commodities. As was shown earlier, these require-
ments were essentially the result of the rapidly rising 
level of economic activity, and particularly of manufac-
turing production (see again table 3) . As is typical of 
the economic expansion of industrialized areas, this de-
velopment was characterized by a lag in imports in rela-
tion to the gross national product. Thus, while production 
in Western Europe recovered its pre-war level in about 
1949, its imports from overseas (i.e., excluding intra-
regional trade) did not exceed 1937-38 levels, in terms 
of volume, until 1954. 
23 According to data from the member countries, OEEC im-
ports c.i.f. from Latin America averaged $1,800 million annually 
in 1949-50 and $2,600 million in 1955-56. United States imports 
f.o.b. from Latin America increased from $2,600 million to 
$3,500 million annually during the same period. 
4. Long-term projections of primary commodity im-
ports: possible effects of the creation of EEC 
The anticipated expansion in the gross national pro-
duct in Western Europe will be reflected in the volume 
and composition of the area's commodity imports from 
the rest of the world. These changes have been recently 
analysed by GATT along more general lines which take 
into account the prospective primary commodity imports 
of both Western Europe and North America^^ (see 
table 6) . The projections are for 1973-75 when the transi-
tion period (assuming that it will last 15 years) envisaged 
in the Rome Treaty will have come to an end. They are 
not based on estimates regarding the possible effects of 
the creation of the Community on the Economies of the 
member countries, but on the sum of the various indi-
vidual national projections. 
See Intemational Trade, 1956, op. cit., "Long-Term Market 
Prospects for Primary Products in Western Europe and North 
America", page 17 et seq., and appendix, page 268 ei .seg. The 
analysis is based in part on the assumptions made in the Paley 
Report, the Gordon Report, and the OEEC and ECSC reports 
mentioned in footnote 12. 
Table 6 
WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NET IMPORTS OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES, IN 1953-1955 AND PROJECTED 
FOR 1973-1975 
(Annual averages in 1,000 millions of dollars, fx.h., at 1953-1955 prices) 
Western Europe North America Total 
Commodity groups ¿953-55 1973-75 1953-SS Í97S-7S 1953-55 1973-75 
Food 
Coffee, tea, cacao 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.6 3.2 4.6 
Fruits and vegetables 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.4 
Other food» 2.9 2.2 4.8 —1.3 - 4 . 9 —1.9 1.6 —2.7 +2 .9 
J A 
T O T A L 5.0 5.4 8.0 0.6 —2.1 +0.9 5.6 3.3 8.9 
Raw materials and fuels 
Fuels 1.5 4.3 0.4 0.5 1.9 4.8 
2.2 0.65 0.8 1.65 3.0 
Natural textile fibres 2.1 1.7 —0.15 —0.15 —0.95 1.95 1.55 0.75 
Rubber , . 0.35 0.35 0.7 0.75 
Other materials 1.25 (1.9) —0.1 (0) 1.15 1.9 
T O T A L 6.20 (10.6) 1.15 (1.40) (0.60) ' 7.35 ' 12.0 11.2 ' 
1 
Grand total primary commodities . , , 11.2 16.0 18.6 1.75 —1.5 -f2.3 12.95 14.5 20.9 
Source: GATT, International Trade 1956, op. cit., tables 8 and 10. 
a Including oilseeds, oils, fats and tobacco. 
Note: Minus sign is for net exports. 
Of interest to Latin Americá is the likelihood that 
Western Europe, at present the world's largest net im-
porter of primary commodities, will import on a rela-
tively even greater scale in the long run. As early as 
1953-55 Western Europe's net imports of primary com-
modities constituted 86.4 per cent of the total as com-
pared with 13.6 per cent for North America. Even 
though such proportions, based on net trade, conceal the 
importance of North America as a market for primary 
commodities, because of the sizeable exports of the latter 
area, the projections for 1973-75 indicate that Western 
Europe's role is likely to be strengthened. Thus a high 
and rising level of economic activity in Western Europe 
is important to the primary producing countries in gen-
eral from the point of view of earning adequate amoimts 
of foreign exchange. 
The picture resulting from the import projections is 
necessarily a very broad one. The degree of uncertainty 
as to anticipated levels of imports varies from one com-
modity group to another, since, in several instances, 
these levels depend primarily on Western Europe's own 
output of the commodities in question or of their sub-
stitutes. The widest variation is to be found in foodstuffs 
(excluding tropical products) due mainly to the marginal 
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character of such imports. For instance, in 1953-55, the 
net value of food production in Western Europe was 
$25,200 million per year and imports of foodstuffs (ex-
cluding coffee, tea, cacao and fruits and vegetables) 
amounted to $2,000 million. It is estimated that, twenty 
years from then, local food production (at constant 
prices) might be valued at between $36,100 million and 
$38,700 million, as a result of which imports (excluding 
the categories just mentioned) could vary within the 
wide range of $2,200 - $4,800 million. In turn, the level 
of foodstuff production in Europe will depend very largely 
on the agricultural policy, at present defined in very 
general terms only, which the EEC countries will follow 
and in which political and other non-economic considera-
tions are likely to play a role. The issues involved are 
discussed in section V. It can also be surmised that, 
should foreign exchange stringency compel the EEC 
countries to reduce imports, the first group of primary 
commodities to be affected by any restrictive measure 
would be temperate zone foodstuffs. 
Technological innovations may cause a considerable 
change in the anticipated demand for certain commodities 
—particularly natural textile fibres (mainly cotton) and 
rubber—which are facing increasing competition from 
synthetics. Among metals, copper may suffer a relative 
displacement by aluminium. The effect of institutional 
and technological factors on import projections is also 
illustrated by the creation of Euratom which led to a 
recent revision of the GATT estimate of Western Europe's 
future production and imports of conventional fuels. For 
1973-75 the latter projection has been reduced from an 
annual average of $4,300 million to $3,400 million (at 
1953-55 prices f.o.b.) This in itself implies a reduction 
of about 6 per cent in Western Europe's net primary com-
modity import projections. 
As stated earlier, an 80 per cent increase in the gross 
national product in Western Europe as a whole between 
1953-55 and 1973-75 implies a 90 per cent increase for 
the EEC countries. The possible effect of such an expan-
sion in the primary commodity imports of the six mem-
ber countries is shown separately in the second column 
of table 7. However, the creation of the Common Market 
may provide an additional stimulus to the economic 
growth of the six countries. The possible targets, namely, 
an increase of 120 or 150 per cent over their combined 
gross national product of 1953-55 would, in turn, be 
reflected in a significant manner in their imports of pri-
mary commodities. Such hypothetical levels are shown, 
in order of magnitude, in the last two columns of table 7. 
A Target for Euratom, Report submitted by Louis Armand, 
Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordani at the request of the Govern-
ments of Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands (May 1957). The conclusions of 
this report have been taken into account by GATT in its Trade 
Intelligence Paper No. 6, op. cit. 
Table 7 
WESTERN EUROPE: PROJECTED ANNUAL AVERAGE NET IMPORTS OF 
PRIMARY COMMODITIES, 1973-75 
(1,000 mJlliom of dollars, f.o.b.) 
Common Market, assuming GNP to be the following 
Western Europe percentages of the level in 1953-55 
outside the — 
Common Market 190 220 250 
Fuels 2.2 0.5 1.15 1.85 
Ores and metals 0.9 1.25 1.5 1.8 
Natural textile fibres 0.5 1.25 1.45 1.65 
Natural rubber (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) 
Wood and pulp - 0 . 1 1.0 1.2 1.45 
Other materials (0.45) (0.55) (0.65) (0.8) 
Raw materials 1.95 4.35 5.2 6.2 
Coffee, tea, cacao 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Fruits and vegetables ( ( A 0.0 0.0 0.0 
J 3.4 ; B 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Other foodstuffs ( ( C 2.8 2.8 2,8 
J. A A 
Total foodstuffs 4.4 1.0 3.8 1.1 3.9 1.2 4.0 
A A A 
Total primary commodities 8.55 5.85 8.05 7.45 10.25 ' 9.25 12.05 
Source: GATT, Trade Intelligence Paper No. 6, op. cit., table 11. 
Note: The sources and methods used in arriving at the 1973-75 estimates are the same as in 
International Trade 1956, with the exception of projected fuel imports in. respect of which account 
has been taken of new estimates published in A Target for Euratom. The three sets of net import 
figures shown for foodstuffs other than coffee, tea, cacao, and the resulting ranges in the total 
foodstuff and total primary commodity figures, are purely notional. They indicate three different 
net import volumes—the same for each of the three GNP levels shown—as follows: A = net imports 
nil; B = net imports of the same volume as in 1953-55; C=: net imports of twice the volume of 
1953-55. 
It should be home in mind that different levels of gross national product will result in changes 
in agricultural productivity in EEC countries which in turn may influence the import of primary 
commodities along somewhat different lines than those indicated in the table above. 
The free access which exports from the EEC depend-
encies to the six member countries will enjoy gives rise 
to the concern that this preferential arrangement will 
reduce the share which other primary producing areas 
will obtain in this important and expanding market. In 
this respect the findings of GATT on the general impact 
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of the liberalization of intra-European trade effected 
under the sponsorship of OEEC in recent years should 
serve as a useful precedent.®' 
The principal finding, based on statistical evidence, is 
that between 1951 and 1955, when most of the liberaliza-
tion programme was carried out, there has been, with 
two exceptions, no substantial diversion of imports from 
non-European to European sources. '^^  Consequently, even 
though the OEEC trade liberalization programme is held 
in some quarters to be "discriminatory", there is no 
evidence that during the period in question it has pro-
duced a significant diversion of imports in favour of the 
participating countries. The fact that the two major 
classes in which a diversion took place in favour of 
OEEC sources were at the same time among the few in 
which OEEC imports declined leads GATT to the tenta-
tive conclusion that "discriminatory (or preferential) 
arrangements are more likely to result in trade diversion 
while total trade values are falling than while they are 
rising". Thus, so long as the promise that Western 
Europe's steady economic growth and expanding imports 
of primary commodities is fulfilled, the relative position 
of Latin American exports in that area need not be seri-
ously imperilled even in those commodity classes in which 
African suppliers are granted preferential treatment. 
Under such circumstances, the main reason for any de-
cline in Latin America's share of the EEC market, should 
it occur, would have to be sought in a slower growth of 
its exportable surplus as compared to that of Africa. 
Finally, it may be noted that a diversion of African 
exports to EEC countries may create a gap in non-
European markets, notably in the United States, which 
exports from Latin America or from other competitive 
areas would be called upon to fill.^® Thus, trade diversion 
by itself need not directly affect the total exports of 
Latin America. Producers in the area, however, would be 
affected by an expansion in the volume of African exports 
due to a diversion of trade to Europe, unless this were 
offset by an increased demand for imports. 
In the light of the probable trends indicated in the im-
port projections, and leaving aside the effects which the 
EEC might have, divergent prospects may be discerned 
in the export volume of most Latin American countries 
over approximately the next fifteen years. As an exporter 
of petroleum and iron ore, Venezuela probably has the 
most favourable outlook in the area. Next are those 
countries which are significant exporters of minerals, 
namely, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, The future prospects 
for Peruvian and especially Mexican cotton exports, how-
ever, will, depend substantially on future United States 
export policy. The third group is constituted by countries 
in whose exports coffee and/or bananas play a dominant 
role, namely, Brazil, Colombia, and Central America. The 
26 See International Trade, 1956, op. cit., "The Development of 
Intra-European Trade in Recent Years", page 35 et seq. 
In this context "diversion" is understood to mean a change 
in the percentage share of a given commodity class supplied by 
European as compared to non-European sources. The two major 
exceptions were cereals and textile fibres. The decline of cereal 
imports from outside OEEC from $2,040 million to |1,580 million 
and from 93 per cent to 86 per cent of total cereal imports was 
due mainly to increased wheat exports from France. The decline 
of textile fibres from $3,620 million to $2,490 million and from 
86 per cent to 83 per cent of total fibre imports was largely due to 
synthetic fibres traded among OEEC countries. 
See, for instance, section IV, point 2. 
prospects of the Caribbean sugar-exporting republics will 
apparently depend more than ever before on the United 
States market. The least favourable future, in relative 
terms, seems to face the countries with temperate-zone 
agricultural exports (Argentina and Uruguay). 
The export prospects, in terms of volume, of the vari-
ous categories of primary commodities provide only a 
rough and frequently unreliable indication as to the 
future course of any particular country's export earnings. 
The latter will be determined, specifically, by the size of 
its export surpluses and by the unit prices involved. No 
realistic appraisal can be made of the long-term prospects 
of either. Nevertheless, some trends may be discerned 
regarding terms of trade which are of special relevance 
from the aspect of the economic development of the pri-
mary producers. The general trend since pre-war has 
been a favourable one for the countries of this group, 
and the creation of the EEC should constitute, from their 
point of view, a sustaining element for two reasons: first, 
the higher level of economic industrial activity anticipated 
for the EEC countries should be a strengthening factor 
for primary commodities taken as a whole; secondly, 
Western Europe's high import requirements and its tech-
nological progress, which may be accelerated within the 
Community, should provide the elements for keener com-
petition among exporters of manufactured goods, result-
ing in a downward pressure on their prices.^® 
On the other hand, the EEC will contribute to speciali-
zation in production not only among its member coun-
tries, but probably also abroad. Thus, the semi-industrial-
ized countries of the world, including those of Latin 
America, will find it more difficult to compete in third 
markets with the manufactures of the industrialized coun-
tries. Under such circumstances, trade in manufactured 
goods among Latin American countries will have to flow 
through sheltered channels to a greater extent than would 
otherwise be the case. By the same token, in Latin 
America, the ultimate users or consumers of manufac-
tured goods imported from within that area are likely to 
feel that their contribution to the industrialization of the 
region is proportionately more burdensome. 
Long-term projections of primary commodity imports 
for specific supplying areas are not feasible. Nevertheless, 
in the sections that follow, six commodities—coffee, 
cacao, bananas, cotton, sugar and copper—which are 
produced both in Latin America and in the French and 
Belgian dependencies in Africa—are analysed mainly 
from the point of view of their future competitive posi-
tion in the Common Market. 
Before selected commodities are discussed individually, 
the following outline will help to place in its proper per-
spective their over-all importance from the respective 
viewpoints of the Latin American export and of the EEC 
import trade in these same commodities. 
The six commodities cover all the major Latin Ameri-
can tropical exports and one of its important minerals. 
Together they accounted for 55 per cent of Latin 
America's primary commodity, exports during the period 
1952-56. The balance was mainly represented by petro-
leum (27 per cent) and temperate-zone products (14 
per cent). 
29 This should not preclude, for instance, the possibility of a 
relative rise in the prices of capital goods in the event of an 
investment boom. 
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On the basis of partial data, it may be estimated that 
Latin American exports of these six commodities to all 
areas averaged about $3,600 million annually, at current 
values, between 1952 and 1956. Almost 75 per cent was 
sold to the United States and EEC Europe. However, in 
contrast to the large share (approximately 56 per cent) 
that was absorbed by the United States, less than 18 per 
cent was directed to EEC member countries. The balance 
of 26 per cent was accounted for mainly by the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and intra-Latin American 
trade. 
The 18 per cent of Latin American exports absorbed 
by EEC Europe represented an annual average value of 
$630 million during the five years 1952-56. The two 
main commodities involved in this trade were coffee and 
cotton, which alone accounted for 70 per cent of Latin 
American exports of the six commodities to EEC Europe. 
Viewing this same trade from the side of the EEC im-
porters, table 8 shows that Latin America is a most im-
portant source of supply for the commodities under 
review. Thus, 28 per cent of all EEC imports of these 
six primary commodities came from Latin America, as 
compared with only 20 per cent from EEC dependent ter-
ritories in Africa and 14 per cent from all other African 
regions. 
Table 8 
EEC COUNTRIES' IMPORTS OF SIX PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN 1952-56, BY MAIN GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
(Annual averages in millions of dollars and in percentages) 
From Africa 
From Latin America Total EEC dependencies From other areas 
Total per cent of per cent of per cent of per cent of 
Commodity Value Value total Value total Value total Value total 
Coffee , . 513.3 229.0 58.3 172.5 33.6 126.2 24.6 41.8 8.1 
Sugar 123.3 52.6 42.7 22.3 18.1 0.2 0.1 48.4 39.3 
152.7 19.2 194.0 24.3 53.2 6.7 450.4 56.3 
Copper 539.8 63.7 11.8 205.1 38.0 156.7 29.0 271.0 50.2 
Bananas 105.1 33.6 32.0 39.4 37.5 37.5 35.7 32.1 30.5 
27.6 15.9 137.1 78.8 74.1 42.6 9.3 5.3 
G R A N D TOTAL , 2,252.6 629.2 27.9 770.4 34.2 447.9 19.9 853.0 37.9 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
Moreover, Latin America's importance as a source of 
supply for the EEC countries varies as between com-
modities: Latin America at present provides 10-20 per 
cent of total EEC imports of cotton, cacao and copper, 
and from 30 to 60 per cent of coffee, sugar and bananas. 
It is also of interest to note that Latin America's share in 
total EEC imports of coffee, sugar and cotton at present 
exceeds the share of the EEC dependencies in Africa. 
Latin America therefore occupies a relatively more 
important position as a supplier (of the six commodities) 
for EEC Europe than EEC Europe as a market for Latin 
America. 
I V . SELECTED PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
1. Introduction 
In this section a brief review will be made of the con-
ditions under which coffee, cacao, bananas, sugar, cotton 
and copper are produced in the African dependencies of 
the EEC countries and, so far as they are now foreseeable, 
the prospects for their expansion in the future. 
The African dependencies that are taken into account 
here include the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, 
French West Africa, French Togoland, French Equatorial 
Africa, French Cameroons and the islands of Madagascar 
and Réunion. Their combined area amounts, in round 
figures, to 10.6 million square kilometres as compared 
with 20.0 million square kilometres for the Latin Ameri-
can republics.^" The arable land and land planted to 
tree crops in the African dejiendencies is reported to be 
102 million hectares, as compared with 85 million for 
Latin America. But these figures tell very little until 
®® United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1956, page 140 et 
seq. 
account is taken of the characteristics of the land: its 
fertility, its climate and its topography. 
Although the quality of the soil in these regions varies 
widely, most of it is of indifferent or poor fertility. 
Again, the rainfall is irregular and the dates when the 
rainy season begins and ends are uncertain. Thus, natural 
resources, though extensive, are generally of poor quality. 
In addition to these drawbacks, the population, con-
sisting of 50 million—mostly indigenous inhabitants— 
in 1957 is widely scattered and not numerous enough to 
make efficient use of the natural resources available. 
Moreover they use very primitive cultivation methods, 
and the prevailing type of agriculture is a shifting system 
in which the crop land is abandoned when yields decline 
and the farmers move to virgin land. Under these con-
ditions most of the effort of the local population is 
required merely to provide themselves with food and 
shelter, leaving but little time for the production of cash 
crops. Their indigenous inhabitants are not slow to learn 
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improved methods, however, when these can be applied 
under their conditions. 
Another main difficulty is the lack of social overhead 
capital for roads, railways, schools, experimental stations 
and extension services, and of private capital for the 
purchase of equipment and materials. Anticipated public 
expenditures, to be financed largely by the metropolitan 
countries and supplemented later by the EEC special 
development fund, are expected to remedy these deficien-
cies somewhat. The Governments of France and Belgium 
have established agricultural experimental stations and 
their colonial administrations are spending considerable 
sums in efforts to stimulate production with a view to 
raising the standard of living. 
In view of the conditions just described, the elasticity 
of supply of African coffee, cacao or cotton cannot be 
considered in terms of a simple mathematical equation. 
Rather it must be viewed in terms of a dynamic institu-
tional situation in which the assimilation of available 
technology will gradually be improved and in which the 
supply both of private and social capital will be slowly 
growing. 
It appears certain that the rate and direction of prog-
ress will be materially affected by the policies of the 
Governments of France and Belgium as well as those yet 
to be developed by the organized European Economic 
Community. 
2. Coffee 
Latin American producers show more concern about 
the probable effects of the European Common Market 
on the coffee trade than on that of any other commodity. 
This is understandable since, on the one hand, coffee is 
an important export from fourteen of the Latin Ameri-
can republics and, on the other, members of the 
European Economic Community have large dependent 
territories in Africa whose coffee competes directly with 
that of Latin America. 
Value of the Common Market's coffee imports 
Annual coffee imports into the six Common Market 
countries from 1952 to 1956 were valued at $513 million 
in round figures (table 9 ) . Of this amount France ac-
counted for $190 million and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for $147 million. During this period the Fed-
eral Republic's imports were recovering rapidly from the 
effects of the war and, by 1956, they had risen to $198 
million. Of total EEC imports, $299 million came from 
Latin America, with Brazil contributing $173 miUion 
and Colombia $40 million. Africa furnished coffee val-
ued at $173 million, of which $126 million came from 
the dependent territories of France and Belgium. Of the 
total' of $190 million for coffee exports from these de-
pendent territories, France accounted for $110 million. 
Table 9 
COFFEE: VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 





of Germany France'^ • /Caiy« 
Belgium 
Luxembourg Netherlajids 
Total imports 515,280 147,077 190,524 79,259 59,127 37,298 
Source of imports 
Latin America, totaC° 298J965 118,974 70,247 47,763 40,988 20,993 
Brazil 172,961 52,938 59,338 30,852 19,697 10,136 
Colombia 40,305 25.273 2,041 2,396 5,798 4,797 
Costa Rica 15,776 13,748 136 609 741 542 
El Salvador 13,931 11,277 . 21 1,212 400 1,042 
Haiti 19,192 252 4,479 6,072 8,258 131 
Mexico . . . . 10,379 6,84« 1,353 1,499 679 
Africa, total , , , 172,477 20,255 114,887 15,169 10,377 11,789 
EEC dependencies 126,189 2,691 109,847 4,851 8,042 738 
Other Africa 46,288 17,564 5,040 10,318 2,335 11,031 
Other regions 41,837 7,848 5,390 16,321 1,162 4,516 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national slalistics and others listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
1 Provisional. 
b Latin American republics. Total for Latin America includes other countries not listed separately. Coffee exports from the European 
dependencies in the Western Hemisphere are included in "Other regions". 
With post-war recovery practically completed, the 
value of Latin American exports to EEC countries rose 
from $229 million in 1952 to $323 million in 1956. 
Exports to the Federal Republic of Germany were the 
largest component and these increased from $57 million 
in 1952 to $163 million in 1956. 
To provide some perspective: aggregate Latin Amer-
ican coffee exports in 1956 were valued at $1,955 mil-
lion; of this amount exports to the United States were 
$1,313 million, those to Europe $559 million and those 
to other markets $83 million. Within Europe, two-thirds 
of the volume of coffee imports from all sources went to 
the six Common Market countries in 1956.®^ 
Conditions of production 
There are several distinct species of coffee and these 
have many varieties and strains which are variously 
affected by different climatic and soil conditions. Coffea 
31 Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics 1956, 
pages 42 and 48 (New York, 1957). 
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arabica,^^ which grows wild in Ethiopia and adjacent 
high-altitude areas has very specific requirements. On 
the other hand, the Robusta, Liberica, and Excelsa vari-
eties, which originated in the lowlands of Africa, are 
planted down to sea level. The different varieties also 
require other specific conditions in which to thrive. 
Not only the tree, but the product as well, is highly 
sensitive to the treatment it receives. The flavour is af-
fected by the type of processing, the altitude and prob-
ably the type of soil. This seems to account for most of 
the difference in flavour between Colombian and Central 
American wet-processed coffees, on the one hand, and 
the dry-processed coffee of Brazil, on the other. Further-
more, the admixture of green, ripe, and over-ripe berries 
affects the quality, as does enzyme action which may be 
caused by moulds when the coffee is being dried. These 
influences as well as variety differences account for the 
wide spread in market grades and prices. The Latin 
American coffees are nearly all of the Arahica species. 
The African coffees are predominantly, but not entirely, 
of Robusta types which have less flavour and body and 
fetch lower market prices. 
In any discussion of the future of coffee production in 
Africa, mention must be made of the fungus disease 
Hemileia vastatrix.^^ Robusta is more resistant to this 
rust than is Arabica. This is the reason for the displace-
ment of Arabica by Robusta varieties over such a large 
area of Africa, as well as in the other coffee-producing 
areas bordering on the Indian Ocean. 
African producing areas 
Among the difficulties confronting coffee production 
in Africa are the wide variation in types of soil and the 
scarcity of soil of high fertility. In addition, the rainy 
seasons are likely to be irregular, and there are often 
long dry periods which are injurious to the crop. 
The territories under the control of France and Bel-
gium are predominantly lowland areas which produce 
Robusta coffee and some Liberica and Excelsa. There 
are, however, some regions such as Ruanda-Urundi, 
parts of the eastern Belgian Congo and the Cameroons, 
which produce Arabica coffee. 
In most of these dependent areas, coffee is produced 
chiefly by small farmers, who may have anything from 
a dozen trees to a few hectares. The greater part of their 
coffee is poorly processed and is not of uniform quality. 
In French Equatorial Africa and in the Cameroons, how-
ever, about two-thirds of the coffee is produced on plan-
tations operated by Europeans. The same is true of 
about one-third of the coffee grown in the Ivory Coast 
and of the part of the production of the Belgian Congo 
and Ruanda-Urundi. These larger growers are able to 
produce coffee of higher and more uniform quality than 
This species prefers a cool climate with a temperature range 
between 15 and 20°C. It does best in deep loam, well drained and 
well supplied with humus. It needs a relatively humid climate 
with a rainfall of 1,300 to 2,300 mm well distributed throughout 
the year. It is unfavourably affected by temperatures above 30° C. 
This rust disease attacks the leaves of the coffee plant, fre-
quently causing defoliation and death of the plant. Development 
of the disease is especially favoured by low-lying, warm and moist 
localities. It appeared in Ceylon in 1867 and since that time has 
destroyed practically all the cultivated plantations of Arabica coffee 
in that country, in Indonesia, in Madagascar, and on the mainland 
of Africa, except in higher and drier localities such as in Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Kfenya and Ruanda-Urundi. 
that grown by the Africans. Production among the Afri-
cans is, however, expanding in all the areas named. It is 
not improbable that they will gradually improve the 
quality of their product, so far as the genetic character-
istics of the predominant Robusta variety permit. 
Rapid progress has been made in planting coffee in 
French West Africa, especially in the Ivory Coast. Experi-
mental stations have acclimatized about fifty varieties and 
strains of the coffee plant and some of these have proved 
to be of practical importance.^'' In addition, a central 
purchasing agency has tried to grade and improve the 
coffee going to market. Production in this area has risen 
very rapidly. 
Madagascar is an old coffee-producing area. Prior to 
the outbreak there of Hemileia vastatrix in 1873, Arabica 
coffee was raised on the island. At present, very little 
except the Robusta type is produced. Until the Second 
Wor d War, Madagascar was the most important French 
coffee-producing area, but it has now been surpassed by 
French West Africa. 
Account should be taken of the fact that there are 
many coffee-producing areas in Africa that are not under 
the control of EEC members. During the past few years 
these other areas have produced just about as much coffee 
as the EEC dependent areas. 
The most favourable conditions for Arabica coffee are 
in north-east Africa, especially in Ethiopia and adjacent 
Kenya. Here, especially in south-west Ethiopia, many 
varieties of coffee grow wild in the forests. This is the 
source of the great bulk of the production of Ethiopia. 
There are relatively few plantations. The cherries are 
picked from wild coffee-trees or shrubs, or are scooped 
up from the ground on the mountain sides and are pre-
pared for market by very primitive methods. This region 
has vast possibilities for increased production. The region 
is also of importance because these numerous strains of 
Co^ea arabica may well provide useful genetic material 
for the improvement of Latin American varieties. 
In Uganda and Tanganyika, as well as in Kenya, there 
are good upland coffee regions, including some with soils 
of volcanic ash on the slopes of several large volcanoes. 
These areas are well suited for Coffea arabica. Grown 
at elevations of over 1,500 metres, Arabica accounts for 
about one-third of the coffee production in the two terri-
tories. The other two-thirds consists of Robusta which 
is produced in lower-lying zones. Most of the production 
here comes from native growers. But there are also planta-
tions owned by Europeans and Asians. In Uganda, these 
account for about one-fifth of the area planted to coffee. 
In Angola, considerable coffee grows wild in the for-
ests at elevations of 800 or 1,000 metres. The berries are 
collected and processed by the dry method. There are, in 
addition, an increasing number of plantations. In order 
to improve the quality of the product, the Government 
requires it to be passed through warehouses where it is 
inspected, cleaned and classified. Production in this area 
has been increasing notably during the past decade. 
Production trends 
Tables 10 and 11 show annual averages of total and ex-
portable production of coffee for 1935-39 as compared 
S^FAO International Institute of Agriculture, "Studies of the 
Principal Agricultural Products on the World Market", The 
World's Coffee, page 292 (Rome, 1947). 
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with 1947-51 and 1952-56.35 Lati^ American production 
in 1935-39 averaged 36.5 million bags per year in round 
figures. This declined to 32 million in 1947-51, but recov-
ered to 35.4 million in 1952-56. In 1935-39, cofifee was 
being destroyed in Brazil or was being stockpiled. Actual 
exports from Latin America in the earlier period given 
were 23.8 million bags, as compared with 26.4 in 1947-51 
and 28.1 million in 1951-56. The greatest shift in pro-
duction and exports occurred in Brazil, where production 
declined from 25.3 million in the first period named to 
18.9 million in the second period and then recovered 
slightly to 19.7 million in 1952-56. 
Table 1 0 
GREEN COFFEE: W O R L D PRODUCTION FOR SELECTED 
FIVE-YEAR PERIODS 
(Thousands of 60-kilogramme bags) 
1935/36-1939/40 m7/*8-19M/52 ¡952/S3-19S5/56 
{Annual averages) 
Latin America 
Brazil 25,340 18,902 19,694 
Colombia 4,452 5,883 6,780 
El Salvador 1,091 1,201 1,298 
Guatemala 1,002 1,068 1,145 
Mexico 959 1,056 1,533 
Other 3,645 3,842 4,969 
TOTAL LATIN A M E M C A 3 6 , 4 8 9 3 1 , 9 5 2 3 5 , 4 1 9 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
Belgian Congo . . . 320 552 740 
French Cameroons, 
T o g o l a n d a n d 
French Equatorial 
Africa 58» 206» 363» 
French West Africa 250 989 1,712 
Madagascar 537 306 785 
TOTAL E E C 
DEPENDENCIES 1 , 1 6 5 2 , 2 5 3 3 , 6 0 0 
Other Africa 
Angola 300 834 1,171 
Ethiopia 345b 375 771 
Kenya 297 177 322 
Tanganyika 263 249 311 
Uganda 225 588 1,018 
Other 7 157 190 
T O T A L OTHER AFRICA 1 , 4 3 7 2 , 3 8 0 3 , 7 8 3 
TOTAL AFRICA 2 , 6 0 2 4 , 6 3 3 7 , 3 8 3 
Asia and Oceania 2,495 1,164 2,058 
TOTAL WORLD 
PRODUCTION 41,586 37,748 44,860 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
" Estimate. 
•> Three-year average. 
Table 11 
GREEN COFFEE: W O R L D EXPORTS F O R SELECTED FIVE-
Y E A R PERIODS 
(Thousands of 60-kUogramme bags) 
1935!36-1939/iO 1947/48-1951/52 1952/53-1956/S7 
(Annual averages) 
Latin America 
15,095 16,638 15,500 
Colombia 3,972 5,117 6,044 
El Salvador 922 1,119 1,155 
Guatemala 759 878 948 
Mexico 599 703 1,330 
Other 2,461 1,994 3,149 
T O T A L LATIN AMERICA 23,808 26,449 28,126 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
Belgian Congo 283 512 713 
French Cameroons, 
T o g o l a n d a n d 
French Equatorial 
Africa 52» 206» 363» 
French West Africa 185 949 1,627 
Madagascar . . . . . . 456 454 741 
T O T A L E E C 
DEPENDENQES 976 2,121 3,446 
Other Africa 
Angola 268 801 1,162 
Ethiopia 183b 322 704 
Kenya 289 170 312 
253 240 323 
Uganda 195 534 975 
Other 93 152 189 
TOTAL OTHER AFRICA 1,281 2,219 3,665 
T O T A L AFRICA 2,257 4,340 7,111 
Asia and Oceania ' 1,678 340 1,054 
GRAND TOTAL 27,743 31,123 36,291 
35 The principal difference between the figures in the two tables 
is explained by the amounts of coffee retained for consumption in 
the producing countries, plus some changes in stocks. 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
» Estimate. 
h Three-year average. 
The other major Latin American producers all showed 
rather consistent increases in production: more than 50 
per cent since pre-war in Colombia and Mexico and 
smaller proportions in the other principal exporting coun-
tries. 
Meantime, production and exports from the African 
coffee regions were steadily increasing from a very low 
level in 1935-39 to substantial totals in 1952-56. In the 
dependencies of France and Belgium, production ex-
panded from 1.2 million bags in the first period to 3.6 
million in the most recent one. In Madagascar the in-
crease was about 50 per cent. In the Belgian Congo, the 
rise was from 320,000 bags to 740,000. In French West 
Africa, it was from 250,000 to 1.7 million, and in French 
Equatorial Africa from 58,000 to 363,000. As remarked 
above, the great bulk of this coffee was of the Robusta 
type. 
Not only EEC dependent territories, but also other 
regions in Africa were offering Latin America increasing 
competition from year to year. Production in Kenya and 
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Tanganyika rose slowly. Ethiopia more than doubled its 
production. Uganda and Angola approximately quad-
rupled their coffee output. 
It should be noted that these rapid increases in output 
occurred before serious consideration was given to the 
formation of a Common Market in Europe. In 1952-56, 
production in the African regions outside the French and 
Belgian dependencies was slightly greater than in those 
dependencies. Finally, part of the coffee in the "other 
Africa" regions is Arabica rather than Robusta. It is not 
improbable that the processing and grading methods in 
these areas will improve as time goes by. It is safe to 
anticipate that, with or without the Common Market, the 
total volume, especially of Robusta, produced in Africa 
will continue to rise for some time in the future. 
Imports into EEC countries 
In 1934-38, the countries which are now members of 
EEC imported, in round figures, 8 million bags of coffee 
each year. This level declined markedly during the Sec-
ond World War, but by 1952-56 it had recovered to 7 
million bags (table 12). Before the war 6.1 million bags 
were furnished by Latin America; 786,000 were from the 
dependent African territories and 150,000 from other 
Table 12 
GREEN COFFEE: IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(Selected five-year periods. 60-kilogramme bags) 
Importing country and source 1934-38 1947-51 
(Annual averages) 
1952-56 
Germany (post-war Federal 
Republic) 2,763,452 346,039 1,645,236 
Latin America 2,641,585 254,951 1,362,489 
Africa, EEC dependencies 3,071 11,412 32,320 
Other Africa 47,630 40,111 184,244 
Other countries 71,168 39,564 66,183 
3,077,019 1,805,088 2,861,79rj 
Latin America 2,119,067 447,076 956,095 
Africa, EEC dependencies 518,214 1,253,387 1,808,002 
Other Africa 35,847 64,673 40,672 
Other countries 403,891 39,951 63,029 
Italy 618,610 802,120 1,151,004 
Latin America 502,531 683,793 666,777 
Africa, EEC dependencies 37 7,152 78,432 
Other Africa 51,817 49,183 159,632 
Other countries 64,226 61,992 246,163 
Belgium-Luxembourg 839,605 1,273,961 852,917 
Latin America 443,702 985,267 560,239 
Africa, EEC dependencies 264,256 159,615 150,573 
Other Africa — 38,701 49,813 
Other countries 131,646 90,378 92,292 
Netherlands 673,252 352,557 494,389 
Latin America 371,367 190,915 254,144 
Africa, EEC dependencies 413 23,358 11,269 
Other Africa 14,766 109,265 166,236 
Other countries 286,704 29,019 62,739 
Total EEC imports 7,971,938 4,579,765 7,011,343 
From: Latin America 6,078,252 2,562,002 3,799,744 
Africa, EEC dependencies 785,991 1,454,924 2,080,596 
Other Africa 150,060 301,933 600,597 
957,635 260,904 530,406 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
African regions. In 1952-56, the imports from Latin 
America were only 3.8 million bags, while those from 
the dependent territories had increased to 2.1 million 
and those from other African regions to 600,000. The 
Federal Republic of Germany and France were the heavi-
est coffee importers and absorbed about two-thirds of 
the total. 
Both in the earlier and the later period Germany pur-
chased the great bulk of its coffee from Latin America, 
chiefly from Brazil and Colombia. The same was true of 
Italy, Belgium and Netherlands, all of which obtained the 
bulk of their coffee from Brazil. 
France's imports followed a somewhat different pat-
tern. In 1934-38, that country imported 2.1 million bags 
from Latin America and 518,000 from its African de-
pendencies. By 1947-51 the proportion had shifted and 
it bought only 447,000 bags from Latin America as com-
pared to 1,253,000 bags from the African possessions. 
In the most recent period France increased its imports 
from the Africein possessions to 1,808,000 bags as com-
pared with 956,000 from Latin America. 
Prospects for Latin America 
It is clear that there are extensive opportunities for 
the expansion of coffee production both in the African 
dependencies of the EEC countries and also in other 
parts of Africa. There are, it is true, certain impediments 
to such expansion. In the first place, the African soils in 
general seem to be less productive than those in the 
present coffee regions of Latin America. Secondly, 
African coffee is mostly Robusta rather than Arabica. 
Thirdly, the bulk of the coffee in Africa is produced by 
indigenous inhabitants who have but little background 
as managers. Fourthly, except in a few areas, such as 
Uganda and Kenya, the technology now used in many 
parts of Africa is inferior to that of Latin America. On 
the other hand, there seems to be no reason why tech-
nology in Africa should not gradually improve. Even with 
its present low level, the volume of Robusta coffee com-
ing from Africa is large enough to make itself felt as a 
competitor. Its use in soluble coffee and in the cheaper 
blends of roasted coffee has a discouraging effect on any 
upward tendency in prices of the Arabica coffee produced 
in Latin America. 
In the GATT long-term projection referred to earlier, 
it is estimated that the population of Western Europe will 
increase by 12.5 per cent between 1953-55 and 1973-75, 
while that of North America will increase by 26 per cent. 
It is also anticipated that the coffee import requirements 
in each area will increase by 45 per cent.®® Since North 
America consumes considerably more coffee than does 
the EEC area, this means that the prospects are for an 
increase in the absolute demand for Latin American coffee 
if the two areas are taken together. But the question 
arises whether the formation of EEC will increase that 
demand further, or whether this area will turn more to 
the dependencies in Africa and reduce its coffee pur-
chases from Latin America. 
EEC imports of coffee in 1952-56 were 7 million bags 
(table 12). An increase of 45 per cent would therefore 
amount to 3.1 million, raising total European imports to 
®®GATT, IniernatioTud Trade 1956, op. cit., pages 17-20 and 
30-31. The two magnitudes taken into account here on the basis 
of GATT projections are of an illustrative nature only and do not 
represent either a lower or an upper limit for future possibilities. 
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about 10 million bags. If Latin America participated in 
this increase in proportion to its 1952-56 shipments to 
the EEC countries, the increase would be 1.4 million 
bags. On the other hand, it may be thought that preferen-
tial treatment to imports from the EEC dependencies and 
expanded African coffee production would lead to Africa's 
supplying all the increased demand, so that none of it 
would benefit Latin America. The difference between 
these two limits, however, would be equivalent to rather 
less than 5 per cent of Latin America's present coffee 
exports. While this is, of course, a figure of some impor-
tance, it is exceeded by the increase in demand expected 
from North America. With the rapid increase in Latin 
American population, it is also likely to be exceeded 
within the 20-year period by increased consumption 
within Latin America itself. 
A further consideration is that European consumers 
have shown a preference for the higher-quality coffees, 
when they can obtain them. If the reduction of trade 
barriers within Europe leads to a rise in consumer pur-
chasing power, it is by no means improbable that the 
eventual European demand for Latin American coffee 
may increase by more than the proportionate figure of 
1.4 million bags which was mentioned above. 
In addition to population and income statistics, coffee 
imports will depend on trends in consumer habits. Coffee 
consumption will also be affected directly by the rates of 
import duties, by internal taxes and by any other factors 
that condition the price which the consumer finally pays. 
Many difficulties stand in the way of a statistical de-
termination of the demand curve for coffee. Some efforts 
in this direction have been made by comparing per capita 
rates of consumption with deiflated prices over periods of 
years. Other studies have compared rates of consumption 
as between low-income and high-income groups. Each of 
these methods suffers from various logical defects, and 
it is by no means sure that the results will indicate the 
change in total consumption that would occur if prices 
changed by a given percentage under a given set of 
conditions. 
The results of the various attempts at measuring the 
elasticity of demand for coffee seem to agree that the 
demand at any given time is relatively inelastic so far as 
the higher-income groiips of consumers are concerned. 
But greater elasticity seems to exist among the lower-
income than among the higher-income groups.®^ Thus 
consumption might well increase materially if the price 
were lowered by an appreciable percentage and the re-
duced price prevailed long enough for the lower-income 
groups to become accustomed to consumption levels at 
that price. 
GATT has recently pointed out that: 
"The connexion between consumption and income as 
revealed by family budget enquiries (and also from 
national time series), relating to the United States 
and the main coffee consuming countries of Western 
Europe, suggests that coffee consumption and hence 
the import requirements of the two areas would both 
rise in volume by 45 per cent between 1953-55 and 
1973-75. The f.o.b. values of these future imports 
(including tea and cocoa) would, expressed in 1953-55 
prices, work out at about $2,000 million in Western 
Europe and $2,600 million in North America. 
"However, these estimates are somewhat uncertain. 
On the one hand, demand for coffee in the United 
States, by far the largest importer, has risen since pre-
war considerably more (about two pounds per capita 
per year) than could be expected on the basis of pre-
war experience, and there are also indications that a 
similar increase in demand occurred in Germany dur-
ing post-war years. Moreover, coffee consumption may 
well be larger than estimated in other European coun-
tries as well should there be a reduction in the margin 
between the import price and the retail price of coffee 
which often includes a large tax element."®® 
The income-elasticity for coffee as adopted by this 
source, in the course of projections for trade oyer the next 
twenty years, is 0.5 for Western Europe and 0.3 for North 
America. 
The formation of the Common Market tends to shift 
the competitive advantage in coffee exports to some ex-
tent away from Latin America to the African dependent 
territories of EEC. This advantage will be felt, however, 
only as the Common Market arrangements actually enter 
into effect during the transition period. In some measure 
the coffee-planters may anticipate adjustments in import 
duties (or of other types) when they know such changes 
are to occur at definite dates in the future. This is more 
likely to occur on plantations operated by Europeans than 
on the smaller plantations run by the indigenous inhabi-
tants, since the latter are likely to be less well informed 
about the impending regulations. 
In 1956, the import duties and internal taxes collected 
on green coffee by members of the EEC countries con-
cerned were as given below. These are expressed as per-
centages of January 1957 values of green coffee. 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
France 









Internal taxes Per capita imports 















Source: Data on customs duties and internal taxes supplied by 
respective embassies in Washington. 
«Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics 1956 
(New York, ^ 5 7 ) , page 78. 
•> Temporarily suspended. 
<= Not applicable to imports from dependent territories. 
"J Includes 1.2 per cent administrative tax. 
The average rate of customs duties applicable in the 
EEC countries in January 1957 was 33.5 per cent ad 
valorem. But the duties in Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands were susperided until 31 December 1957, 
this period being subject to extension. The average of the 
Kathryn H. Wylie, "Production, Consumption and Price 
Trends of Coffee," United States Department of Agriculture, OfSce 
of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Foreign Agricultural Report 
No. 33, December, 1948. 
38 GATT, International Trade 1956, op. cit., pages 30-31. GATT 
also points out that the margin between the import price and the 
retail price is, in the United States (where coffee imports are 
duty-free), of the order of 20-25 per cent, while in Europe it 
ranges from 35-50 per cent in the Scandinavian countries, to 110 
and 160 per cent in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
respectively. 
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rates actually in effect, weighted by values of 1952-56 
dutiable coffee imports, was only 15.1 per cent.®^ The 
agreed rate that is finally to be applied under the Com-
mon Market tariff is 16 per cent. Shifts in the respective 
duties to their new level are, however, to be effected by 
steps. A shift of 10 per cent will occur within a year after 
the Treaty enters into effect, and not less than 50 per 
cent of the total change is to be made by the end of the 
second four-year period. Duties and restrictions on im-
ports into the Common Market of commodities from EEC 
are gradually to be removed in the course of the transi-
tion period. 
During the first transition period, Italy is to be allowed 
to retain its present low duty on a quota of green coffee 
imports equal to those registered in 1956. The size of the 
quota is to be reduced by 20 per cent from the sixth year 
after the Treaty becomes effective until the end of the 
second stage, and then to a 50-per-cent level during the 
third stage. But the low tariff rate may be continued on 
20 per cent of the initial coffee quota for four years after 
the end of the transition period. 
A similar privilege is to be extended to the Benelux 
countries. Throughout the second transitional stage, they 
may continue to import duty-free up to 85 per cent of the 
amount of coffee imported during the last year for which 
statistics are available. During the third stage this duty-
free quota is to be reduced to 50 per cent. 
For EEC as a whole, the ultimate adoption of a coffee 
import duty of 16 per cent will have different effects in 
the various member countries, depending on whether 
their previous duties were above or below this level. It 
will tend to discourage coffee consumption in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, where duties on coffee 
are at present suspended. On the other hand, the 16-per-
cent duty will tend somewhat to encourage coffee con-
sumption in the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
now has a high tariff. 
Favourable customs treatment of imports such as coffee 
from the overseas territories may be expected to shift the 
channels of trade so that a somewhat greater proportion 
of the EEC imports of coffee will eventually come from 
African dependencies. To the extent that this diverts 
more of the African Robusta and other coffee to the EEC 
countries, it will reduce the relative amount of such 
coffee available for the United States or the non-EEC 
countries in Europe. A rather larger relative volume of 
Latin American coffee will, correspondingly, be shipped 
to the United States and to non-EEC countries in Europe, 
and less to the EEC countries. 
This rechannelling of trade that derives from the 
changes in import duties will not of itself increase the 
world supply of coffee, and it is difficult to see how it can 
cause any very great changes in coffee prices in Latin 
America. The exception is that there may be some specific 
types of Latin American coffee that have been used in 
EEC member countries, which will not be so popular in 
other parts of the world coffee market. 
It should be noted also that the internal taxes col-
lected on coffee in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and Italy are much higher than the import duties. 
These internal taxes add to the price which the consumer 
pays for coffee just as much as if they were import duties. 
Their reduction would go a long way towards encourag-
ing increased use of coffee. However, they are not affected 
by the Rome Treaty. 
There is another aspect of the formation of the Com-
mon Market that may place the Latin American coffee-
producer at a more tangible disadvantage. The higher 
level of economic activity in the EEC countries is likely 
to increase the budgetary receipts of the metropolitan 
Governments available for the financing of basic social 
capital, especially transport, in their dependent territories. 
This effort will be supplemented by the creation of the 
special development fund for overseas territories. By 
rendering the producer areas in the dependent territories 
more accessible, these facilities will increase returns to 
the producers in the French and Belgian dependencies, 
thereby stimulating production. Exactly how great an 
expansion of coffee production will result after ten or 
twenty years cannot at present be predicted. 
To the Latin American coffee producer, the most im-
portant practical question is how he can maintain his 
income and keep his lead in the world coffee market. 
It is clear from what has been said above that coffee 
production in Africa is increasing and that Latin America 
will have to face greater competition than in the past, 
-j Increased competition up to this time, however, has come 
as much from regions such as Uganda, Kenya, Angola 
and Ethiopia, which are not controlled by EEC members, 
as from the dependent territories. Furthermore, the stim-
ulating effects of the Common Market on African produc-
tion will be felt only slowly, although they may be sub-
stantial in the long run. 
Latin America has at least three factors in its favour. 
The first is that the population of the coffee-consuming 
countries is increasing. Coffee consumption can be ex-
pected to continue to rise in the United States and, also, 
at an even greater rate, in the European countries. Size-
able increments have been reported in the United King-
dom and in the Federal Republic of Germany since the 
war. Increases elsewhere will depend partly on population 
growth and partly on the purchasing power of consumers. 
A second factor in favour of Latin America is the 
superior quality of its coffee as compared to most of that 
from Africa. Not only can this qualitative advantage be 
maintained, but in some cases it could with relative ease 
be pressed still further by improved processing methods. 
A third advantage is that, as a general rule, Latin 
America is ahead of African producers in the technology 
of production. If the Latin American coffee-grower should 
cease to make progress in his production methods, it is 
safe to anticipate that the African grower will gradually 
equal or surpass his performance.*" On the other hand, 
there is in Latin America a growing awareness of the im-
portance of introducing better methods and of the oppor-
tunities for doing so. Improved and higher-yielding strains 
of coffee trees are now available, and much more is 
known than formerly about the use of fertilizers and other 
improved practices. With more intensive research and 
prompt application of the results on coffee plantations, 
the Latin American growers should be able to increase 
®® More recently the weighted average may have exceeded 16 
per cent as a result of a more rapid increase in the amount of 
cofifee imported by the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Should political developments in Africa discourage European 
ownership of coffee plantations, it is likely that the improvement 
of production methods will continue to lag behind that achieved 
in Latin America. 
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yields per tree and to reduce their operation costs. This 
seems to be the only way they can keep ahead of their 
rivals in a world of growing competition. 
3. Cacao 
Trade in cacao will very probably be affected by the 
organization of the Common Market. This will be of con-
cern to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and two or three 
other Latin American countries. World demand for cacao 
may well be increased if the Common Market succeeds in 
raising consumer purchasing power in member coun-
tries. At the same time, production in the French and 
Belgian possessions in Africa will expand because of 
improved technological and economic conditions, and this 
will intensify competition with the Western Hemisphere. 
Value of trade 
The trade values at stake are shown in table 13. During 
the five-year period 1952-56, the EEC countries imported 
an average of 174 million dollars' worth of cacao beans 
per year. Of this amount 27.6 million dollars' worth came 
from Latin America, two-thirds of it from Brazil. In 
addition, the EEC countries imported cacao butter and 
paste to an average value of 1.9 million dollars, also 
chiefly from Brazil. Of the cacao beans, 15.4, 4.9 and 3.4 
million dollars' worth went to the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, respectively, and the 
remainder to France and Belgium. 
Table 13 
CACAO BEANS: VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 
(Annual averages for 1952-56, in thousands of dollars)' 
Federal 
EEC Republic Belgium- Nether-
Total of Germany France^ Italy^ Luxembourg lands 
Total imports 173,989 63,901 41,247 14,868 7,156 46,817 
Source of imports 
Latin America, totalb 27,589 15,380 1,711 4^16 2,167 3,415 
Brazil 20,013 12,338 1,296 3,497 237 2,645 
Ecuador 4,032 1,712 219 1,049 839 213 
Venezuela 2,961 1,144 196 345 1,091 185 
Africa, total 137,078 47,161 38,382 9,093 3,069 39,373 
EEC, dependencies 74,050 11,786 33,527 5,301 1,250 22,186 
Other Africa 63,028 35375 4,855 3,792 1,819 17,187 
Other regions'^ 9,333 1,369 1,154^ 859 1,921 4,030 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
® Provisional. 
Latin American republics. Total for Latin America includes other countries not listed separately. 
«Including Asia, Oceania, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and also trans-shipments through other 
coimtries. 
"1 Including $233,000 from Martinique and Guadeloupe. 
One outstanding fact, shown in table 13, is that the 
value of cacao imports from Latin America constituted 
only 16 per cent of total EEC purchases.^^ African de-
pendencies of France and Belgium provided 42 per cent 
and other African areas, chiefly Ghana and Nigeria, an-
other 36 per cent. France and the Netherlands were the 
largest purchasers from the dependencies, and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany from the other African regions. 
In 1952-56, the combined EEC countries imported an 
annual average of 209,000 tons of cacao beans. Of these, 
92,000 tons came from African dependencies, 77,000 
from other parts of Africa and 32,000 from Latin 
America. To keep the data in proper perspective, however, 
it may be mentioned that the United States imported 
123,000 tons of cacao beans from all African sources, as 
compared to 129,000 tons from the Western Hemisphere. 
These percentages would be raised slightly by the incorpora-
tion of trans-shipments of cacao via other countries, which in the 
table are included with cacao from Asia and Oceania vmder "Other 
regions". 
Conditions in producer areas 
Cacao is indigenous to the Americas, but is now grown 
in most of the humid tropical areas of the world, princi-
pally in Latin America and Africa.^ The crop has spread 
gradually to new areas during the last couple of decades, 
both in Africa and in Latin America. 
The typical cacao plantation covers a very small area. 
This is even truer in Africa than in the Americas. In 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast most of the cacao is produced 
on a small scale by African farmers. European estates are 
more common in the French possessions and predominate 
in the Belgian Congo. The figures in table 14, show the 
size distribution of cacao plantings in Ghana, Nigeria, 
and the Ivory Coast. Ninety-two per cent of the planta-
tions in Ghana are smaller than 2 hectares, as are 75 per 
cent in Nigeria and 20 per cent in the Ivory Coast. 
Cacao is grown for the most part at elevations of not over 500 
metres. The trees are very sensitive to cold and may be harmed by 
temperatures lower than 50 or 60 degrees F (10° or 15°C). 
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Table 14 
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN CACAO HOLDINGS BY SIZE 
Size of cacao 
plantings (hectares) 
Less than 0.5 . 
Less than 1.0 . 
0.5 to 2.0 . . . . 
1.0 to 2.0 . . . . 
2.0 to 4.0 . . . . 
2.0 to 10.0 . . . 
2.0 to 10.0 . . . 
4.0 to 8.0 . . . . 
8.0 and over . 
10.0 and over 
T O T A L 
Percentage of holdings Percentage of area 
Ghana Nigeria Ivory Coast Ghana Nigeria 
71.0 0.5 20.6 
50.0 17.0 







0.2 1.5 2.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: FAG, Commodity Series, Bulletin No. 27, Cacao, A Review of Current Trends in 
Production, Price, and Consumption, November 1955. 
Until recently, virtually nothing was done to educate 
the African growers in improved methods of production. 
FAO reports: "The typical cacao 'farm' is a small cluster 
of trees, planted too close to one another, without order 
or system, and of different ages".^ Another writer con-
veys "the essential idea that the great cacao region is still 
one of untidy African farms (averaging only about 3 
acres in extent), largely hidden by forest—untidy, but 
thus escaping the evils of soil erosion".^^ Very little 
pruning is done and the use of fertilizers is practically 
unheard of. 
Factors limiting production 
The growth of cacao production has been retarded 
principally by three adverse factors. These are diseases 
and insect pests, soil depletion and senility of trees in 
the older producer areas. 
Each cacao area has its own combination of diseases, 
insect pests and other production problems. In various 
parts of America are found witch's broom disease, black 
pod rot (Phytohthora Palmivora) and monilia pod rot, 
which result in heavy losses and have caused cacao pro-
duction to disappear from some areas. Damage by witch's 
broom has been particularly heavy in Ecuador, Colombia 
and Venezuela. 
In Africa the three principal causes of losses are swollen 
shoot disease, black pod and capsid bugs. It is estimated 
that in some years the losses in Nigeria from black pod 
may amount to 30 per cent.^ ® 
Very heavy losses have been caused in Africa, especially 
in Ghana, by swollen shoot, a disease produced by a virus 
of which there are apparently many different strains. The 
only way of controlling this disease discovered up to the 
present is to cut out diseased and contact trees. An exten-
sive campaign for this purpose has been under way for 
several years in Ghana and Nigeria. The number of trees 
cut out in Ghana is reported to have reached a cumula-
tive total of 54 million in 1956. 
^®FAO Commodity Series, Bulletin 27, Cacao, A Review of 
Current Trends in Production, Price, and Consumption (Rome, 
November, 1955), page 19. 
Stamp, L. Dudley, Africa, A Study in Tropical Development, 
John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1953, page 303. 
FAO Commodity Series, Bulletin 27, op. eit., page 27. 
Production in Africa also suffers from damage done 
by the capsid bug to the cacao shoots and young wood. 
During the last few years energetic steps have been taken 
in Ghana and Nigeria to disseminate information among 
African producers regarding methods of pest and disease 
control. One aspect of this campaign consists in the sub-
sidized distribution of hand spray pumps and spray 
materials for combating the capsid bug and black pod, 
and growers have taken to spraying with surprising en-
thusiasm. It is said that these steps are already resulting 
in visibly improved yields. 
The second factor restricting cacao production is the 
rapid depletion of tropical soils, especially in Africa. The 
best soils for cacao are deep loams with a high content 
of humus and good drainage. In early African plantings 
high yields were obtained by clearing off the original 
forest and planting the cacao in virgin soil. But in the 
tropical climate humus decays rapidly and plant food 
quickly leaches out of unprotected soil. Consequently, 
yields fall off as the years pass. Production from trees 
replanted in the old soil is much lower than from original 
plantings. The planting of cacao, therefore, tends to de-
cline in old areas and to shift to new ones so long as 
satisfactory land is available. With the competing demand 
for food crops, the area available for cacao has been 
decreasing rapidly in the older producing regions. In 
Ghana, according to some estimates, the area of closed 
forest-land suitable for cacao will be exhausted in an-
other decade. 
The third factor restricting production, especially in 
Africa, is the relatively high rate of senility of present 
bearing trees. The cacao tree begins to bear at 5 or 6 
years of age, reaches its peak between 10 and 15 and 
begins to decline between 25 and 30 years. Both in 
Ghana and in Nigeria, an estimated 30 per cent of the 
trees are over 30 years old, and losses from senility have 
recently been greater than new plantings. Recently there 
has been a strong increase in plantings in the Ivory 
Coast, the French Cameroons and the Belgian Congo, 
but this is partly offset by the rising senility rate in the 
Ivory Coast. 
Production trends 
Approximately one-third of the world's cacao is pro-
duced in Latin America, nearly two-thirds in Africa, and 
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small scattered amounts in Asia and Oceania (table 15). 
In Latin America there has been a continuous, though 
rather irregular upward trend, with production in Brazil 
rising from an annual average of 120,000 tons, in round 
numbers, in 1935-39 to 135,000 in 1952-56. Production 
in the Dominican Republic in the same period increased 
from 25,000 to 33,000 tons and in Ecuador from 19,000 
to 28,000 tons. The total production of Latin America 
rose 16 per cent from 231,000 to 267,000 tons. Mean-
while, world production increased from 717,000 to 
780,000 tons. 
Table 15 
CACAO BEANS: WORLD PRODUCTION 
(Tons) 
1935/36-1939/40 1947/48-1951/52 1952/53-1955/56 
(Annual averages) 
Latin America 
Brazil 119,768 126,641 135,014 
Dominican Republic . 24,522 28,680 32,857 
Ecuador 19,225 21,767 28,269 
Other Latin America 67,391 64,372 71,235 
T O T A L 230,906 240,461 267,375 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
Belgian Congo . . . 1,274 1,736 2,928 
French Equatorial 
Africa, Cameroons 27,322 46,984 62,186 
French West Africa 49,878 50,194 62328 
French T o g o l a n d 
and Madagascar. 1,116 4,231 7,916 
T O T A L 79,591 103,145 135,358 
Other Africa 
Ghana 276,468 247,970 234,251 
Nigeria 98,143 102,499 106,086 
Fernando Pó and 
Rio Muni 11,343 15,321 ' 19,059 
St. Thomas and 
Principe 10,206 7,940 7,757 
Angola, L i b e r i a , 
Sierra Leone . . . 315 1,194 2,233 
T O T A L 396,475 374,924 369,386 
T O T A L AFRICA 476,067 478,069 504,744 
Asia and Oceania 7,932 6,377 7,642 
W O R L D TOTAL 717,173 724,913 779,761 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
In parts of Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, and 
some other countries, conditions for cacao are relatively 
favourable over areas considerably greater than those 
now planted. Furthermore, there are opportunities for 
increasing yields from existing plantations by spraying 
to control diseases and pests, replacing old trees with 
improved varieties, and by other means. 
In Africa there are divergent production trends in the 
different regions. Tn Ghana, there was a decline of about 
15 per cent in production from 1935-39 to 1952-56 
(table 15). This, as suggested earlier, is related to the 
aging of trees and the spread of diseases and insects. 
In Nigeria, production has risen about 8 per cent. In 
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, there 
has been an increase both in area planted and in produc-
tion. Cacao planting is expanding in the Belgian Congo, 
and, although production is still small, a further increase 
in output is foreseeable for the next several years. Taken 
together, production of the EEC dependent territories 
increased 69 per cent from 1935-39 to 1952-56, while 
that of other African regions decreased by 7 per cent. 
The dependent territories expanded their share of world 
production from 11 per cent in 1935-39 to 17 per cent 
in 1952-56, while the share of other African areas shrunk 
from 55 per cent to 47 per cent. There is still land suit-
able for cacao in various parts of tropical Africa and, 
in addition, improvements in production techniques are 
already under way. 
Table 16 
CACAO: SOURCES OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(Annual averages for selected five-year periods, in tons) 
Importing country and source 1934-38 1947-51 1952-56 
Germany (post-war Federal 
Republic) 81,224 25,982 76,201 
Latin America, total 16,199 2,752 17,934 
Brazil 6,446 1,677 14,627 
Ecuador 5,875 905 1,867 
Africa, EEC dependencies 4,578 4374 14,469 
Other Africa 58,555 18,250 42,416 
Other countries 1,892 606 1,382 
43,009 58,007 48,359 
Latin America, total 2,128 1,607» 1,667 
Brazil 783 1,408a 1,253 
Ecuador 374 79» 227 
Africa, EEC dependencies 36,316 55,235 40,275 
Other Africa 565 766 5,137 
Other countries 4,000 399 1,280 
Italy 9,129 9,471 17,765 
Latin America, total 3,600 5,346 5328 
Brazil 3,042 4,100 4,129 
Ecuador 372 693 1,196 
Africa, EEC dependencies 216 1,594 6,349 
Other Africa 4,563 1,120 4,743 
751 1,411 , 845 
Belgium-Luxembourg 9,910 10,724 8,934 
Latin America, total 2,883 2,995 2379 
Brazil 1,083 1,328 244 
Ecuador 360 675 1,029 
Africa, EEC dependencies 1,655 1,548 1,627 
Other Africa 1,833 3,469 2,391 
Other countries • 3,539 2,712 2,337 
Netherlands 64,688 44,513 58,118 
Latin America, total 4,128 9,777 4,077 
Brazil 3,137 8,661 3311 
Ecuador 429 370 248 
Africa, EEC dependencies 5,911 11,437 29,326 
Other Africa 52,136 21,072 22,143 
Other countries 2,513 2,227 2372 
EEC countries, total 207,960 148,697 209,377 
From: Latin America 28,938 21,999 32,085 
Brazil 14,491 17,174 23364 
Ecuador 7,410 2,722 4367 
Africa, EEC dependencies 48,676 74,286 92,046 
Other Africa 117,651 43,958 76,830 
Other countries 12,695 7,985 8,416 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
« Average for 1948-51. 
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Imports into EEC countries 
In 1934-58, the EEC countries imported an annual 
average of 208,000 tons of cacao beans in round num-
bers. These imports fell off noticeably during and just 
after the Second World War, but recovered their pre-war 
level in 1952-56 (table 16). Imports from Latin America 
were 29,000 tons in the earlier period and 32,000 in 
1952-56, or 15.3 per cent of the total. This is the trade 
that may be affected by the Common Market agreement. 
It should be pointed out that the EEC countries absorbed 
only 12 per cent of total Latin American cacao produc-
tion in 1952-56. 
The Federal Republic of Germany is the largest cacao-
importing country in EEC. It is followed by the Nether-
lands, France, Italy and Belgium, in that order. The 
Federal Republic imported an annual average of 76,210 
tons of cacao during 1952-56, 18,000 tons of which 
came from Latin America, 14,000 tons from the African 
dependencies of France and Belgium, and 42,000 tons 
from other African areas. 
The Netherlands showed a different pattern. Of the 
58,000 tons of cacao beans imported per year in 1952-56, 
it purchased only 4,000 tons from Latin America, 29,000 
tons from the dependencies of France and Belgium and 
22,000 tons from other African areas. Imports into the 
Netherlands from the non-EEC African territories de-
clined sharply from 1934-38 onwards, while imports from 
the dependent territories increased from 6,000 to 29,000 
tons. 
France, with the largest cacao production in the de-
pendent areas, imported an average of 40,000 tons from 
them out of total imports of 48,000 tons in 1952-56. 
Imports from other African sources were 5,000 tons and 
those from Latin America were less than 2,000. 
Italy imported just under 18,000 tons of cacao, of 
which about 6,000 tons came from Latin America, a 
further 6,000 tons from the EEC dependent areas, and 
5,000 tons from other African sources. Italy's imports 
from the dependencies has risen to the present figure from 
only 216 tons per year in 1934-38. 
The EEC cacao import duty, which is to be levied on 
deliveries from all outside countries, is 9 per cent. This is 
a relatively modest tariff. Nevertheless, as it enters into 
force, it will tend to shift the advantage further towards 
the dependent territories. Cacao exports from those re-
gions, however, have already been increasing in compari-
son with those from Latin America, and the bulk of their 
production has already been going to the EEC countries. 
The EEC countries imported 32,000 tons of cacao per 
year from Latin America in 1952-56, as compared with 
29,000 tons in 1934-38. During the same interval im-
ports from the African dependent areas increased from 
49,000 to 92,000 tons. The growth of trade from the de-
pendencies was partly at the expense of the other African 
regions, whose exports to the EEC countries declined 
from 118,000 to 77,000 tons. 
4. Bananas 
For some years Latin American banana producers have 
hoped to develop larger markets in Europe. The possi-
bilities of achieving this after the coming into effect of 
EEC, when Latin American bananas will have to compete 
with the African product enjoying preferential treatment, 
are analysed below. 
Value of trade 
The total annual value of EEC member countries' 
banana imports in 1952-56 averaged $105 million (table 
17). Of this amount, however, $55 million represents 
imports effected by France, which obtained $26.7 million 
worth of its supply from African dependencies and $28 
million from Martinique and Guadeloupe. The Federal 
Republic of Germany was the second largest importer, 
with banana purchases valued at $28 million. These came 
in almost equal proportions from Colombia, Ecuador and 
Guatemala. Imports into Belgium and Luxembourg were 
valued at $7 million, and those into the Netherlands at 
$4.7 million. 
Table 17 
BANANAS: VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 










Total banana imports^ 105,106 28,043 55,295 10,123 6,985 4,660 
Source of imports: 
Latin America'^ . 33,603 24,662 — 32 5,198 3,711 
Colombia 12,785 8,560'i — 32 2,270 1,923 
Ecuador 11,463 8,692<i — — 2,176 595 
Guatemala 6,842 7,393d — — 523 926 
Africa: 
EEC dependencies . 37,481 422 26,688 9.185 1,080 106 
Other Africa 1,875 680 551 636 — 8 
Other regions . . . 32,144 2,279 28,055® 271 706 833 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
" Provisional. 
Details for table may not add to total because of rovmding. 
c Total, but excluding European possessions in the Caribbean. 
<1 May contain small amounts of other tropical fruits. 
® Including $27,929,000 worth of bananas from Martinique and Guadeloupe. 
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The total value of the EEC countries' banana imports 
from Latin America was $33.6 million, or about ten per 
cent less than their purchases from African dependencies. 
About an equal value of imports came from non-EEC 
regions, chiefly Martinique and Guadeloupe. As will be 
shown later, current banana imports represent an appre-
ciable increase over pre-war years. 
Conditions and problems in the producing areas 
Although bananas are widely produced in the tropics 
for local consumption, the crop for international trade 
has for many years been centred in the Western Hemi-
sphere. In 1955, world exports were reported to be 131 
million standard stems of 50 lb. Of this amount 43 iml-
lion stems were shipped from Central America, 16 million 
from the Caribbean area and 45 million from South 
America, making a total of 79 per cent of world exports. 
Of the, remainder, 24 million came from Africa and its 
adjacent islands and the rest from Oceania and Taiwan. 
Large-scale banana production requires certain well-
defined natural conditions.^® An essential for economical 
production and marketing is a highly organized transport 
system, so that the fruit can be moved from plantations 
to consuming centres promptly and without bruising. 
This means that there must be a system of refrigerator 
ships to carry the fruit from ports in the producing areas, 
closely co-ordinated with railways or highways and with 
port facilities equipped to load the bananas without 
injury. 
The necessary natural conditions exist in many places 
in the Latin American tropics within reach of shipping 
ports and the needed transport facilities have been, or 
can be, developed at many points along the coast. In 
tropical West Africa, there are likewise areas where such 
conditions prevail. Plantations have been developed in 
French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, the French and British 
Cameroons, the Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland and 
near Lourengo Marques in Mozambique. The heaviest 
and most concentrated production in this region, how-
ever, is in the Canary Islands. 
Bananas are affected by various diseases and pests. 
The most serious and widespread of these are Sigatoka 
{Cercospora musae) and Panama disease {Fusarium 
oxiosporum f. cúbense) which are now prevalent in most 
producing regions in Latin America as well as in Africa. 
Both of these are fungus diseases. Sigatoka attacks the 
leaves of the plant and is spread by airborne spores. It 
can be controlled by spraying every two to four weeks. 
This treatment is expensive but essential for the produc-
tion of marketable fruit of uniform quality. 
Panama disease is caused by a soil organism. Once 
plants are infected, there is no known way to save them. 
The Gros Michel banana, which is so desirable because 
of its uniform high quality and good shipping character-
istics, is highly suscéptible to Panama disease. In some 
producing areas, such as Brazil and Africa, the produc-
tion of Gros Michel has been discontinued in most com-
^ Bananas require a deep fertile soil, preferably alluvial loam. 
They are rather exacting in their demand for a temperature of at 
least 23°C (73°? ) and prefer a relatively narrow range of tem-
perature with about 2000 mm of rainfall well distributed through-
out the year. The producing area should be free from strong winds, 
which cause serious damage by blowing down the heavy plants 
and fruit. 
mercial zones, although Gros Michel is the principal type 
raised in the British Cameroons. Varieties resistant to 
Panama disease, such as Cavendish, have been planted 
instead. The Cavendish has to be sprayed to protect it 
against Sigatoka. 
Under the conditions described, commercial banana 
production has been carried on most successfully on 
relatively large plantations, with a high degree of man-
agement skill, scientifically trained staffs, a heavy capital 
input, close co-ordination with transport facilities, and 
extensive and efficient marketing organizations. These 
characteristics differentiate the international banana in-
dustry sharply from the small plantations which produce 
bananas for local consumption. To date, commercial pro-
duction in the Western Hemisphere has surpassed that of 
other regions in its organization and in the uniform high 
quality of the fruit delivered to consumers. But there 
does not appear to be any essential reason why the tech-
nology and the organization of the African producing 
areas should not approach that of the Latin American 
industry sometime in the future. 
There are certainly more immediate problems facing 
banana producers in Latin America than African com-
petition. Most of these call for changes in technology or 
management in one way or another. First, there are the 
problems which result from the Panama disease. This has 
already made banana-growing a transitory enterprise so 
far as most small-scale producers are concerned. As the 
soil in banana-producing regions becomes more thor-
oughly infested with the disease spores, the grower must 
either move to new land or else inundate his old fields for 
several months to eliminate the fungi. This treatment 
requires large amounts of capital as well as a nearby 
source of water. The decline in production in many of the 
old banana areas may be attributed to Panama disease. 
Furthermore, the same fate lies in store for the present 
areas unless a new and cheaper method of control is 
developed. 
Secondly, there is a need for educating the smaller 
producers in methods of controlling Sigatoka. Proper 
methods of spraying are already well known but are not 
always üsed. Such control is essential in order to pro-
duce fruit acceptable in the international banana trade. 
Considerable amounts of capital are required here as well, 
although not so much as in the case of Panama disease. 
A third problem of considerable importance, especially 
for the small-scale producer, is that of transporting the 
fruit to the port. This involves both the extension of 
smooth, paved roads or of railways, and also the training 
of producers and labourers in methods of handling the 
fruit in order to avoid injuring it. 
A fourth problem, which is highly important in some 
areas, is how to utilize fruit that fails to pass inspection 
for shipment. Cases are reported in which over 50 per 
cent of bananas hauled long distances over rough roads 
have been rejected as unfit for export when they arrive 
at the side of the ship. Of course, Ais type of loss can be 
materially reduced by improving highways and handling 
methods. Nevertheless, theré is usually an appreciable 
percentage of rejection of undersized or slightly damaged 
bunches which might be used to manufacture dried 
banana products or puree, or even for livestock feed, in 
addition to bunches that can be disposed of locally. This 
involves both technological problems and also questions 
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of capital supply in developing dehydrating plants or 
other facilities. 
Trends in commercial production 
Since pre-war years there have been quite diverse 
trends in banana production in various countries, due, 
in some cases, to the opening-up of new lands. In others, 
banana-growing has been rendered unprofitable by spread 
of Panama disease or Sigatoka. Taking world commercial 
production as a whole, the level of production in 1952-56 
was above that of pre-war by some 10 or 12 per cent. 
Table 18 shows exports from the principal commercial 
producing countries. Data on total production are not 
very accurate or reliable, and for the present purpose 
exports from producing countries can be taken as in-
dicating general production trends. 
Table 18 
BANANAS: EXPORTS FROM PRINCIPAL P R O D U a N G 
COUNTRIES 
(Annual averages, thousands of 50-lb stems) 
Principal exporting country or region 193S-39 1947-51 1952-55 
Latin Americifi-
9 , 3 6 6 6 , 9 7 5 8 , 9 2 0 
7 , 4 7 5 4 , 7 7 3 8 , 0 5 6 
Costa Rica 4 , 5 6 9 1 4 , 2 7 7 1 5 , 7 4 1 
1 , 9 2 0 6 , 4 2 2 2 1 , 1 7 3 
8 , 4 0 5 9 , 2 0 7 7 , 0 6 6 
1 1 , 7 2 3 1 4 , 0 5 1 1 3 , 5 7 3 
1 3 , 1 0 3 4 , 1 4 1 1 , 9 5 9 
Panaraal" 9 , 7 7 9 8 , 1 3 6 8 , 5 5 9 
Guadeloupe, Martinique 3 , 1 4 6 4 , 3 5 2 5 , 4 3 2 
1 3 , 0 4 2 2 , 8 6 8 6 , 0 1 5 
Other 9 , 1 2 4 4 , 9 8 0 3 , 2 7 3 
TOTAL 9 1 , 6 5 2 8 0 , 1 8 2 9 9 , 7 6 7 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
7 3 3 1 6 1 , 0 4 8 
Eritrea, Italian Somaliland . . 9 8 3 4 9 1 1 , 4 9 3 
French Cameroons 9 0 7 1 , 3 9 5 3 , 0 5 6 
French Guinea 1 , 8 8 2 1 ,859 J. 4 , 4 3 4 
Ivory Coast 5 1 7 7 5 6 
T O T A L 4 , 3 6 2 4 , 8 1 7 1 0 , 0 3 1 
Other Africa 
Canary Islands 5 , 3 1 9 6 , 9 1 9 7 , 6 2 4 
Nigeria, British Cameroons . 2 , 3 3 7 2 , 1 9 5 3 , 6 1 0 
Other 4 5 7 4 4 5 7 5 1 
TOTAL 8 , 1 1 3 9 , 5 5 9 1 1 , 9 8 5 
TOTAL AFRICA 1 2 , 4 7 5 1 4 , 3 7 6 2 2 , 0 1 6 
Asia and Oceania 6 , 1 2 2 9 2 6 2 , 3 0 0 
WORLD TOTAL 1 1 0 , 2 9 9 9 5 , 4 8 4 1 2 4 , 0 8 3 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
»Including Caribbean dependencies of European countries. 
•> Including Canal Zone. 
Exports from the Western Hemisphere, including 
United Kingdom and French dependencies, averaged 
91.7 million stems per year during 1935-39. After a sharp 
war-time contraction, exports recovered to 80.1 million 
in 1947-51 and then continued to rise to 99.8 million in 
1952-55 (104 million in 1955). The outstanding recent 
development in the banana trade in the Western Hemi-
sphere was the rapid development of production in 
Ecuador, from 1.9 million stems exported per year in 
pre-war years to over 26 million in 1955. Costa Rica 
increased its exports from 4.6 million stems per year 
pre-war to 15.7 million in 1952-55. Brazil, Colombia and 
Panama recovered to approximately their pre-war level 
of production. But Mexico was unsuccessful in control-
ling the Sigatoka and Panama diseases and its exports 
fell off from 13.1 million stems pre-war to 4.1 million in 
1947-51 and to 2.0 million in 1952-55. 
For Latin America as a whole it may be said that the 
commercial banana producers demonstrated their ability 
to maintain their level of production, under prevailing 
price and demand conditions and with what they know 
about disease control. 
African banana exports, taken as a whole, increased 
from 12.5 million standard 50-lb stems in the pre-war 
years to 22 million in 1952-55. Exports from the de-
pendencies of the EEC countries, however, increased more 
rapidly than those from other areas, rising from 4.4 
million to 10.0 million. 
The most striking increase in banana exports occurred 
in the Belgian Congo, but shipments from this region in 
1952-55 amounted to only 1.0 million stems. Exports 
from the French Cameroons trebled between pre-war and 
1952-55, and those from French Guinea and the Ivory 
Coast rose from 2.3 million to 4.4 million stems. Exports 
from Italian Somaliland increased about 50 per cent 
under Italian encouragement. In addition, bananas im-
ported into Italy are handled by a monopoly which 
strongly favours those produced in the Italian de-
pendencies. 
Outside of the EEC dependencies, the principal African 
sources of export bananas are found in the Canary 
Islands and the British Cameroons. Exports from these 
areas have also been increasing but not at so rapid a rate 
as in the dependent regions just mentioned. 
Bananas are widely grown in tropical Africa for local 
consumption. Many of them are of the plantain type and 
are produced for cooking. But high grade soils are not 
widespread and transport facilities are often lacking from 
potential producing regions to the ports. 
Imports into EEC countries 
In 1955, 53 per cent of the world's banana exports were 
consigned to the United States, 21 per cent to members 
of EEC, and 17 per cent to other countries in Europe. 
A summary of the EEC countries' imports is shown in 
table 19 for 1934-38, 1947-51 and 1952-56. 
The total banana imports of the EEC countries before 
the war averaged 341,000 tons per year. In the post-war 
period, they recovered to 263,000 tons in 1947-51 and 
then continued to rise to 565,000 tons, in round numbers, 
in 1952-56. In the post-war period imports from the 
African dependencies of the EEC countries recovered 
more quickly than those from other sources, and in 
1952-56 amounted to 154,000 tons, while imports from 
other African areas were only 20,000 tons. The possi-
bilities of expanding European markets for Latin Ameri-
can bananas are indicated by the increase of such imports, 
from 60,000 tons pre-war to 224,000 tons in 1952-56. 
In fact, by 1956 imports into the EEC from Latin America 
amounted to 349,000 tons. Of this amount 277,000 tons 
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went to the Federal Republic of Germany and included 
103,000 tons from Colombia, 111,000 from Ecuador and 
34,000 from Guatemala. 
Table 19 
BANANAS: IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(Annual averages for selected five-year periods, in tons) 
Importing country and source 1934-38 1947-51 19S2-56 
22,371 36,596» 46,956 
n.a. 15,401 34,880 
EEC African dependencies n.a. 6,674 7,450 
n.a. — — 
n.a. 14,521» 4,626 
170,878 171,145 263,747 
6,887 580 — 
EEC African dependencies . . . . 58,949 80,863 104,880 
Other Africa 40,932 3,094 3,418 
Other countries^ 64,110 86,608 155,449 
Germany (post-war Federal Re-
public) 119,775 35,929 185,606 
Latin America 33,315 18,133 165,718 
EEC African dependencies . . . 35,747 5,803 6,656 
Other Africa 29,681 7,120 12,688 
Other countries 21,031 4,873 544 
Italy 19,202 9,362 , 39,457 
Latin America — 55 162 
EEC African dependencies 19,154 8,094 34,182 
Other Africa 47 969 3,546 
Other countries 1 245 1,567 
Netherlands 31,259 9,981 29,466 
Latin America 19,335 4,366 23,645 
EEC African dependencies . . . 33 331 566 
Other Africa 1,325 1,799 82 
Other countries 10,566 3,485 5,172 
Grand total 341,114<= 263,013 565,232 
Latin America 59,5370 38,535 224,405 
EEC African dependencies . . . 113,883= 101,765 153,734 
Other Africa 71,985= 12,982 19,734 
Other countries 95,708= 109,732 167,358 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
11948-51 averages. 
b Chiefly from Guadeloupe and Martinique. 
" Excluding Belgium-Luxembourg; grand total including Bel-
gium-Luxembourg is 363,485. 
n.a. = Data not available. 
Belgium and Luxembourg also materially increased 
their imports from Latin America. In 1952-56, they im-
ported 47,000 tons, more than double the pre-war figure. 
Of this amount 35,000 tons came from Latin America. 
The Netherlands, on the contrary, slightly reduced its 
imports but three-fourths of them came from Latin 
America. 
The pattern of France's banana imports is strikingly 
different. That country increased its consumption of 
bananas by 55 per cent. But out of 264,000 tons per year 
in 1952-56, 105,000 tons came from dependent territories 
and 155,000 tons from other areas, mostly from Guade-
loupe and Martinique. Virtually none in the recent past, 
and only little in the pre-war period, came from Latin 
America. 
Italy, as already mentioned, has been encouraging the 
production of bananas in Italian Somaliland. Its imports 
in 1952-56 amounted to 39,000 tons. This was double the 
imports in pre-war days, but only 162,000 tons came 
from Latin America as against 34,000 tons from Somali-
land. Somaliland is shortly to become independent of 
Italy. The exact status of imports from Somaliland into 
EEC areas after independence is not clear. Member 
States have, however, declared themselves willing to in-
vite Somaliland to join the EEC. 
The prospects for Latin America 
It seems quite probable that Latin American banana 
producers will encounter increasing competition from the 
African dependencies as organization of the Common 
Market progresses over the next 12 or 15 years. It is not 
clear, however, whether the absolute volume of Latin 
American banana exports to these countries will be re-
duced. On the contrary, the rapid increase in Europe's 
banana imports since the war suggests that there is still 
room for expanding their consumption in many countries. 
The long-term GATT projection of international com-
modity trade anticipates a 70 per cent increase in Western 
European imports of fruits and vegetables, consisting 
largely of bananas and citrus fruits, between 1953-55 
and 1973-75.^^ This projection is based on an income 
elasticity of 0.8, i.e., a 10 per cent increase in per capita 
income would be accompanied by an 8 per cent increase 
in expenditure on the components of the import class in 
question. Assuming that the same considerations aré 
applied to the EEC countries as to Western Europe (OEEC 
countries), the minimum that could be expected of Latin 
American banana exports to EEC would be that they 
should remain at their present level of 224,000 tons and 
the maximum would be the maintenance of their share 
(39 per cent) in total EEC banana imports, which would 
represent 374,000 tons by 1973-75. Even this broad 
range may not correspond to actual facts since the pat-
tern of banana consumption varies in the different ÉEC 
countries and since retail prices in these countries are 
not likely to be comparable even after the introduction 
of the common tariff. 
Evidence that there is, in fact, a fairly high degree of 
elasticity in the demand for bananas is shown by the 
rapid increase in the imports effected by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom since the 
Second World War. The wide divergence in the consump-
tion rate as between members of EEC also suggest that 
there are opportunities for raising the rate in countries 
that have imported the fruit on a small scale in the past. 
About two-thirds of the total EEC imports of bananas 
from Latin America in 1952-56 went to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, where they enter at present free 
of import duties. Even at this rate of importation, per 
capita consumption of bananas in that country was 
slightly less than half as great as was that of the United 
States in 1955.^ ® France's total banana imports were 
slightly greater than those of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the per capita consumption was about two-
thirds as great as in the United States. Italy's banana im-
ports were only one-fifth as great as the Federal 
Republic's, and per capita consumption was far below 
that in any of the three countries just mentioned. From 
International Trade 1956, op. cit., page 31. 
Based on data on banana imports in Banana Exports Continue 
Upward Trend, United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign 
Agricultural Circular, 12 September 1956. 
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these figures, it may be inferred that there is a large 
potential demand for this product in Europe. But the 
extent to which such demand will be filled will depend on 
the cost of bananas to consumers, the purchasing power 
of the consumers, the availability of competing fruits and 
the general patterns of consumption. 
The agreed duty on bananas imported into the Com-
mon Market area at the end of the transition period will 
be 20 per cent ad valorem. Under the Rome Treaty, the 
Federal Republic of Germany is to be allowed to con-
tinue to import bananas duty free up to a quota of 90 per 
cent of 1956 imports, less the quantities coming from 
dependencies, until the end of the second stage of transi-
tion. This figure for 1956 is specified in a protocol to 
the Treaty as 290,000 tons. During the third stage the 
quota is to be 80 per cent of the base figure, and after 
the transition period it is to be 75 per cent. Gradual 
imposition of the 20 per cent duty on imports above the 
quota would tend to increase the cost to the consumer and 
thus discourage further increase in banana consumption 
in the Federal Republic. 
In Italy, the present import duty on bananas is 36 per 
cent. Lowering it to 20 per cent will encourage banana 
consumption. But this may help Italian Somaliland rather 
than Latin America. With Italian policy favouring de-
velopment of Somaliland, and with all bananas imported 
into Italy handled by a national monopoly, banana con-
sumption in Italy is likely to depend on political as much 
as on economic considerations. France will, no doubt, 
continue to obtain the greater part of its bananas from its 
own African dependencies and from Guadeloupe and 
Martinique. 
There is a considerable elasticity in the potential de-
mand for bananas in the EEC area. But the growth of 
banana consumption over the next fifteen years cannot 
be measured without knowing the degree to which con-
sumers' incomes will in fact be raised and also what the 
effect will be of the various influences now restricting 
their use. 
On the supply side, there is an obvious opportunity to 
produce more bananas in the EEC dependencies in Africa. 
Conditions there may not be as favourable as in some of 
the Latin American regions. Nevertheless, there are al-
ready European-owned plantations producing for export 
in French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, the French and British 
Cameroons and in the Belgian Congo. Furthermore, some 
time will yet be required to determine whether increasing 
production in these African areas will fully cover the 
increased consumption in the EEC countries, or whether 
Latin America will also continue to benefit from it. It is 
at least clear that there will be stronger African competi-
tion than in the past. 
5. Cotton 
Value of trade 
For the period 1952-56 cotton imported by the six 
members of the EEC was valued at an average of $797 
million per year, as is shown in table 20. Of this amount, 
$256 million worth of cotton was imported by France, 
$237 million by the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
$160 million by Italy. Latin America shipped to the EEC 
countries cotton valued at $153 million, or 19 per cent 
of the total. Four Latin American countries delivered 
cotton worth an average of more than $10 million per 
year. These were Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Nicaragua, 
in order of magnitude. Considering the values involved, 
it is clear that the cotton trade is one which deserves 
attention. 
Table 20 
RAW COTTON: VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY, 1952-56 










Total imports . . , 797,053 237,290 256306 160Í97 81,589 61,371 
Source of imports: 
Latin America . . . 152,707 73,767 27,239 13,667 26,601 11,433 
843 279 133 2,324 968 
Brazil 39,756 18,813 10,220 7,651 1,897 1,175 
Mexico . . . 59,260 30,726 7,982 4,567 12,515 3,470 
Nicaragua . . . 12,808 8,903 185 1,542 1,921 
Paraguay 2,913 927 255 27 1,327 377 
Peru 10,111 8,091 757 6,214 2,925 
1,967 227 205 321 392 
Africa 
EEC dependencies , . . . , . 53,178 8,822 31,866 16 12,094 380 
Other Africa . 140,761 40,878 52,978 37,500 4,310 5,095 
113,823 144,423 109,114 38,584 44,463 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
Under the Rome Treaty, cotton is to enter the Euro-
pean Common Market free of import duties. Thus, the 
Latin American producers will be in as favourable a 
position as any other producers, including those in the 
EEC overseas dependencies. 
In addition, it is probable that, with the development 
of a large free-market area, consumer income in the six 
member countries will increase to some degree, generating 
greater demand for textile products than at present. 
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Cotton growing countries would therefore seem to have 
no reason for serious apprehension regarding their Euro-
pean markets unless the African dependencies should ma-
terially increase their cotton production in competition 
with present established cotton growers elsewhere. The 
probability of such a development is analysed below. 
Production trends 
A long-term projection by GATT indicates that, from 
1953-55 to 1973-75, there is likely to be an increase of 
45 per cent in the output of textile products in Western 
Europe and of 67 per cent in North America.''® But it is 
pointed out that the proportion of synthetic fibres used 
in making such products has been rising by about 2 
points per year since the war and now stands at about 
35 and 20 per cent of total fibre consumption in the 
United States and Europe, respectively. Assuming that 
this trend continues, virtually all of the increased fibre 
consumption in 1973-75 would be accounted for by the 
synthetics, and there would be but little need for in-
creased production of such natural fibres as cotton, wool 
or silk. 
On the other hand, some authorities question the con-
tinuance of this trend at its recent rate. They point to the 
sharp increase in world cotton exports and consumption 
since cotton prices dropped in early 1955. If cotton prices 
remain at competitive levels, they reason, this fibre may 
continue to hold a large, if not the largest, share of the 
market for textile fibres. It is clear, however, that prices 
would have to decline further if there were any material 
increase in cotton production. 
Another influence that will affect the volume of cotton 
production is technology. The development of new and 
better cotton varieties, improved methods of cultivation 
and of controlling diseases and pests and the more exten-
sive use of mechanized equipment all affect cost-price 
relationships and will influence the marginal level of 
cotton production in each area. This subject, however, 
goes beyond the scope of this study. For the present, only 
general production trends can be reviewed and a brief 
analysis made of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the regions principally concerned from the standpoint 
of cotton growing. 
Trends in cotton production since 1935-39 are shown 
in table 21. From this period until 1952-56 cotton pro-
duction in Latin America increased 53 per cent, from an 
annual average of 3,073,000 to 4,706,000 bales. Most of 
this increase is accounted for by the rapid rise in pro-
duction in Mexico, although Argentina, Nicaragua, and 
El Salvador also expanded their output by large per-
centages. 
At the same time, the EEC dependencies in Africa in-
creased their cotton production by 80 per cent, from 
242,000 to 440,000 bales. But it should be noted that 
their 1952-56 production was still less than one-tenth as 
great as that of Latin America, and less than one-sixth 
as great as the rest of Africa, including Egypt and Sudan. 
The percentage expansion in Latin America and that in 
the dependent territories both exceeded the 22 per cent 
rate of growth for the world as a whole and the 12 per 
cent increase in the United States. 
It does not seem likely that cotton production in the 
EEC African dependencies will prove a very serious 
i» International Trade, 1956, op. cit., pages 27-28. 
Table 11 
C O T T O N : P R O D U C T I O N I N S E L E C T E D F I V E - Y E A R 
PERIODS» 
(Thousands of 480-lb bales, net weight) 
1935-39 1947-51 1952-56 
(Annual averages) 
Latin America 
Argentina 288 513 560 
Brazil 1,948 1,532 1,540 
Mexico 333 883 1,652 
Nicaragua 9 20 143 
Paraguay 111 52 54 
Peru 377 345 480 
El Salvador 9 29 96 
Others 127 182 474 
TOTAL 3,073 4,455 4,706 
United States 13,097 13,603 14,666 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
Belgian Congo 171 212 231 
French Equatorial Africa . . . 41 115 153 
French West Africa 27 25 56 
Italian Somaliland 3 
TOTAL 2 4 2 3 5 2 4 4 0 
Other Africa 
Egypt 1,885 1,673 1,627 
Mozambique 32 117 144 
Nigeria 35 73 133 
Sudan 247 306 434 
Uganda 280 271 290 
Others 97 103 180 
TOTAL 2 , 5 7 6 2 , 5 4 3 2 , 8 0 8 
T O T A L AFRICA 2 , 8 1 8 2 , 8 9 5 3 , 2 4 8 
Europe 146 173 459 
USSR (in Europe and Asia) . . . . 3,417 3,040 
Asia and Oceania 9,009 6,731 9,887 
WORLD TOTAL 3 1 , 5 6 0 3 0 , 8 9 7 3 8 , 4 8 5 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
a Reported in or converted to the equivalents of bales of 480 
lb net for crop years beginning 1 August in which the major 
portion of the crop was harvested. Totals include estimates for 
minor producing countries not shown separately. 
threat to Latin America in the near future. Most of the 
cotton in the dependent areas is produced in the Lake 
Chad region and in the eastern part of the Belgian Congo. 
It is probable that more land will eventually be irrigated 
in the less humid parts of French Equatorial Africa and 
in French West Africa, where the climate is suitable for 
cotton. But little cotton is likely to be produced in the 
humid regions of West Africa. High rainfall and a warm 
climate in the southern parts of French West Africa and 
Equatorial Africa make it difficult to control weeds and 
insects which thrive under these conditions. It seems 
likely that cotton expansion in central and western Africa 
will depend chiefly on the progress of irrigation in areas 
with moderate rainfall. 
Cotton exports are summarized in table 22. For the 
world as a whole it will be noted that exports are only 
about one-third as great as the amounts produced. Most 
of the difference is, of course, attributable to the con-
sumption of cotton in the countries where it is grown. 
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Exact comparisons cannot be made throughout tables 21 
and 22, because the years do not correspond exactly in 
the first and third periods. In addition, during the last 
two periods the United States was accumulating large 
stocks of cotton rather than exporting its surpluses. In 
the period 1947-51, however, the years do correspond 
and some rather interesting comparisons are possible. 
Table 22 
COTTON: EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 
(Thousands of bales of 480 lb net, for marketing years beginning 
1 August) 
1934-33 1947-51 19S2-SS 
(Annual averages J 
Latin America 
Argentina 133 71 133 
Brazil 1,065 731 849 
Mexico 105 592 1,306 
Nicaragua 3 11 128 
Paraguay 41» 42 48 
Peru 337 274 394 
El Salvador t> 14 66 
TOTAL 1 , 6 8 3 1 J 4 9 2 ^ 
United States 5 , 2 9 6 4 , 5 9 6 3 ,250 
Africa 
EEC dependencies 
Belgian Congo 133» 202 203 
French Equatorial Africa . . . 35 115 148 
French West Africa 22» 8 18 
TOTAL DEPENDENOES 1 9 0 3 2 5 3 6 9 
Other Africa 
British East Africa 334» 323 398 
Egypt 1,747 1,470 1,432 
Mozambique 25» 121 155 
Nigeria 40» 49 133 
Sudan 257 335 384 
TOTAL OTHER AFRICA» 2 , 4 1 3 2 , 3 2 7 2 ,565 
TOTAL AFRICA^ 2,603 2,652 2,934 
Asia 
India (2,746) 287 289 
Pakistan ( — ) 873 881 
Iran 80 38 166 
Turkey 84 191 296 
Syria 12 63 262 
TOTALC 3,192 1,522 2,064 
Other countries^ 116 731 1,260 
WORLD TOTAL 1 2 , 8 9 2 1 1 , 2 5 0 12 ,464 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, Foreign Crops and Markets, various issues, and 
unpublished statistics provided by the Department. 
» Calendar year average. 
t> Less than 500 bales. 
Including other areas not shown separately, 
a Mostly USSR. 
The United States was the world's largest cotton pro-
ducing nation. But because of its large domestic market, 
this country exported only 34 per cent of the cotton it 
produced in 1947-51. Asian countries, with their large 
populations and relatively small cotton crops during 
these disturbed years, exported only 23 per cent of their 
cotton, and in fact some of this was traded within the 
same region. Latin America, with a relatively smaller 
population as compared with its cotton production and 
only a moderately developed textile industry, exported 39 
Table 23 
RAW COTTON:» IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(Annual averages for selected five-year periods, in tons) 
Importing country and country or origin 1934-38 1947-51 1952-56 
Germany (post-war Federal Re-
public)^ 271,703 167,137« 259,833 
Latin America 89,120 8,120» 90,755 
Brazil 53,758 4,050» 23,278 
Mexico 6,033 1,267» 37,565 
Peru 17,602 2,113» 11,309 
African EEC dependencies . . . . 3,776 1,804» 10,227 
Other Africa<J 43,465 15,664» 39,380 
Other countries 135,342 141,550» 119,471 
France 267,858 237,787 278,769 
Latin America 22,290 26,263 30,093 
Brazil 15,636 17,664 12,167 
Mexico 1,105 6,169 8,618 
Peru 1,955 1,455 8,084 
African EEC dependencies . . . . 6,136 27,272 40,004 
Other Africad 52,518 39,176 50,189 
Other countries 186,913 145,076 158,482 
Italy 152,381 187,369 167,630 
Latin America 7,447 25,079 16,929 
Brazil 3,935 14,296 10,500 
Mexico 602 6,052 5,329 
Peru 74« 1,620 353 
African EEC dependencies . . . 1,327 395 642 
Other Africa-» 27,488 32,842 32,372 
Other countries 116,119 129,052 117,688 
Belgium-Luxembourg 109,631 94,692 94,981 
Latin America 8,410 16,505 34,040 
Brazil 5,753 5,046 4,046 
Mexico 41 5,636 15,059 
Peru 5,753 5,107 6,795 
African EEC dependencies . . . 27,490 21,622 15,199 
Other Africa"» 3,645 3,528 5,080 
Other countries 70,090 53,038 40,662 
Netherlands 50,065 55,947 69330 
Latin America 6,864 8,813 14,111 
Brazil 3,855 4,023 1,708 
Mexico 55 2,236 4,201 
Peru 1,243 1,624 3,176 
African EEC dependencies . . . 2,050 1,986 429 
Other Africa 1,806 3,067 4,892 
Other countries 39,344 42,081 49,898 
Totals 851,638 742,932 870,543 
Latin America 134,131 84,780 185,928 
Brazil 82,936 45,079 51,699 
Mexico 7,836 21,360 70,772 
Peru 27,301 33,279 37,981 
African EEC dependencies . . . 40,779 53,079 66,501 
Other Africa 128,922 94,277 131,913 
Other countries 547,808 510,797 486,201 
Source: ECLA on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
»German imports include some carded and combed cotton. 
French imports include small amounts of seed cotton converted to 
raw basis. 
"Pre-war German cotton imports from "other countries" were 
largely from the United States. 
» For Germany, a four-year average was used, 1948-51. 
d "Other Africa" includes the following amounts of cotton im-
ported from Algeria, in tons: 1934-38: France 79, Germany 8, 
Italy 2; 1947-51: France 432, Italy 13; 1952-56: France 1935, 
Germany 82, Belgium 18. 
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per cent of its output. Both the EEC dependencies and 
other African cotton producers exported in this period 
92 per cent of the cotton they produced, since they do 
not yet have large textile industries. Under these condi-
tions, if cotton production in Africa expands, a high 
proportion of the increase may be expected to enter 
directly into world trade in competition with cotton from 
other regions. 
Imports into EEC countries 
In spite of population growth and active industries dur-
ing the past few years, the EEC countries imported only 
871,000 tons (4 million bales) of cotton per year in 
1952-56 as compared with 852,000 tons (3.9 million 
bales) in the five pre-war years. This represents an in-
crease of only two per cent in imports, although the 
population had grown by one-sixth. The explanation is 
undoubtedly related to the shift in textile types and to 
the spreading use of synthetic fibres. 
The imports into the present EEC countries from Latin 
America rose from 134,000 tons (616,000 bales) per year 
pre-war to 186,000 tons (856,000 bales) in 1952-56, with 
the gain going mostly to Mexico, Peru and some minor 
producers, such as Nicaragua. At the same time EEC 
imports from the African dependencies rose from 41,000 
tons per year to 67,000, with France taking 40,000 tons 
and Belgium 15,000 tons in the most recent five years. 
Offsetting these increases in cotton purchases, there were 
declines in imports from other cotton producers especially 
the United States. 
Prospects for Latin America 
It has been shown that cotton consumption in the EEC 
countries has grown little during the past twenty years. 
Furthermore, in its projection of international trade, 
GATT concludes that most of the increase in textile pro-
duction from 1953-55 to 1973-75 will be based on larger 
amounts of synthetic fibres.®" Other authorities believe 
this forecast to be unduly pessimistic. For one thing, the 
1955 drop in cotton prices stimulated considerably more 
demand. Furthermore, the cotton textile industry may be 
60 International Trade, op. cit., page 27 et seq. 
expected to develop some new products. In addition, there 
are other industrial uses for cotton apart from its use 
in wearing apparel. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that 
the prospects for increased utilization of cotton are very 
favourable, unless prices remain at their present level 
or decline even further. 
Although most of the area of the EEC dependencies 
in Africa is not very conducive to cotton growing, there 
are opportunities for cotton production using irrigation 
in the medium-rainfall zones around Lake Chad and prob-
ably in some other sections as well. Therefore, as such 
irrigation progresses, the current growth in cotton pro-
duction is likely to continue in the dependent territories 
as well as in Latin America. Even though cotton produc-
tion in the dependencies is still relatively small, the com-
petition it offers is likely to be felt by the other producers 
during the next couple of decades. 
6. Sugar 
The value of trade 
The position of the EEC countries is different as re-
gards their supplies of sugar, on the one hand, and of 
coffee, cacao and bananas, on the other. The latter three 
commodities are produced only outside Europe, which is, 
therefore, entirely dependent on imports. Sugar, on the 
other hand, is produced in large quantities in Europe 
from beet. Consequently, imports are designed to supple-
ment local production or are intended in some cases, 
merely for re-export. Sugar production in the EEC coun-
tries in the crop year 1955 amounted to 4,952,000 tons 
and, in 1956, to 4,183,000 tons. Sugar imports in the 
calendar year 1956 were 897,000 tons, but in the same 
year, following a good beet crop in 1955, 827,000 tons 
were exported. 
The value of the EEC sugar import trade is shown in 
table 24. Total sugar imports for 1952-56 averaged $123 
million annually in round numbers. Of this, Latin America 
contributed $53 million. France imported $22 million 
worth of sugar from its dependencies of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, and a similar amount from Réunion. Little 
sugar is produced in the dependencies of the EEC coun-
tries on the continent of Africa. 
Table 24 
SUGAR: VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
C O M M U N I T Y 
(Values in thousands of dollars, annual averages for 1952-56) 
Federal 
EEC Republic of Belgium- Nether-
total Germany France Italy Luxembourg lands 
Total imports 123,300 27,746 60,589 2,554 7,168 25,243 
Source of imports: 
Latin America 52,554 15,616 12,693 585 5,470 18,190 
Brazil 1,271 — 350 — 183 738 
Cuba 46,186 14,014 12,258 553 4,626 14,735 
Dominican Republic 2,732 681 63 — 502 1,486 
Africa 22,234 — 22,136 92 — 106 
EEC dependencies 149 — 139 10 — — 
Other Africa 22,185 — 21,997» 82 — 106 
Other regions 48,412 12,131 25,759f 1,877 1,698 6,947 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
" Chiefly from Réunion. 
Includi:^ $22,521,000 from Martinique and Guadeloupe. 
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Among the Latin American sugar producers in 1952-56, 
Cuba shipped $46 million worth of sugar to EEC coun-
tries, the Dominican Republic $2.7 million, and Brazil 
$1.3 million. 
Since the pre-war years there has been a pronounced 
increase in net exports of sugar from the Western Hemi-
sphere, as is shown in table 25. From pre-war to 1952-56 
there was a very slight decrease in net shipments to 
Europe as a whole. The EEC countries, however, in con-
trast with other parts of Europe, achieved a considerable 
measure of self-sufficiency in sugar supply. In 1935-39, as 
is shown by the table, net imports into these countries 
were, roughly, 765,000 tons of sugar per year as com-
pared with only 196,000 tons in 1952-56. Thus, the 
expanding beet sugar output in the EEC countries has 
tended to reduce the demand for imports from Latin 
America. 
Table 25 
SUGAR TRADE BETWEEN PRINCIPAL PRODUCING AND CONSUMING COUNTRIES 
(In thousands of tons, annual averages for selected periods) 
Exports Imports 
1935-39 1948-51' 1951-56' 1935-39 1948-51' 1952-56' 
Latin America 
Cuba 2,605 5,346 5,057 — — — 
Dominican Republic 436 437 577 b b b 
Peru 299 287 409 b — b 
Chile — — — 128 174 211 
T O T A L LATIN AMERICA 3,440 6,332 6,396 248 364 393 
Other fTestern Hemisphere 
Canada 2 3 2 440 552 590 
British Caribbean territories. 552 666 926 7 7 8 
United States'^  84 106 62 2,722 3,255 3,595 
Guadeloupe, Martinique 102 75 165 3 3 5 
TOTAL WESTERN HEMISPHERE 4,180 7,182 7,551 3,422 4,181 4391 
Europe 
EEC countries 
Germany (post-war Federal 
285 Republic) — — 2 505 585 
238 223 530 368 270 355 
Italy 18 b b 24 65 16 
109 114 128 144 89 60 
59 130 116 147 273 257 
EEC Total 423 467 776 1,188 1,281 972 
United Kingdom 367 726 728 2,235 2,147 2,453 
TOTAL EUROPE^ 1,649® l,795f 2,053 4,019® 4 3 4 f 4,432 
Africa 
EEC dependent territories 
Algeria b b b 83 118 161 
— — — 23 41 76 
Réunion 75 89 161 b — — 
Other dependent territories 20 4 7 4 5 10 
TOTAL DEPENDENCIES 96 93 168 110 164 247 
Other Africa 
lOe 25 25 180® 185 285 
283 423 495 — — — 
Union of South Africa . . . 214 54 142 1 3 1 
TOTAL AFRICA^ 800 710 949 509 621 983 
Asia and Oceania, Total 3,701 1,722 2,512 2,208 1,415 2,602 
WORLD TOTAL 10,473 12,826 13,228 10,158 12,268 12,825 
T O T A L E E C DEPENDENQES 198 168 333 113 167 252 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
» Preliminary figures for 1951 and 1956. 
l" Less than 500 tons. 
« Excluding trade between the United States, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and United States territories. 
<1 Including other countries not shown separately. 
® Less than five-year averages for Austria, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Morocco, Poland and Spain. 




Since the Second World War, from 60 to 65 per cent 
of the world's sugar supply has consisted of cane sugar 
produced in tropical and sub-tropical regions. The re-
mainder has been produced from beet in the temperate 
zones, chiefly in Europe and the United States. Some 
Latin American sugar producers have feared that the 
formation of the European Common Market may stim-
ulate production of cane sugar in the African depend-
encies. But consideration should also be given to the pos-
sibility of increased production of beet sugar in the ÉEC 
countries themselves, if their agricultural development 
plan, yet to be developed, should raise the efficiency of 
European agricultural production. 
Sugar cane requires a warm growing season and a 
relatively rich soil. For highest sugar yield, however, it is 
desirable that the weather be relatively dry and slightly 
cooler, but without frost, for a period shortly before the 
harvest than during the main growing season. These 
conditions are approximated in some parts of the African 
dependencies. But in most of the lowlands of this region 
temperatures tend to remain uniformly warm. Further-
more, there is a tendency in most African regions for 
rain to fall rather erratically. Consequently, most of the 
French and Belgian dependencies are not particularly 
suitable for sugar cane, except for some territory in the 
Belgian Congo. There is, however, heavy sugar produc-
tion on Reunion, and conditions for sugar cane are 
believed to be favourable on the east coast of Madagascar. 
Sugar cane production might be increased here and in 
some other limited areas for the benefit of the EEC 
countries. 
Since the pre-war years there have been many im-
provements in the technology of producing sugar. From 
1935-39 to 1952-56, world sugar production rose 46 per 
cent (see table 26). Production in Latin America almost 
exactly doubled, with all of the six major producers par-
ticipating in the increase. At the same time, , there was 
a rise of 65 per cent in sugar output in Western Europe, 
a 14 per cent rise in Asia and Oceania and 71 per cent 
in Africa. In the latter case, however, the principal in-
creases were in Egypt, the Union of South Africa, and 
Mauritius. Only Réunion showed a pronounced increase 
among the EEC dependencies. In the dependencies on the 
African continent sugar production expanded from 28,000 
to 39,000 tons. While this represents a relatively large 
percentage rise, it still leaves absolute production at a 
very low level, and tropical Africa still remains a sugar 
deficiency area. 
It is evident that the growth in sugar production will 
continue. A survey of expansion plans in various coun-
tries early in 1957 showed that at least 70 new sugar 
mills are to be built in the Far East, increasing production 
in that area by about one-third.®^ The Middle East is to 
add 17 new mills, and Africa has plans for an additional 
nine. Europe is planning five more mills. North America 
is building or remodelling five. South America will have 
12 more mills than in 1950 when reported plans are com-
pleted. Of the new mills planned in Africa, one is to be 
built in French Equatorial Africa and one in the Belgian 
Congo. These two will have a combined capacity of 
Table 26 
SUGARa: ANNUAL AVERAGE PRODUCTION FOR 
SELECTED FIVE-YEAR PERIODS 
(Thousands of tons) 
Country or region 1935-39 1947-Sl 
Western Hemisphere'^ 9 , 8 5 3 1 5 , 1 1 3 1 6 , 5 7 8 
Latin Americaf^ 5 , 4 6 4 1 0 , 1 4 4 1 0 , 9 4 5 
Argentina 4 6 3 6 2 5 7 1 5 
Brazil 7 5 3 1 , 4 6 0 2 , 2 0 0 
2 , 8 8 8 5 , 9 6 7 5 , 0 2 8 
Dominican Republic 4 4 6 4 9 8 6 9 4 
Mexico 3 2 0 6 8 0 8 8 7 
Peru 4 0 3 4 6 4 6 6 0 
Guadeloupe, Martinique 1 1 3 9 6 1 8 2 
United States, Puerto Rico and 
Hawaii 3 , 5 8 7 3 , 9 4 0 4 , 2 5 5 
6 , 6 0 5 7 , 1 8 7 9 , 3 2 0 
EEC countries 2 , 3 7 9 2 , 9 2 5 4 , 3 6 9 
Germany (post-war Federal 
Republic) 5 5 4 7 3 8 1 , 2 1 0 
France 9 7 8 1 , 0 4 2 1 , 4 7 1 
3 7 6 5 1 8 9 1 1 
Belgium-Luxembourg 2 3 5 2 9 1 3 5 8 
Netherlands 2 3 7 3 3 6 4 1 9 
Western Europe, total 3 , 9 5 0 4 , 7 2 6 6 , 5 3 1 
Eastern Europe, e x c l u d i n g 
USSR 2 , 6 5 5 2 , 4 6 1 2 , 7 8 8 
USSR (in Europe and Asia) . . 2 , 5 0 5 1 , 9 9 6 3 , 3 8 5 
1 , 1 7 5 1 ,487 2 , 0 1 1 
EEC dependencies 1 1 0 1 3 0 1 9 4 
1 3 15 17 
Madagascar 15 1 3 2 2 
Réunion 8 3 1 0 2 1 7 2 
Other Africa^ 1 , 0 6 5 1 ,357 1 , 8 1 7 
Egypt 1 5 1 1 9 4 2 8 4 
2 9 0 4 2 0 5 1 7 
Union of South Africa 4 5 2 5 2 6 7 2 8 
Asia and Oceanta" 5 , 7 5 6 4 , 3 0 6 6 , 5 8 3 
1 , 1 8 2 1 , 3 5 1 1 , 8 1 8 
Indonesia - 1 , 0 9 5 2 4 0 . 7 1 1 
Philippines 9 6 0 6 9 4 1 , 1 5 6 
1 ,125 4 8 5 8 0 8 
8 1 1 8 3 9 1 , 1 6 6 
WORLD TOTAL 2 5 , 8 9 4 3 0 , 0 8 8 3 7 , 8 7 7 
T O T A L DEPENDENT TERKITOMES 2 2 2 2 2 6 3 9 7 
World Sugar Mill Developments, United States Department 
of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Foreign Agriculture 
Circular, FS 1-57, 18 February, 1957. 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
1 Centrifugal sugar for crop year indicated. 
''Including preliminary figures for 1956. 
Including other areas not shown separately. 
25,000 tons of sugar. The other African mills are to be 
widely distributed over other parts of the continent, but 
only the two mentioned are to be in the EEC dependencies. 
Imports into EEC countries 
A summary of the imports of sugar into the EEC 
countries is given in table 27. Of the annual average of 
933,000 tons imported in 1952-56, 504,000 came from 
Latin America, with Cuba by far the most important 
source. About 100,000 tons came from Africa. There 
were substantial imports by France from Martinique 
and Guadeloupe. An appreciable part of the reported 
trade, however, consists of shipments of sugar from one 
country to another within Europe. France, the Federal 
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Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands were all large 
importers, while Italy has imported very little sugar. 
Table 27 
SUGAR: IMPORTS INTO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(Annual averages for selected five-year periods, in tons, raw basis) 
Importing country and source 1934-38 1947-Sl 19S2-S6 
Germany (post-war Federal Re-
public) 14,531 502,806 246,913 
Latin America, total 4,494 298,069 161,617 
Cuba 1,659 289,420 145,612 
Africa, EEC dependencies — — — 
Other Africa — 9 — 
Other countries 10,037 204,728 85,296 
France 363,482 243,674 351,800 
Latin America, total 151,388 125,865 100,686 
Cuba 90,428 100,233 95,194 
Africa, EEC dependencies . . . . 8,278 — 25,129 
Other Africa 76,709 36,504 74,503 
Other countries 127,107 81,305 151,482 
Italy 16,617 61,389 18,441 
Latin America, total 257 34,976 2,145 
Cuba 253 31,046 1,975 
Africa, EEC dependencies . . . . 967 2 1 
Other Africa 313 15 — 
Other countries 15,080 26,396 16,295 
Bdgium-Luxemhourg 133,399 92,567 59,634 
Latin America, total 96,096 88,223 50,045 
Cuba 57,271 79,445 39,950 
Africa, EEC dependencies 7,403 2,679 — 
Other Africa — — — 
Other countries 29,900 1,665 9,589 
Netherlands 138,832 233,598 256,037 
Latin America, total 55,556 224,245 189,875 
Cuba 32,737 197,599 150,052 
Africa, EEC dependencies —• — — 
Other Africa — — — 
Other countries 83,276 9,353 66,162 
Totals—EEC imports 666,861 1,134,034 932,825 
From: Latin America 307,791 771,378 504,368 
Cuba 182,348 697,743 432,783 
Africa, EEC dependencies . . . . 16,64B 2,681 25,130 
Other Africa 77,022 36,528 74,503 
Other countries 265,400 323,447 328,824 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
Prospects for Latin America 
It was said above that natural conditions in most of 
the dependent areas of Africa are not highly favourable 
to sugar cane. It is possible that the large prospective 
increases in production elsewhere will discourage further 
expansion in this region, thus averting one possible source 
of competition for Latin America. 
In a long-term projection of international primary 
commodity trade made by GATT, it was estimated that 
the population would increase 12.5 per cent in Western 
Europe and 26 per cent in North America between 1953-55 
and 1973-75.®^ It is assumed that there will be an appre-
ciable increase in per capita income in Western Europe 
as well as in North America. This may be expected to lead 
to greater consumption of the more palatable and refined 
foods, including sugar. Each 10 per cent increase in per 
capita income is assumed to lead to a 5 per cent expan-
sion in food consumption and to a consumption of sugar 
greater by 2 per cent in Europe and by over 3 per cent 
in North America. This would seem to provide an outlet 
for such expansion in sugar production as is foreseeable 
in the near future. 
An influence in the contrary direction is the continued 
support which the European countries give to their beet 
sugar industry by means of tariff protection and quotas 
and other import restrictions. When those indirect sub-
sidies are counted, beet sugar production appears to be 
much more expensive than would the purchase of cane 
sugar. It is possible that the European Governments may 
not be willing to continue this production indefinitely at 
its present level. On the other hand, the EEC organiza-
tion is committed to the development of a programme for 
encouraging and stimulating agriculture in its member 
countries. There are appreciable opportunities for in-
creasing agricultural productivity in Europe, and sugar 
beet output may well be affected. 
Briefly, there is in prospect a continued growth of 
demand for sugar, and this seems likely to be greater in 
North America than in Europe. At the same time, the in-
creased numbers and capacity of sugar factories already 
planned can fulfil consumption requirements for several 
years in the future. There is not at present any serious 
reason to expect that Latin American sugar exports will 
be threatened by competition from Africa in the near 
future. There is more reason to be concerned about EEC 
plans and policies in Europe itself, and about the growing 
volume of production in other parts of the world. 
7. Copper 
On the basis of available information, the creation of 
a European Common Market need^ not react adversely on 
the prospects for future Latin American copper exports. 
As in the past, Chilean, Peruvian and Mexican copper 
shipments will, in the aggregate, continue to receive their 
major stimulus from the United States rather than the 
EEC market. Growing levels of industrial production in 
either of these markets, and especially in the former, 
should be far more important to Latin America's copper 
trade than the institutional arrangements consequent 
upon the Rome Treaty. 
International copper developments 
Three important developments have characterized the 
international copper industry during the present century. 
First, there has been a substantial growth in copper 
supply and demand, exceeded only by aluminium among 
the five non-ferrous metals.®® By 1956, for example, world 
mine production had increased to a record level of more 
than six times that of 1900, reflecting in turn the exten-
sive use of copper in electrical, construction, transport 
and similar industries, whose output is particularly stim-
ulated by high and growing levels of income and eco-
nomic activity. Secondly, there has been a fairly narrow 
geographic concentration as regards the origin and con-
52 GATT, International Trade, 1956, op. cit., pages 17-35. 
In order of recent importance: aluminium, copper, zinc, lead 
and tin. See Metal Statistics 1956, Metallgesellschaft Aktienge-
sellschaft, Frankfurt, Germany, 1956, table 11. Throughout this 
section, data exclude the USSR. 
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sumption of copper, with mines in North America, Chile, 
Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo long account-
ing for over 80 per cent of primary copper production, 
on the one hand, and the United States, United Kingdom 
and EEC Europe for 80 per cent or more of copper con-
sumption, on the other®^ (see tables 28 and 29). Thirdly, 
copper prices have fluctuated widely over the short term, 
with post-1946 prices rising rapidly to an unprecedented 
peak of 47 cents per pound by early 1956, followed there-
after by a sharp decline to under 30 cents at present®® 
(see table 30). From 1947 to early 1956, copper-
aluminium price developments, in terms of both level 
and stability, favoured the latter metal and helped to 
stimulate its growing substitution in many copper-using 
industries. Conversely, by late 1957 price relationships 
should moderate the incentives for such substitution. 
Trade channels 
Tables 28 and 29 shows that traditionally, with the 
United States as a key exception, the major copper-con-
suming areas import the bulk of their needs, and most 
large producers export the bulk of their output. One 
important segment of the resuhing international trade in 
copper, namely, the flow from Africa and Latin America 
towards the EEC countries, will be discussed below.®® 
Value of trade 
Although copper shipments represented less than 4 per 
cent of Latin America's primary commodity exports in 
1952-56, their value reached the substantial level of ap-
proximately $370 million annually during that period. 
Since the Second World War, two significant area shifts may 
be noted. Africa produced 19 per cent and Latin America 23 per 
cent of world production in 1936-39, whereas almost exactly the 
reverse ratios obtained in 1952-56. This was due to an 80 per cent 
increase in African production during these periods, contrasted 
with an increase of 22 per cent for Latin America. On the con-
sumption side, Europe's share of the total fell from 54 per cent 
in 1935 to only 37 per cent immediately after the Second World 
War, subsequently increasing to 46 per cent in 1956, with the 
EEC countries contributing heavily to this recent recovery. 
Despite the generally depressed copper prices between 1919 
and 1939, mine production nonetheless increased substantially. 
This was due mainly to rich new ore discoveries in Canada, Africa 
and Latin America, and to such important metallurgical innova-
tions as changing from selective underground mining to open-pit 
stripping of lower-grade disseminated deposits, and the growing 
use of new flotation processes, which increased the scale of effec-
tive operations and average copper recovery rates. From the late 
1930's to the initial post-war years, however, new primary mine 
capacity was added only gradually, as memories of inter-war price 
trends persisted. Faced with general reconstruction and develop-
ment needs and such specific stimuli as Europe's interest in non-
dollar copper and United States requirements after Korea, invest-
ment programmes steadily gathered momentum. Due to the 2-5 
years required before full-scale production is reached, the heavy 
post-war demand pressed steadily upon supplies, and copper prices 
rose as indicated above. By 1956, however, the new output that had 
been initiated by earlier investments, especially about 1950, led 
to the subsequent easing of copper prices. 
5® In simplified terms, the world copper trade follows two broad 
patterns. One involves the flow from Latin America and Africa to 
Western Europe and the United States. The second comprises 
inter- and intra-zonal trade between the United States and Western 
Europe, mainly of copper in refined and fabricated forms, or as 
component parts of consumer durables and capital goods. Thus, 
since part of the United States and United Kingdom imports from 
Latin America are ultimately re-exported to EEC countries in 
more finished forms, the final impact of EEC direct plus derived 
demand on the Latin American copper trade is greater than indi-
cated by the direct trade discussed above. For additional .data on 
the world copper trade, including the significance of intra-comnany 
trading circuits, see Non-Ferrous Metals in Under-Developed 
Countries, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1955, II.B.3. 
Table 11 
MINING OF COPPER, BY PRINCIPAL WORLD REGIONS» 
(Annual averages, in thousands of tons) 
1936-39 •1947-51 1952-56 
2,177 2,633 
1,006 1,141 
United States 622 775 869 
231 272 
365 465 661 




Latin America 433 509 528 
397 412 
41 62 57 
Peru 36 26 38 
Othersc 24 21 
All others^ 197 303 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1956, and United 
States Bureau of Mines, 
a Excluding USSR. 
b Mainly South West Africa and Angola. 
= Mainly Cuba and Bolivia. During 1947-56, approximately 80 
per cent of the amount came from Cuba. 
^ Including Europe, Asia and Australia. 
Table 29 
WORLD® CONSUMPTION" OF COPPER, BY PRINQPAL 
REGIONS 






World total 1,315 2,266 2,740 3,226 
North America 565 1,229 1,366 - 1,461 
United States 524 1,133 1,254 1,329 
Canada 41 96 112 132 
712 844 1,113 1,445 
91 109 139 184 
Germany^ 221 132 249 351 
Italy 63 54 75 110 
Belgium-Luxembourg . 27 54 68 73 
Netherlands 5 14 26 37 
(EEC countries) (407) (363) (558) (755) 
United Kingdom 220 343 395 509 
Other Europed 85 138 160 181 
All others^ 38 193 261 320 
Source: American Bureau of Metal Statistics, Yearbook, various 
issues, and converted from short tons to metric tons, 
a Excluding USSR. 
Including consumption of secondary copper on partial report-
ing basis, and hence not directly comparable with data on primary 
copper production. 
1935 data cover pre-war boundaries; post-war data the Fed-
eral Republic, 
d Mainly Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. 
® Including Latin America, Japan, Australia and Asia. In 1956, 
Latin America accounted for less than 2 per cent of this total, 




PRICE RELATIONSHIPS OF COPPER AND ALUMINIUM IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
(Cents per pound, and percentages) 
Copper» AluminiumP 
Aluminium as 
% of copper 
Average 1935-1939 10.45 20.22 193 
1947-1951 21.53 16.89 78 
1952-1956 36.40 22.36 61 
1956: January 43.75 24.40 56 
March 46.73 24.40 52 
June 45.06 25.90 57 
September 39.60 27.10 68 
1957: January 35.53 25.00 70 
March 31.45 25.00 80 
25.00 83 
Source: American Bureau of Metal Statistics, Yearbook, 1956, 
June 1957, and Engineering and Mining Journal, selected issues. 
" Annual and monthly averages, electrolytic, domestic refineries. 
New York quotations. 
•> Annual and monthly averages, 99 per cent virgin ingots, New 
York quotations. 
Chile is by far the principal Latin American exporter, 
accounting for 80 per cent of the area total. As a direct 
market outlet, the EEC countries have in recent years 
tended to absorb a relatively small proportion of such 
exports. Since 1952, for example, only one-sixth of Latin 
American copper exports by value is estimated to have 
gone directly to the EEC countries, with over two-thirds 
going to the United States, and the United Kingdom being 
the next most important single customer. 
Copper imports into the EEC countries from all areas 
averaged $540 million annually between 1952 and 1956.®''^  
As may be seen from table 31, the Federal Republic of 
Germany is the largest importer ($154 million), followed 
by Belgium-Luxembourg ($142 million) and France 
($128 million). The Netherlands and Italy absorbed only 
one-fifth ($116 million) of the total. A substantial amount 
of all EEC copper imports originates from developed 
countries in various finished forms. In fact, intra-EEC 
trade in copper, together with imports from the United 
States and the United Kingdom, represented $271 million 
or almost exactly half of the $540 million involved. 
The remaining 50 per cent consisted of EEC imports in 
forms in which Africa and Latin America are more 
directly competitive with one another, and of this share 
Africa was the major supplier, exporting $205 million 
annually to the EEC countries since 1952. Within Africa, 
moreover, the EEC dependent areas (almost exclusively 
the Belgian Congo) accounted for $157 million of this 
total. The balance of EEC imports came from Latin 
America, averaging $64 million annually since 1952. As 
might be expected, this trade is of primary interest to 
Chile, which provided $53 million, or more than four-
fifths of all Latin American copper exports to the EEC 
market. Peru and Mexico shared evenly in the remaining 
$11 million. 
This section and related statistics refer to copper in wrought 
and unwrought forms, but excludes ores and concentrates. Total 
EEC copper imports of the latter averaged only $28 million an-
nually between 1952 and 1956, with 96 per cent purchased by the 
Federal Republic of Germany alone. Latin America provided about 
$5 mUlion of the $28 million involved, with Chile exporting almost 
the entire amount. 
Table 31 
COPPER: IMPORTS INTO EEC COUNTRIES FROM SELECTED AREAS» 










Total imports 539.8 153.6 127 S 69.0 142.3 47.4 
Source of imports 
Latin America 63.7 41.6 3J 17.2 0.7 0.9 
Chile 52.7 35.5 1.5 14.3 0.5 0.9 
Peru 5.7 1.6 1.8 2.2 0.2 — 
4.4 — 0.7 — — 
Africa 205.1 14.2 39.4 25.2 1262 0.1 
— 31.0 8.0 117.8 — 
Other Africa 48.2 14.2 8.3 17.2 8.4 0.1 
Other regions 271.0 98.8 84.9 26.7 15.4 463 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others listed in the appended Note on 
Statistical Sources. 
® Including copper alloys, refined and not refined, unwrought; copper and copper alloys— 
worked bars, rods, plates, sheets, wires, pipes, tubes, castings, and forgings (SITC Oode 682). 
Excluding ores and concentrates, which averaged less than $28 million annually between 1952 and 
1956, with 96 per cent imported by the Federal Republic of Germany. Latin America provided 
around $5 million of this amount, with Chile exporting almost the entire area total. 
Volume of trade 
After the Second World War, the initial volume of 
EEC copper imports was far below immediate pre-war 
levels (see table 32) . To a considerable extent this was 
due to the special situation of Germany®® and the lower 
levels of European industrial activity at that time. But in 
more recent years income and production have risen 
B8 Pre-war data apply to boundaries before partition, and post-
war refer only to the Federal Republic of Germany. The pre-war 
period included sizeable imports for military purposes. 
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markedly in the EEC countries, and in consequence their -
copper imports expanded by almost 50 per cent between 
1947-51 and 1952-56. The Federal Republic of Germany 
has recorded by far the largest growth and, during the 
two post-war periods mentioned above, German imports 
of this metal increased 2 times whereas in none of the 
other did the expansion surpass 50 per cent. During 
1952-56, therefore, the Federal Republic's rapidly grow-
ing industrial output has resulted in its becoming the 
largest copper importer, absorbing 30 per cent of the 
EEC total. Belgium, which imports primarily from the 
Congo and subsequently re-exports copper in refined 
forms or as manufactures, is second with 27 per cent. 
France, which also obtains sizeable amounts of copper 
from the Congo, is third with 22 per cent. The Nether-
lands and Italy, despite their rapid rates of consumption 
in recent years, together imported only 20 per cent of 
the EEC total. 
Table 32 
COPPER: IMPORTS INTO EEC COUNTRIES» 
(Annual averages in selected five-year periods, in tons) 
Importing country and source 1934-38 1947-51 19S2-56 
Belgium^Ltixembourg^ 172,233 166,638 178,962 
Latin America 254 67 1,245 
African EEC dependencies . . . . . 119,204 117,685 147,616 
Other Africa 4,019 5,416 16,146 
Other countries 48,756 43,470 13,955 
124,119 114,295 148,884 
Latin America 25,027 30,895 4,235 
African EEC dependencies . . . — 7,686 38,525 
Other Africa 3,934 12,769 9,608 
Other countries 95,158 62,945 96,515 
Germany'^ 228,589 58,6604 200,701 
Latin America 28,427 6,78ia 49,289 
African EEC dependencies . . . . 24,945 228<i 25 
Other Africa 52,863 8,430a 18,224 
Other countries 122,354 43,2211 133,164 
Italy 64,121 87,165 
Latin America , . 21,028 20,Í33 19,886 
African EEC dependencies . . , 4,022 4,567 10,379 
Other Africa . . 20,698 8,230 21,586 
Other countries 35,346 31,191 35,318 
Netherlands 23,762 43,842 54,388 
Latin America 727 151 1,138 
African EEC dependencies . . . 85 — 41 
Other Africa 243 23 29 
Other countries 43,668 53,180 
EEC countries 629,799 447,556 670,100 
Latin America 75,463 58,027 75,793 
African EEC dependencies . . . .. 148,256 130,166 196,586 
Other Africa'^ , 81,757 34,868 65,593 
Other countries 324,321 224,495 332,132 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of national statistics and others 
listed in the appended Note on Statistical Sources. 
a Including unwrought and semi-manufactures, but excluding 
scrap, ores and concentrates. 
1» Including scrap in 1934, 1947-48. 
Pre-war Germany in 1934-38 and the Federal Republic in post-
war years. 
•J Average for 1948-51. 
® Imports from Algeria, averaging approximately 400 tons an-
nually during 1952-56, are included in "Other Africa". 
Not only has Africa's share of EEC copper imports 
risen in the course of time (from 37 per cent in 1934-38 
to 40 per cent in 1952-56) but, in addition, this strength-
ened position has been due to expanded output from 
their, African dependencies, which now provide 29 per 
cent of such imports in contrast to only 23 per cent 
before the war. Heavy Congo shipments to Belgium and 
France have led to this development, and the two latter 
countries by themselves at present import approximately 
95 per cent of all the EEC copper that originates in EEC 
dependencies in Africa. 
By 1952-56, the volume of Latin American copper 
exports to the EEC countries was almost exactly the 
same as in 1934-38, with Chilean shipments being 
slightly below pre-war levels, and the small shortfall 
being offset by new production from Mexico and Peru. 
However, since EEC imports from all areas had risen 
during such time, Latin America's relative position as a 
supplier declined from 13 per cent in the pre-war to 11 
per cent in the post-war period mentioned. At present, 
as in the past, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Italy are the two main customers, absorbing 65 per cent 
and 25 per cent, respectively, of total EEC copper im-
ports from Latin America during 1952-56. 
Thus four main factors are basic in assessing the 
possible impact of the creation of the EEC on Latin 
America's future copper trade. First, the six members 
have experienced a very substantial increase in the vol-
tmie of their copper imports during recent years. Sec-
ondly, Africa has always been a far more important 
supplier of EEC copper than has Latin America, and 
due to its rapid post-war growth in production, Africa's 
share of total EEC imports has been further strength-
ened while Latin America's has declined. Thirdly, Bel-
gium and France at present account for over 80 per cent 
of all EEC copper imports from Africa, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Italy for 90 per cent of all 
EEC imports from Latin America. In the future, Belgian 
and French imports will undoubedly continue to be 
largely met by African, especially Congo copper, and 
even in the absence of a Common Market, Latin America 
would probably not make significant inroads into this 
well-established trade. Latin America's prospects in the 
EEC countries therefore seem likely to depend chiefly 
upon the Federal RepuLlic of Germany and Italy, and 
since the EEC common tariff does not involve any area 
discrimination for unwrought copper imports, Latin 
America's future position will hinge, not upon the insti-
tutional aspect of the Common Market but upon normal 
commercial considerations of prices and availability. 
Finally, EEC Europe will probably continue in the future 
to be the major market for copper from its African 
dependencies,®® whereas the United States can be ex-
pected to remain the chief outlet for Latin American 
copper, at least in terms of the initial destination of such 
exports. The impact of the EEC on Latin American cop-
per, in brief, should not be considered separately from 
the over-all trends of future United States and European 
industrial growth and requirements. 
Future prospects 
Considering that copper consumption has increased 
appreciably in response to past levels of world income 
and production, future industrial expansion should con-
tinue to induce a rising trend in copper requirements. 
This seems particularly warranted, since growth pros-
as The United Kingdom is also, of course, an important importer 
of African copper. From 1952-1955, for example, the Rhodesian 
Federation alone provided about three-fifths of all United King-
dom copper imports by value. 
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pects are especially favourable for those specific indus-
tries from which the major stimulus to copper consumj)-
tion derives.®" While lesser-developed countries will 
contribute to this demand, the current estimates for metal 
requirements in the United States and Western Europe 
are of major importance. Recent GATT projections, for 
example, consider that North America and West Euro-
pean consumption of four basic non-ferrous metals 
(copper, lead, zinc and tin) will, in the aggregate, expand 
by almost 50 per cent between 1953-55 and 1973-75 (see 
table 33). Even if it is assumed that copper shares only 
linearly in this expansion, the resultant trend would still 
compare favourably with past periods when copper con-
sumption was increasing substantially The same 
90 As pointed out in i^orld Minerals and World Peace (The 
Brookings Institution, 1942), there has been a close correlation 
between long-term trends in world industrial and mineral produc-
tion. During the past quarter century, comparable relationships 
may be noted between United States and European copper con-
sumption, on the one hand, and the production levels of the dur-
able goods manufactured from them, o.n the other. 
The above 50 per cent increase over 20 years represents a 
cumulative annual growth rate of 2 peí cent. According to avail-
able long-term data, combined United States and European copper 
consumption increased at a cumulative annual rate of approxi-
mately 1.8 per cent between 1926-30 and 1950-54. 
source, moreover, assumes that the North American and 
West European import volume will grow faster, i.e, by 
over 60 per cent in the next 20 years. Although imports 
are shown on a net basis, and copper is not individually 
projected, such estimates and several others recently 
published all indicate a strong and continued stimulus 
to consumption and exports of this metal.®^ 
See especially: (a) the list of factors leading to the con-
clusions that ". . . the long run trend of world copper consumption 
is unmistakably and strongly upward", in OAS document 5, Com-
modity Market Trends, Volume II, July 1957, and that ". . . copper 
is expected to be consumed in increasing quantities in the future, 
following much the same growth pattern as in the past . . .", in 
Minerals, Facts and Problems, Copper, Bulletin 556, United States 
Bureau of Mines, 1956; (6) the expanded level of "free-world" 
per capita copper consumption forecast for 1965 in Iron Age, 3 
January 1957; (c) the estimated doubling of gross United States 
copper imports from 1956 to 1975, in United States Imports and 
World Trade, Henry Aubrey, Oxford University Press, 1957; and 
( ¿ ) the substantial growth in United States and other "free-world" 
copper requirements by 1975, in Resources for Freedom, Presi-
dents Materials Policy Commission ("Paley Report"), 1952, 
Vol. II. It should be noted, moreover, that some of the 1975 pro-
jections in the latter study have already been nearly attained, due 
to the rapid increase in "free-world" production and consumption 
between 1952 and 1957. 
Table 33 
PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND NET IMPORTS OF NON-FERROUS METALS INTO 
WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1953-55 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1973-75 
Western Europe North America Total 
19S3-SS 1973-75 19S3-SS 1973-75 1953-55 1973-75 
(million tons copper equivalent) 
Major non-ferrous metals 
Production^ 
Conventional metals'' . . . 0.27 0.3 1.75 2.3 2.02 2.6 
Aluminium 0.32 0.5 1.21 3.0 1.53 3.5 
0.59 0.8 2.96 5.3 3.55 6.1 
Consumption 
Conventional metals'" . . . 2.10 3.5 2.66'= 3.5 4.76 7.0 
Aluminium 0.44 1.6 1.07 2.4 1.51 4.0 
2.54 5.1 3.73<= 5.9 6.27 11.0 
Net imports 
Conventional metals'» . . . 1.83 3.2 0.91 1.2 2.74 4.4 
Aluminium 0.12 1.1 —0.14 - 0 . 6 —0.02 0.5 
1.95 4.3 0.77 0.6 2.72 4.9 
(Thousands of millions of dollars) 
Value of net imports (f.o.b.) 
of all non-ferrous metals 
and ores, including iron and 
manganese ore 1.01 2.2 0.64 0.8 1.65 3.0 
Source: GATT, International Trade 1956, page 270 (Geneva, June 1957). 
® Mine production for the conventional metals, smelter production for aluminium. 
•> Copper, lead, zinc, and tin. 
<= Including about 330,000 tons in copper equivalent added to stocks. 
Note: All figures (also values) refer in principle to primary metal only. Scrap is therefore 
excluded from the trade values. 
On the other hand, economic recessions, as well as 
labour disputes and future tariff and tax measures could 
all modify the favourable trends indicated above. Since 
these are uncertain as regards their occurrence or effect, 
mention will only be made of some technological and 
price factors which might encourage substitution and 
copper-saving practices. Regarding the latter, a growing 
use of secondary recovery scrap and of new alloys will 
limit the extent to which demand is satisfied by primary 
copper. As for substitution, the extremely rapid growth 
in the use of aluminium may well be a most important 
development moderating the future demand for copper. 
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Thus, in addition to its rapid rate of expansion over 
time, the absolute level of aluminium production since 
1954 has, for the first time in history, been equivalent to 
copper in terms of volume. This sharp degree of compe-
tition has been due both to the physical characteristics 
of aluminium, and as mentioned earlier, to aluminium-
copper price movements between 1947 and 1956. In view 
of recent indications of a continued easing of the copper 
supply-demand balance, however, copper prices could 
remain well below their 1955-56 levels for some time to 
come. Certainly the post-war relative price relationships 
stimulating the replacement of copper by aluminium 
would be significantly altered if levels of the past year 
are maintained. 
On balance therefore, the long-term prospects for 
world copper production and trade are favourable. Latin 
America seems well equipped to maintain its recent 
shares in both. This is based on the view that Latin 
America's existing installations and techniques, such as 
those in Chile, are well advanced in both primary pro-
duction and processing; that its labour force is large 
and adequately trained; that its access to the facilities of 
United States parent companies can make modern tech-
nology and new resources available for expansion; and 
that its production costs compare favourably with those 
of other important producing areas of the world.®® More-
over, Latin America's estimated mineral reserves are 
among the world's largest and have a high ore content. 
Again, according to a recent survey of current invest-
ment programmes for expanding world primary copper 
production to be completed by 1962, those for Latin 
America are the largest among the regions tabulated (see 
table 34). 
Table 34 
ESTIMATED NET EXPANSION IN WORLD COPPER MINE 
CAPAOTYa 
(In thousands of short tons) 
United States Other World 
capacity capacity capacity 
1956 2,183 3,313 
1962 2,666 3,944 
Source: Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1957. 
® Capacity in 1956 plus net new additions to capacity until 1962 
inclusive. 
b Of the 483,000 net addition in this column, Latin America is 
estimated to account for 204,000; Africa for 146,000; and Canada 
for 63,000. Within Latin America, individual area shares are as 
follows: Chile, 79,000; Peru, 120,000; and Nicaragua, 5,000. 
Within Africa, individual area shares are as follows: Northern 
Rhodesia, 107,000; Southern Rhodesia, 9,000; French West Africa, 
22,000; and Kenya and Uganda, 8,000. 
In the United States, growing industrial requirements 
will press steadily upon domestic copper output, thereby 
requiring a continued and growing volume of copper 
83 See, for example, ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1953, and Economic Review of Latin America, special issue, 
Bogotá, Colombia, August, 1955, pages 32 et seg.; OAS document 
5, op. cit.; and Bureau of Mines Publication 556, op. cit. The last 
named study offers the interesting contrast that ". . . African pro-
ducers face transportation difficukies and shortages of fuel, power 
and skilled labour" whereas in Latin America the ". . . vagaries 
of local government policies" are stressed. 
imports.®^ The current Latin American investment pro-
grammes and a continuation of copper's present techno-
logical and pricing characteristics should help to 
maintain the area's position as the largest single sup-
plier of this important market. As for Europe, the EEC 
countries have long relied far more on African than on 
Latin American copper imports. Since no tariffs are to 
be levied on unwrought copper (refined or not)®® under 
the Rome Treaty, normal commercial considerations 
rather than institutional factors should continue to de-
termine whether the relatively small share that Latin 
American contributes to the EEC copper trade will rise 
or fall. This is so particularly since there are no indi-
cations of additional new projects under way to expand 
primary capacity in the African dependencies. Further-
more, the expansion of industrial activity that underlies 
the entire Common Market scheme is expected to require 
a continued and substantial growth of EEC non-ferrous 
metal imports, including copper, over the long term, and 
Latin America can compete directly for part of this 
growing market. Even if an expansion of copper mining 
capacity in the Congo were to take place and if the EEC 
countries were to obtain a larger share of imports from 
that colony, their copper imports in various finished 
forms from the United States are also likely in increase. 
This in turn would ultimately stimulate additional Latin 
American exports to the latter country. Directly and 
indirectly therefore, the same factors that have influ-
enced past demand for Latin American copper, namely 
growth in the European and especially United States 
industrial output, should influence future Latin Ameri-
can copper exports to a far greater extent than EEC 
institutional arrangements. 
8. Prospects for selected commodities 
Development of the European Common Market and 
the removal of trade barriers between the six member 
countries should appreciably raise consumer purchasing 
power. This should lead to an increased demand for 
each of the six major commodities just discussed. The 
African dependencies of France and Belgium have al-
ready been expanding their output of the five agricul-
tural commodities. T^e rate at which such production 
continues to rise will depend on world demand and also 
on Government policies designed to increase social 
overhead capital. It will also be influenced by the amount 
of agricultural research and extension work and of new 
capital invested in agricultural enterprises, and by the 
investment in new highways, railways, port improve-
ments and irrigation works. The rate of increase for 
During the decade 1931-40, the ratio of United States copper 
imports to domestic mine production was 45 per cent. From 1947 
to 1956 this ratio increased to 63 per cent. Moreover, three-fourths 
of all United States domestic production comes from open pit 
operations ". . . which face eventual termination due to increas-
ingly adverse ratios of waste rock that must be removed to un-
cover copper ore", as mentioned in the Bureau of Mines Bulletin 
556, op. cit. In the event of excessively high imports or low prices, 
of course, there is always the prospect that stricter measures will 
be introduced to protect domestic producers. Under existing legis-
lation, for example, a 2 cent excise tax can be levied if copper 
prices fall below 24 cents per pound. 
65 According to available sources, the only relevant EEC country 
tariffs now applying to such types of copper, which comprise 
90-95 per cent of all EEC imports, are the duties levied by the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on refined copper of 5 
and 1-3.5 per cent, respectively. Tariffs up to 10 per cent may be 
levied on wrought copper under the Treaty. 
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each commodity will also be affected by the competition 
between it and other local crops for the limited supply 
of labour, land and capital. And it will, of course, be 
influenced by the speed with which plantation operators 
and native producers avail themselves of existing tech-
nological opportunities. 
As regards coffee, it is apparent that Latin American 
producers will encounter increasing competion from 
Africa. African production has already been rising at a 
rapid rate and will continue to do so for several years as 
a result of new plantings. This expansion was already 
under way before EEC. Furthermore, expansion is also 
occurring in other part of Africa as well as in the EEC 
territories. 
The bulk of African coffee is of the Robusta type 
which is in less demand than the Arabica coffee pro-
duced in Latin America. Most of it has been going to 
Europe, especially to France. But the United States has 
also become a heavy purchaser of Robusta coffee, either 
for blending or for use in the manufacture of soluble 
coffees. There is, however, some limit to the percentage 
of Robusta that can be mixed with other types without 
affecting consumer preference. Consequently, as the sup-
ply of Robusta increases, its price is likely to decline 
relatively to that of Arabica. 
There are some factors which will offset the increasing 
supply of coffee. In the first place, population is growing 
in consumer areas, both in Europe and in the United 
States. Secondly, there has been some shift in consumer 
habits towards greater coffee consumption in Europe 
since the end of the Second World War. Thirdly, there 
is a possibility that the internal taxes levied on coffee in 
some European countries, such as the Federal Republic 
of Germany may be reduced, thereby placing coffee 
within the reach of a greater number of consumers. 
Finally, the greater part, though not all, of the Latin 
American coffee is of a better quality than most African 
coffee. And the majority of Latin American producers 
are ahead of most African producers in technology. But 
there are exceptions to both statements. There are some 
good African producers and there is some very high 
quality African coffee. Latin American producers would 
be advised to make prompt use of the higher yielding 
new coffee varieties, fertilizers, and newly developed 
techniques if they wish to keep ahead of their African 
competitors. Henceforth they will find it even more neces-
sary than before to give close attention to keeping down 
their costs and simultaneously maintaining the highest 
possible standards of quality. 
Production of cacao in the EEC dependent areas has 
risen by nearly 70 per cent since pre-war years, while 
there was only a modest increase in Latin America and 
an actual decline in African areas other than the EEC 
dependencies. Furthermore, there are new plantings 
about to bear in the EEC dependencies, and there are 
apparently vast areas of unused land suitable for cacao. 
In Ghana and Nigeria, on the other hand, the supply of 
good cacao land is becoming quite limited. Government 
authorities in the Belgian Congo and the French terri-
tories are making an effort to encourage cacao planting 
and to teach the Africans improved methods. It would 
not be surprising if cacao output continued to increase 
for some years in the future. The expansion was, how-
ever, already under way before the formation of EEC. 
Here again the Latin American producers will en-
counter increasing competition. Their best defence ap-
pears to be effectively applied research and extension 
work so that they reduce their costs and increase output 
under favourable conditions. The greater part of Latin 
America's cacao is exported to the United States. Only 
about one-sixth of its production has been going to the 
EEC countries. 
The bulk of the bananas produced in the Western 
Hemisphere is also being shipped to the United States. 
The Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium-Luxem-
bourg have been the principal EEC importers of bananas 
from this Hemisphere. France has obtained nearly all its 
bananas from its African dependencies or from Guade-
loupe and Martinique. Italy tries to limit its imports 
largely to bananas produced in Italian Somaliland. While 
conditions in the African dependencies may not be as 
favourable, in general, as in the banana-growing sections 
of Latin America, there are already large plantations in 
Africa, and banana exports doubled from 1947-51 to 
1952-55. Production in the EEC dependencies and in 
other African areas accessible to shipping facilities may 
be expected to expand further. Here, as with coffee and 
cacao, Latin American producers may expect continuing 
competition. 
On the brighter side of the picture, the rapid increase 
in banana imports into the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany after the war indicates a 
fairly high degree of elasticity in demand. In addition, 
the impact of the 20 per cent duty on bananas entering 
the EEC countries will be softened by the arrangement 
whereby the Federal Republic of Germany may continue 
to import, during the transition period, a large quota of 
bananas from sources other than the EEC dependencies. 
There is to be no import duty on cotton or unwrought 
copper imported into the Common Market territory. 
Thus Latin American exporting countries will be at no 
disadvantage as compared with producers in the African 
dependencies. Their principal concern is that production 
of these commodities may expand in the African depend-
encies because of the opening up of new mines, in the 
one case, or of regions favourable to cotton, in the other. 
The humid rain forest area of the EEC dependencies 
is not well suited for cotton. But there are less humid 
areas farther north where it is already being grown, and 
where production could be materially increased by irri-
gation. To the extent that such development occurs in 
the future, these areas would provide additional compe-
tition. Production in the EEC dependent territories in 
the recent past, however, was less than one-tenth as 
great as in Latin America and less than one-thirtieth 
that of the United States. Cotton production in Latin 
America has increased rapidly since pre-war years. The 
greatest concern now seems to be whether or not the 
increasing use of synthetic fibres ;WÍll,liíiiiPfhé. ácpansion 
of cotton production in general rííSier than-^ny^iinmedi-
ate threat from Africa. / — — — - ' - - . 
The bulk of Latin Amerioaa:co/>per exports has "gone 
to the United States rather tháñ tqj Europe and this-will 
no doubt continue to be the^case. Much more of the 
copper imported by EEC couiítífes has come from Africa 
than from Latin America. ThejFormation of the Euro-
pean Common Market is unlikely fg affect even the 
relatively small share of Latin American copper that is 
ordinarily sold to EEC countries. Since imwrought cop-
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per is to be admitted to the EEC area free of duty, Latin 
American producers will encounter no institutional im-
pediments to its continued sale to this area. There seem 
to be no specific EEC projects for stimulating copper 
production in the African dependencies. The trade should 
therefore continue to be guided by normal commercial 
considerations. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that 
larger direct European investments in the African de-
pendencies will be placed in exploring and opening up 
new sources of copper and other minerals in that area. 
Sugar is produced in large volumes in the EEC coun-
tries themselves from beet. Some sugar is imported to 
supplement these supplies or, in some cases, for re-
export. France, however, imports appreciable amounts 
of sugar from Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion. 
Little sugar is produced in the tropical dependencies of 
the EEC countries in Africa. Present prospects are for 
much larger increases in sugar production in other 
regions, including Latin America, than are likely in 
Central Africa. Imports into EEC countries from Latin 
America have not been large, and they will not be en-
couraged by the 80 per cent import, duty to be applied 
imder the Common Market agreement (the present aver-
age duty is 84i per cent). To some extent the expansion 
in sugar production may be balanced by the continued 
growth of population and of consumer incomes in the 
importing countries. 
In brief, cotton and unwrought copper are to be ad-
mitted to the EEC countries free of duty. Latin American 
producers of coffee, cacao and bananas, however, are 
likely to encounter increased competition from produc-
tion in the African dependencies, although this will 
develop gradually as the terms of the Rome Treaty enter 
into effect during the next 12 to 15 years. This added 
competition makes it even more important than in the 
past for Latin American producers to continue research 
and to introduce technological improvements promptly 
in order to keep down their costs and to maintain the 
best possible quality. 
Sugar is in a class by itself. Sugar production has 
been expanding on a world-wide basis, but on a very 
small scale so far in Africa. Prospects for increased 
imports of sugar into the EEC countries do not seem 
bright, partly because of continued high import duties 
and partly because the EEC countries produce most of 
their own sugar. 
V . AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Attention has been focused on the creation of EEC 
because it is believed that it may have unfavourable 
effects on the exports of tropical agricultural commodi-
ties from Latin America to the Community consequent 
upon the preferential treatment to be accorded to similar 
products from the EEC dependencies in Africa. While 
this problem has been analysed in Chapter IV, there is 
also another broad field in which primary conunodity 
competition is likely to be accentuated. The agricultural 
policy of EEC and the revolution in agricultural tech-
nology which has been taking place in Western Europe 
will have a direct bearing on the world trade in tem-
perate zone products, and, specifically, on the exports of 
Argentina and Uruguay. It seems likely that the impact 
on the exports of temperate zone commodities will be 
even greater than on those of tropical products. 
The Rome Treaty outlines the agricultural policy and 
organization of EEC in considerable detail (articles 38 
to 47). A list of the commodities to which this policy 
applies is given in Annex II of the Treaty and includes 
among other things: animal and dairy products, cereals, 
fruits, vegetables, coffee, cacao, sugar, tobacco, vegetable 
and animal fats and oils.®® Within two years from the 
entry into force of the Treaty the Council has to decide 
what articles are to be added to this already extensive 
list. The member States are to follow a common policy 
(article 38). Its purpose is: (a) to increase productivity 
by rationalization in the utilization of the factors of 
production, particularly labour; (fe) to ensure thereby a 
fair standard of living for the agricultural population; 
(c) to stabilize markets; (d) to guarantee regular sup-
plies; and (e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies 
to the consumer (article 39). 
®® Additional information on the trade prospects for these com-
modities may be found in FAO, Commodity Series No. 29, Agri-
cultural Commodities and the European Common Market (Rome, 
1957). 
To achieve these purposes, there is to be a common 
organization for agricultural markets. This is to take one 
of the following forms: (a) a system of common rules 
concerning competition; (b) compulsory co-ordination 
of the various national market organizations; (c) a 
European market organization (article 40). 
Measures may be adopted to co-ordinate occupational 
training schemes, research and popularization of rural 
economy, which may involve projects or institutions 
financed jointly. There may be common action to in-
crease consumption of certain products (article 41). The 
Council of EEC may authorize the granting of assistance 
in connection with economic development programmes 
or to protect handicapped enterprises (article 42). 
A conference of member States is to be called upon 
the entry into force of the Treaty to determine general 
lines of policy, to compare their agricultural policies and 
to draw up a statement of their resources and needs. 
Within two years from the entry into force of the Treaty 
proposals are to be submitted for working out and imple-
menting agricultural policy, including the replacement of 
national organizations by one of the forms of common 
organization mentioned in article 40 (article 43). 
Since abolition of customs duties between the member 
States may result in prices likely to jeopardize the 
achievement of the agricultural policy, during the transi-
tion period member States may apply minimum prices to 
certain products. Below those prices, imports may be 
temporarily suspended; or may be made conditional on 
their price being above the minimum price fixed for 
the product concerned. As soon as the Treaty enters into 
force, the Council is to establish objective criteria for 
establishing minimum price systems and for fixing such 
prices (article 44) . 
Until one of the forms of common organization pro-
vided for in article 40 replaces the national organization, 
expansion of trade in commodities, for which there exist 
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in member States (o) provisions designed to guarantee 
a market for national producers, and (b) a demand for 
imports, is to be pursued by the conclusion of agreements 
or long-term contracts between member States and ex-
porting countries (article 45). 
Thus, it is clear that the Common Market is conceived 
of as a highly organized and closely controlled one and 
not as a free market in the ordinary sense. Because of 
the size and importance of the EEC area, the market 
organization visualized in articles 38 to 47 should be 
able to exert a powerful influence in dealings with the 
countries that export agricultural products. This power 
becomes greater than ever when account is taken of the 
progress that has been made in recent years in increasing 
Europe's self-suf&ciency in temperate zone products. 
The agricultural revolution in Europe 
Since the end of the Second World War there has 
been a technological revolution in Western Europe that 
surpasses that of any previous period in that region and 
compares not unfavourably with the rate of progress in 
the United States. This revolution is still continuing and 
will evidently go considerably farther in the next couple 
of decades. Throughout the twentieth century. United 
States farmers have rapidly been adjusting their methods 
to technological and scientific progress. This process 
reached its most rapid rate during the Second World 
War in response to economic inducements and to a 
rapidly declining labour supply. It was this process, to-
gether with a series of favourable seasons, that led to 
the great increase in agricultural production and to the 
current surpluses of farm products. 
In Europe, the farmers' awareness of the new techno-
logical opportunities apparently developed during the 
years of recovery following the war. Progress, however, 
has been quite unequal as between different countries 
and regions. Some idea of this may be formed from 
table 35, which compares various data on land utilization, 
livestock, horses and tractors, fertilizers and feed used, 
as between pre-war years and the recent past for the EEC 
group of countries, the total area of OEEC, and the 
United Kingdom. 
In the OEEC area as a whole, there was an appreciable 
increase in the land tilled between the pre-war years and 
1952-55, an increase in the area planted to cereals, an 
increase in temporary pasture and a decline in the area 
of permanent pasture. Not all of these changes in land 
use are apparent from the figures for the EEC countries 
alone. To some extent there have been contrary move-
ments as land in some regions is no longer used for 
marginal production or has been absorbed by cities, high-
ways, or for other non-agricultural purposes. As regards 
the EEC countries, table 35 shows a 43 per cent annual 
increase in the combined tonnage of fertilizers used from 
the pre-war years to 1952-55. The increase for all OEEC 
countries was 71 per cent and for the United Kingdom 
it was 180 per cent. Crop yields have also been affected 
by improved techniques and by better pest and disease 
control. Larger yields of forage and feed grains have 
led to increases in the numbers of cattle, especially of 
milch cows, and of pigs. Bigger crop yields have enabled 
farmers to use greater amounts of coarse grains as 
cattle feed to offset reduced imports both of grains and 
of oilcake. 
One of the most far-reaching changes has been in the 
type of farm traction. Numbers of horses, mules and 
asses have declined 17 per cent since pre-war years in 
the EEC area and 67 per cent in the United Kingdom. 
Offsetting these declines there were increases of over 
800 per cent in the numbers of tractors on farms both 
in the EEC area and in the United Kingdom. Since the 
substitution of mechanical for animal traction is more 
recent in the EEC countries, the reduction in the num-
ber of horses has not gone as far there as it has in the 
United Kingdom. As more horses are disposed of, labour 
formerly expended on them can be shifted to other live-
stock or to the production of crops for direct human 
consumption. At the same time, feed formerly used by 
horses can be shifted to dairy cattle, hogs and poultry. 
The broad effect of the shift to mechanical traction on 
farms has been a transfer of the economic effort formerly 
needed to provide farm traction to the factories that 
produce tractors and the petroleum refineries that pro-
duce fuel. 
The farmer will now need to purchase tractors rather 
than raise colts as draught animals, and he must buy 
tractor fuel instead of producing forage for horses. The 
result is that he is more dependent than before on his 
commercial relationships and more vulnerable to fluc-
tuations in economic activity. 
It is apparent that the great increase in productivity 
and the shift in the use of economic resources on farms 
will have profound effects on the international trade 
between Europe and the predominantly agricultural 
countries such as those of Latin America. 
The revolution in agricultural technology is, however, 
much more than a mere shifting from animal power to 
tractors. A recently completed study by the Foreign 
Agricultural Service of the United States Department of 
Agriculture points out that the post-war expansion of 
Western European industry and trade has effected agri-
culture, in many ways.®'^  The growth of population and 
of per capita income has stimulated agricultural output. 
The urban demand for labour has drawn away partly 
employed persons from rural districts, while increased 
wages have made it profitable for the farmer to adopt 
labour-saving methods and appliances. In 1955-56, West-
ern European agricultural production was about 25 per 
cent above the pre-war level, while population had in-
creased only about 13 per cent. During the late 1940s 
agriculture made a rapid recovery from the low levels of 
the war years. This was followed by a further expansion 
in output of approximately 2.5 per cent per year from 
1950 to 1955-56, a remarkable rate for this large area. 
Furthermore, even though there was new investment in 
mechanical equipment among other things, it is apparent 
that much of the increase represents a greater output per 
unit of total input. 
The report®® draws attention to the rates of expansion 
in the output of some of the principal products since 
the mid-thirties. Fruit output has grown 70 per cent, 
sugar 50, eggs 25, milk 10, principal grains 20 and 
potatoes 10 per cent. Striking advances have been ob-
tained in the yields of grains per hectare. A 12 per cent 
increase has been obtained in yields of milk per cow 
despite smaller feed imports. 
«•i Foreign Agricultural Report No. 102, Technology and Agri-
cultural Expansion in. West Europe, Foreign Agricultural Service, 
United States Department of Agriculture, August 1957. 
68 Foreign Agricultural R ^ o r t No. 102, Technology and Agri-
cultural Expansion in West Europe, Foreign Agricultural Service, 
United States Department of Agriculture, August 1957. 
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Table 35 
SHIFTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY OF EUROPE, PRE-WAR TO 1955 
Unit EEC countries Total OEEC countries^ United Kingdom 
Item (Thousands) Pre-war 1948-51 1952-SS Pre-war 1948-51 1952-55 Pre-war 1948-51 1952-55 
Population persons 140,545 153,523» 163,685» 244,822 267,177» 285,020» 47,100 49,300» 50,900» 
Agricultural area hectares 77,904 78,337 78,418 192,094 187,992 187,872 19,552 19,521 19,432c 
Arable land " 49,641<» 47,4101 47,798^ 87,405 90,286 95,436 5,296 7,425 • 7,246 
Land in tillage " 41,5028 39,487 39,333 73,703® 74,790^ 79,373' 3,604 5,129 4,826 
Temporary grassland " 6,9298 7,923 8,465 13,702 15,496 16,063 1,692 2,296 2,420 
Permanent grassland " 20,480 21,192 21,210 58,492 51,457 46,589 7,588 5,159 5,337 
Rough grazings " 9,783i> 9,735» 9,410» 46,197 46,249 45,847 6,668 6,937 6,849 
Total cereals " 24,394 20,903 21,665 40,550 40,154 44,177 2,144 3,281 3,167 
Sugar beet " 653 836 995 983 1,233 1,420 136 171 170 
Horses, mules and asses head 7,244' 6,649» 5,953» 14,906 13,669 12,514 1,305 707 427 
Cattle, all " 39,834 39,617 42,985 75,182 77,587 82,432 8,675 10,286 10,519 
Milch cows " 15,354 16,263 18,042 28,928 30,410 32,333 3,281 3,673 3,678 
Pigs, all " 26,195 23,907 28,634 42,267 36,903 47,326 4,674 3,386 6,028 
Poultry " 266,320 235,117 268,829 473,090 455,401 489,190 91,300 110,617 105,947 
Tractors on farms Units 107 2301 1,001^ 198 5981 1,801^ 50i 2801 430^ 
Fertilizer used 
Nitrogenous tons 822 974 1,257 1,002 1,416 1,853 66 202 254 
Phosphate " 1,270 1,327 1,684 1,694 2,123 2,553 178 402 376 
Potash " 1,112 1,307 1,656 1,238 1,779 2,313 74 211 260 
Used for feed: 
Total cereals " 19,832 16,008 21,335 36,853 31,933 41,197 6,464 6,418 8,247 
Imported " 4,988 2,942 4,124 10,706 6,373 8,845 3,789 1,947 2,980 
Coarse grains ; " 15,906 13,207 17,022 30,867 27,690 35,062 5,528 5,600 6,824 
Imported " 4,289 2,855 3,780 9,817 6,160 7,884 3,649 1,868 2,556 
Oilcake, imported " 2,476 1,407 1,934 5,490 3,243 4,358 1,748 1,029 1,395 
Source: Agricultural and Food Statistics, OEEC, Paris, 1956. 
«For 1947-48. 
» For 1954-55. 
«Including arable land and permanent grassland temporarily out of use because of flooding, 20,000 hectares. 
dFor Netherlands, area of orchards included under "Permanent grassland": pre-war 34,000; 1948-51, 26,000; 1952-55, 21,500 hectares, 
e Including temporary grassland in Belgium and Portugal. 
'Including temporary grassland in Portugal. 
K Pre-war data for Belgium-Luxembourg not available. 
» France and Italy only. 
1 Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg animals on farms only. Italy excludes army animals. 
1 For 1948. 
k For 1955. 
1 Estimated from results of incomplete census taken in 1937-39. 
Including Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Turkey. 
Improved plant varieties and growing methods and 
the application of greater amounts of fertilizer per hec-
tare largely explain the increased crop output. Greater 
attention is being given to seed testing and certification. 
Agricultural agencies now give farmers more advice and 
guidance in the control of pests and diseases and the use 
of chemical weed-killers is spreading. 
In livestock production, greater attention has been 
paid to breeding, including the use of artificial insemina-
tion. In most countries campaigns have been organized 
for the eradication or control of such diseases as bovine 
tuberculosis, foot-and-mouth disease, brucellosis and hog 
cholera. 
Agriculture is a complex of many production factors 
and methods. A change in any one is quite likely to 
entail eventual readjustment in several other phases be-
fore a new equilibrium is established. It is obvious that 
the introduction of known technological improvements 
is by no means complete; the continued existence of 
farms and regions that have lagged behind in the adop-
tion of improved methods, the strong interest that has 
developed in the minds of farmers and officials and the 
present momentum of the change, together assure its 
continuation at a rather high rate. 
There is a possibility that the direction of progress 
may shift. The Department of Agriculture report points 
out that the growth of productivity may be forced to 
slow down because of limitations in the absorptive 
capacity of the market. Imports of temperate zone pro-
ducts such as cereals and oilcake have already been 
appreciably reduced. It is considered possible that West-
ern Europe may before long produce all of these crops 
that it needs for its own consumption. This may be a 
rather optimistic assumption. It may be argued that there 
are still many European families that could use greater 
amounts of farm products if they had the purchasing 
power to obtain them. There will probably be a tendency 
on the part of the European countries to continue im-
porting from overseas in order to keep markets open for 
European manufactures. Nevertheless, the supply of farm 
products might for a time outrun the increase in demand, 
thus greatly reducyng the need for imports. In fact, the 
volume of production has already been exceeding con-
sumption during the past several years, producing an 
unfavourable effect on the exports of Argentina, Canada, 
Australia and the United States. This trend may well 
continue for some years yet. 
The improvement in European farm technology dis-
cussed above occurred prior to the formation of the 
European Common Market. The removal of trade bar-
riers, however, may be expected to speed the readjust-
ment in the use of farm resources in at least three ways. 
First, the wider markets will open new opportunities to 
farmers as regards the production of various specialized 
products. This will make rationalization and readjust-
ment even more advantageous than heretofore. Secondly, 
the unification of agricultural agencies and their closer 
co-operation can hardly fail to speed up research and 
extension work, thereby increasing the need for later 
readjustment. Thirdly, the strongly centralized agricul-
tural marketing and purchasing agencies foreshadowed 
in the Rome Treaty, will constitute a powerful asset for 
this region in the reshaping of agricultural foreign 
trade. 
The prospect thus appears to be that the trade in such 
temperate zone products as cereals, oilcake, tobacco, 
meats, dairy products and fruits will shrink still further 
and that European fruits will compete more strongly 
with imports. The marked increase in European produc-
tion of sugar has reduced the market for that product. 
The growing European population and rising purchasing 
power promise a growing market for coffee and cacao. 
Whether the bulk of these products is imported from 
Latin America, however, will depend on the rate of de-
velopment in Africa and on how closely its future is 
identified with that of Europe. 
Note on statistical sources 
A . SOURCES FOR TABLES ON EEC IMPORT VALUES 
1. Coffee (table 9) cotton (table 20), sugar (table 24) and 
copper (table 31) 
1952-55 
ALL COUNTRIES: United Nations, Statistical OfiSce, Statistical 
Papers, Series D. Commodity Trade Statistics, vols. II-V. 
1956 
FRANCE AND ITALY: Organization for European Economic Co-
operation, Paris, OEEC Statistical Bulletins, Series IV, 1956. 
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG: Ministere des Affaires Economiques, 
Institut National de Statistique, Bulletin Mensuel du Commerce 
Extérieur de VUnion Economigue Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, De-
cember 1956. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: S t a t i s t i s c h e s B u n d e s a m t , Der 
Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1956. 
NETHERLANDS: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Maand-
statistiek van de in-, uit- en Doorvoer per Goederensoort, De-
cember, 1956. 
2. Bananas (table 17) and cacao (table 13) 
1952-56 
FRANCE: Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects, 
Tableau General du Commerce Extérieur, annuals and Decem-
ber 1956 monthly issue. 
ITALY: Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Stalistica Annuale del 
Commercio con I'Estero, annual and December 1956 monthly 
issue. 
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG: Ministere des Affaires Economiques, 
Institut National de Statistique, Bulletin Mensuel du Commerce 
Extérieur de VUnion Economigue Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, De-
cember issues. 
FEDERAL REPÜBUC OF GERMANY: S t a t i s t i s c h e s B u n d e s a m t , Der 
Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, December issues. 
NETHERLANDS: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Matmd-
statistiek van de in-, uit- en Doorvoer per Goederensoort, De-
cember issues. 
B . SOURCES FOR TABLES ON EEC IMPORT VOLUME 
1. Coffee (table 12) and cacao (table 16) 
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG 
1934-38 
Ministere das Finances de Belgique, Service de la Statistique 
Commerciale, Bulletin Mensuel de Commerce avec les Pays 
Etrangers, December issues, 1947, and, in part, 1938 and 1948; 
Ministere des Affaires Economiques, Institut National de Sta-
tistique, Statistigue Annuelle du Commerce Extérieur de PUnion 
Economigue Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, 1949. 
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1948^6 
Ministére des Affaires Economiques, Instituí National de Sta-
tistique, Bulletin Mensuel du Commerce de l'Vnion Ecommi^ue 
Belgo-Luxemhourgeoise, December issues. 
1951-55 (in pan) 
United Nations, Statistical 0£Bce, Statistical Papers, Series D. 
Commodity Trade Statistics (quarterly), January-December 
issues. 
1956 (in part) 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, OEEC 
Statistical Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, BelgiwmrLuxem-
bourg (bi-annual), January-December, 1956. 
FRANCE 
1934-38 and 1947-55 
Direction Genérale des Douanes et Droits Indirects, To i i eaB 
Général du Commerce Extérieur (annual). 
1956 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, OEEC 
Statistical Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, France (bi-
annual) , January-December, 1956. 
GERMANY (pOSt-WOr FEDERAL REPUBUC) 
1934-38 
Statistisches Reichsamt, Montetlicke Nachuteise iiber den Aus-
wartigen Handel Deutschlands, December issues. 
1947 
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 
Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1950, Part 2, 
Trade. 
1948-56 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik 
Detuschland, part 2 (monthly title varies for 1948-49, showing 
bi-zonal area data only), December issues. 
ITALY 
1934-38 
Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Commercio di Importazione e di 
Esportazione del Regno d'ltalia, vol. Analisi per Merci e per 
Paesi (annual—title varies for 1934-36). 
1947-55 
Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Statistica Annude del Commercio 
con I'Estero. 
1956 
Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Statistica Mensile del Commercio 
con I'Estero, December 1956, and (in part) Organization for 
European Economic Co-operation, Paris, OEEC Statistical 




Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarstatistiek van den in-, 
uit- en Doorvoer, Part 1. 
1947-56 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Maandstatistiek van den in-, 
uit- en Doorvoer per Goederensoort, December issues. 
2. Bananas (table 19) 
Same as in B above, with the following exceptions and addi-
tions: 
BELGIUM, FRANCE AND ITALY 
United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, and Organization 
for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, OEEC Statistical 
Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, are not included. 
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOÜKG 
1947 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,' 




Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects, Statistique 
Mensuelle du Commerce Extérieur, December 1956. 
3. Cotton (table 23) 
Same as in B-l above, except that the following is not included. 
ITALY 
1956 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, OEEC 
Statistical Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, Italy. 
4. Sugar (table 27) 
Same as in B-l above, with the following exceptions and addi-
tions : 
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG 
United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, and Organization 
for European Economic (¿-operation, Paris, OEEC Statistical 
Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, Belgium, are not included. 
PRANCE 
1956 
Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects, Statistique 
Mensuelle du Commerce Extérieur, December 1956, and (in 
part) Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, 
OEEC Statistical Bulletins, Series IV, Foreign Trade, France, 
January-December 1956. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1949-56 (in part) 
International Sugar Council, Pocket Sugar Yearbook, 1956. 
ITALY 
1955 (in part) 
United Nations, Statistical Office, Coiwnodity Trade Statistics, 
January-December 1955. 
NETHERLANDS 
1953 (in part) 
International Sugar Council, Pocket Sugar Yearbook, 1956. 
5. Copper (table 32 ) 
Same as in B-l above, with the following exceptions and addi-
tions : 
Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics is not included 
for any country. 
BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, NETHERLANDS 
1951-55 
United Nations, Statistical Office, Statistical Papers, Series D. 




Sources in table B-l for corresponding period are not included. 
NETHERLANDS 
1953 (in part only) 
Sources in table B-l for corresponding period are not included. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1952-56 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, part 5 (monthly), December issues. 
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D E V E L O P M E N T P O L I C I E S A N D P R O G R A M M E S ' ' ' 
H o l l i s B. C h e n e r y 
Professor of Economics, Stanford University, California 
INTRODUCTION 
In all parts of the world, Governments of the less 
developed countries have become increasingly concerned 
with policies to promote economic growth. One of the 
most popular techniques used for this purpose is the 
adoption of a development programme, whose function 
it is to provide a consistent framework for different 
types of policy. Even where over-all programmes have 
not been formulated, the extent and diversity of Gov-
ernment intervention in decisions affecting the course 
of economic activity in the long run—especially in the 
field of investment—has greatly increased. 
The questions raised by this trend in policy, which 
may be observed in Latin America as well as Asia and 
Africa, are quite diiferent from the earlier debates over 
socialism versus capitalism as ideal forms of economic 
organization. Outside the communist bloc, the advantages 
of private initiative are widely recognized in even the 
most socialistically inclined countries. The basic ap-
proach of most democratic countries is to limit inter-
vention to those aspects of economic activity where 
free-market forces do not appear to give the best results. 
Since present investment determines the future pattern 
of growth, development policies are primarily focused 
on the magnitude and composition of investment al-
though they are also concerned with the quality of 
labour and other productive factors available and with 
the distribution of income among various social groups. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the grounds 
for Government policy towards economic growth. It will 
take up in summary form: (i) defects in the free-market 
mechanism for determining the best use of resources; 
(ii) the logical basis for a development policy; (iii) 
the range of policy instruments used by Governments; 
(iv) some of the analytical techniques available for 
formulating development programmes; and (v) some of 
the problems of executing development policy. 
The main theme of this discussion is derived from Tin-
bergen's pioneering work on economic policy that the 
choice of a policy must be made on the basis of objective 
criteria and its implications tested against those of al-
ternative policies. In earlier views of economic policy, 
EDITORIAL NOTE: This article, being a personal contribution to 
the Bulletin, has not undergone the customary editorial process-
ing. 
" This paper is based on lectures given in October-November 
1957 to the E C X A / T A A Economic Development Training Pro-
gramme. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Profes-
sor Regino Boti of the Universidad de Oriente, Cuba, and of 
Dr. Thomas Vietorisz of ECLA, on many of the problems I have 
dealt with here. 
i j . Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy, 1952, and 
Economic Policy: Principles and Design, 1956. 
from laissez-faire to Marxist, it was assumed that a 
priori theorizing based on very general premises would 
lead to policy recommendations of general applicability. 
For the problems that are typically the concern of de-
velopment policy, however, the practical conclusions 
that can be reached by a priori reasoning seem to be 
very limited indeed.^ 
The traditional view of economic policy in Western 
countries is derived from the classical theory of com-
petitive equilibrium, which has been refined over the 
past century. The main policy implication of this model 
is that, under static conditions of perfect competition, 
market forces will tend to bring about the best use of 
a country's resources in the sense that the greatest 
total output consistent with individual choices will be 
achieved. Nobody can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off. To the extent that this theory 
is applicable, it follows that Government policy towards 
growth should be limited to establishing the institutional 
conditions for perfect competition, controlling monopo-
lies, redistributing income, and providing services which 
are essentially public in nature. The allocation of re-
sources should otherwise be left primarily to market 
forces. 
The Keynesian revolution of the nineteen-thirties suc-
cessfully challenged the adequacy of the classical theory 
for dealing with short-term fluctuations in income and 
employment, while leaving its conclusions as to resource 
allocation in the longer run practically unaffected. In 
nearly all countries, the scope of Government action has 
been enlarged to include the maintenance of stability in 
income, prices, and the balance of payments. There has 
been a corresponding development of macroeconomic 
analysis as a guide to these policies. 
In the past ten years there has been a similar attack 
on the adequacy of the classical analysis of resource 
allocation under dynamic conditions. Such writers as 
Rosenstein-Rodan,® Nurkse,^ Lewis,® Prebisch® and Myr-
dal,'^  have pointed out the extent to which the classical 
2 Alternative approaches to policy are discussed in H. Tyszyn-
ski, "Economic Theory as a Guide to Policy; Some Suggestions 
for Reappraisal", Economic Journal, June, 1955. 
3 Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N., "Problems of Industrialization in 
Eastern and South-Eastem Europe", Economic Journal, June-
September, 1943. 
* Nurkse, R., Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries, Oxford, Blackwell, 1953. 
5 Lewis, W. A., The Theory of Economic Growth, Richard D. 
Irwin, 1955. 
® United Nations, Theoretical and Practical Problems of Eco-
nomic Growth, ECLA, E/CN.12/221, 1951. 
^ Myrdal, G., Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, 
London, Gerald Duckworth, 1957. 
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¡ assumptions of equilibrium and perfect competition are 
I not fulfilled in the less developed countries, and the in-
adequacy of policy recommendations based on the im-
I plicit use of the static competitive model. An alternative 
form of analysis has not yet been developed, however, 
and in its absence development policy tends to be guided 
by partial analyses and improvised principles. 
The elements of a new approach to development policy 
are to be found in various places. Tinbergen® has pro-
vided a logical framework for the analysis, in which the 
selection of policy instruments and the analysis of their 
effects are determined by the nature of the problem. In 
this approach, the classical model is one among several 
alternatives, each of which can be weighed in terms of 
the adequacy of its analysis and the workability of its 
policy implications. 
A policy of Government intervention in certain sectors 
requires an analysis of the economy which can explicitly 
take into account some of the elements that are lacking 
in the classical model. It is not sufficient to point out 
- that competitive equilibrium rarely exists; to improve 
on the results of this assumption it is necessary to de-
termine the nature of the departures from equilibrium 
and how they affect the optimal resource allocation. 
Among the tools of economic analysis that may be used 
for this purpose, inter-industry analysis is one of the 
8 Op. cit. 
most promising, since a development programme must 
take into account the inter-relations among industries, 
the composition of final demands, and the availability of 
labour, capital, and other resources. The use of the 
input-output model for this purpose has been discussed 
in an earlier issue of this Bulletin.'^ In Part II of this 
paper, I will explore the possibilities of using the more 
powerful techniques of linear programming, which have 
the advantage of determining an equilibrium set of prices 
for the economy as well as a consistent set of production 
levels. Even where it can hot be applied in detail for lack 
of adequate statistics, this method provides an improved 
theoretical framework for development policy. 
The real test of the new development policies will only 
come from experience with their operation over a long 
period of time. Few countries have accumulated much 
experience of this type, and what there is has not been 
systematically analysed. Since my discussion is mainly 
concerned with the theoretical aspects of development 
policy, I will have only a few scattered comments to offer 
on this subject. This does not imply a belief that policy 
conclusions can be derived mainly from theoretical con-
siderations, or that non-economic factors may not out-
weigh the economic considerations, but merely reflects 
the limits of this essay. 
» " T h e Input-Output Model", Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, September 1956. 
I . APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Economic policy consists of the actions taken by Gov-
ernments to influence economic activity. Policies are 
customarily identified by the economic variables which 
they are designed to influence: price policy, employment 
policy, trade policy, monetary policy, etc'". Because of 
the inter-dependence of the economic system, however, 
any such classification is at best approximate and may 
I be misleading because the secondary effects of a given 
action on other parts of the economy may be quite 
significant. 
Development policy is concerned with the rate of 
growth and future structure of the economy. It is there-
fore distinguished from policies aimed at preventing 
short-term fluctuations in prices, employment, and trade, 
which may be called stabilization policies. Here again, 
the dividing line is arbitrary because all short-term 
measures have some effect on growth rates and the pat-
tern of resource use. The distinction is nevertheless a 
useful one. Thé requirements of stabilization limit the 
alternatives available for development policy by putting 
restrictions on the total investment, the balance of pay-
ments, and the allowable demands for other resources. 
Within these limits, development policy tries to achieve 
various long-term objectives, of which the most im-
portant is the growth in total income. 
In reality, development policy should encompass much 
more than the part of economic policy just assigned to 
it. It should be as much concerned with the institutional 
setting of economic activity and with the quality of 
managernent and labour available as with the use made 
of existing resources. There is, however, some justifica-
tion in this field for the traditional separation between 
economic and non-economic factors.^® Government ac-
tivities in this broader field are complementary to the 
more narrowly defined economic policies except as they 
compete for scarce resources of Government revenue and 
technicians. The balance among these various types of 
Government activity will in any case be decided outside 
of the market sector of the economy, and with less 
reliance on an economic calculus. For the purposes of 
this paper, therefore, I will identify development policy 
with the decisions as to the way in which the supply and 
use of investment funds (i.e., public and private saving 
plus foreign investment), foreign exchange, and other 
scarce resources are to be determined. 
As has already been indicted, a central problem of 
development policy is the adequacy of free market forces 
in allocating investment resources. This question will be 
taken up first, before other alternatives are considered. 
A. Defects of the market mechanism in determining 
investment decisions 
The idealized model of a perfectly competitive econ-
omy which is always in equilibrium is the best starting 
point for a study of resource allocation, even though it 
may never be approximated in actuality, because its 
characteristics and effects on resource use can be reduced 
from a simple set of premises. Even when the assumption 
of rational planning is substituted for that of compe-
An examination of the inter-relations between economic and 
non-economic factors is made by Arthur Lewis, The Theory of 
Economic Growth, 1955, and by Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory 
and Underdeveloped Regions, 1957. 
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tition, similar conditions for optimal use of resources 
can be deduced. This model therefore provides a 
standard with which actual economic systems can be 
compared. 
Under the assumptions of perfect competition, it can 
be demonstrated that individual choices of producers 
and consumers will result in prices which, under static 
conditions, lead to maximum economic efficiency (a 
Pareto optimum) Maximum efficiency is a condition 
in which the welfare of one group cannot be raised 
•without reducing that of another. Since under these 
assumptions any interference with the price mechanism 
results in a lowering of the social welfare (unless offset 
"by gains in equity), such interference must be justified 
by identifiable deficiencies in the working of the price 
mechanism. 
There are three kinds of defects in the free-price 
mechanism as an instrument for achieving the maximum 
social welfare. They may be classified as (i) departures 
from the assumptions of perfect competition; ^i) dy-
namic causes; and (iii) equity considerations. 
(i) Departures from perfect competition. Perfect 
...competition assumes complete knowledge of available 
alternatives by producers and consumers, the absence of 
obstacles to entry into different occupations or indus-
tries, access on equal terms to factors of production, no 
'monopoly positions, etc. All actual economies depart 
from these idealized conditions to some extent, but in 
almost all respects the under-developed coimtries are 
farther removed from the competitive assumptions than 
, are most developed countries.. Information as to con-
sumer and producer demands, alternative productive 
techniques, factor supplies etc. is less widely available. 
! Entry into some occupations is limited by social factors 
and by lack of educational opportunities. Access to capi-
tal and natural resources is very unequal. This list could 
be greatly extended, but the examples given illustrate 
the pervasiveness of the problem. These factors combine 
to produce a rigid market structure, prevalent monopoly 
positions, immobile labour and capital, and consequently 
great inequalities in the returns to labour and capital in 
different uses. 
(ii) Dynamic effects. The effects of change are also 
more important in the less industrialized countries be-
cause one or two new plants may double or triple pro-
duction of a given commodity where they would only 
constitute a marginal increase in a more industrialized 
country. In cases of successful development, rates of 
growth of the industrial sector as a whole are usually 
high, and in individual branches of industry they are 
often discontinuous. 
The most important of these effects for investment 
decisions are imperfect anticipations of future demands 
and of commodity and factor costs. These are particu-
larly important in the production of commodities for 
use by other sectors and for investment having a long 
planning and construction period. As a result of un-
certainty, risks to private investors in some sectors may 
be increased and investment resources devoted to less 
productive uses. Inexperience in certain types of pro-
This is only a rough statement of the central proposition of 
welfare economics, which has been much refined in recent theo-
retical discussion. A good summary of the conditions required for 
efficient resource allocation is given in Scitovsky, Shaw and Tar-
shis, Mobilizing Resources for War, appendix II. 
duction and aversion to risk act to exaggerate this 
tendency.i^ 
The supply of various skills to the economy is also 
determined in a very imperfect way by reactions to 
present prices. Until a certain type of production is 
established, there may be little demand for some skills, 
but without them the likelihood of its being established 
may be much less. Here the lag in adjustment is longer 
than in the case of investment. In both cases, there may 
be no tendency to move toward the optimum position. 
(iii) Equity considerations. There is no demon-
strable tendency for competition to reduce inequality in 
income distribution among economic classes or geo-
graphical regions, and it can be argued that in fact it 
has tended to operate in the opposite direction in the 
poorer countries. Some form of intervention to reduce 
income inequalities is an accepted policy in all countries, 
but here again the problem is more acute in the less 
developed countries, where regional differences are likely 
to be of greater importance, i® 
The effect of all three sets of factors is to produce a 
structure of prices which does not provide the best 
available guide to resource allocation in a number of 
sectors. Private investment decisions made on the basis 
of this price structure often lead to structural dis-
equilibrium, in the sense that productive factors are not 
used in the proportions in which they are available. 
Usually, labour is not fully employed or natural re-
sources may be inefficiently exploited for lack of com-
plementary investment. The marginal productivity of 
investment may be substantially lower than it could be 
with a better mechanism for resource allocation, either 
through improved prices or direct allocation. 
The factors enumerated above often occur in com-
bination. In countries which have policies for promoting 
development, the following cases can be identified where 
intervention in investment decisions is commonly thought 
to be justified: 
(i) When there is serious structural disequilibrium 
in the use of labour, natural resources, or foreign 
exchange; 
(ii) In investment in overhead facilities—^power, 
transport, etc.—^which depends primarily on an evalu-
ation of future production patterns and where economies 
of scale (and monopoly tendencies) are important; 
(iii) In the promotion of investment in new types of 
production, where dynamic factors are particularly im-
portant and the risk to private investors may be much 
greater than with some form of Government co-ordina-
tion of investment plans; 
(iv) To prevent the establishment of monopolies; 
(v) Where export markets are notably unstable and 
the balance of payments is subject to great fluctuations; 
(vi) When it is desired to improve the distribution 
of income by region or class. 
A number of policies that Governments may undertake 
to offset these defects in the market mechanism do not 
require an over-all economic programme to guide them. 
These include control of monopoly, employment services, 
This set of factors has been discussed by Rosenstein-Rodan, 
op. cit., and by R. Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in 
Underdeveloped Countries, chapter 1. 
13 Myrdal, G., stresses this argument in op. cit., Chapter 3 
and 5. 
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removal of obstacles to entry, and other measures of an 
institutional nature. Most types of intervention in the 
price system and measures to anticipate the eiFects of 
change do require some kind of analysis, however, in 
order that they may be consistent. 
B. The logic of development policy 
We need a consistent set of concepts and an idea of 
their formal properties in order to discuss alternative 
forms of economic policy. Such concepts have been de-
fined by Tinbergen for the general field of economic 
policy, and these can readily be adapted to the specific 
problems of development policy.^^ 
To analyse the effects of a given type of Government 
action, it is necessary to formulate an economic model 
which states the relationships among the aims of the 
policy makers, the means which they employ, and their 
impact on the economy. These terms may be clarified 
as follows: 
• (i) Policy-makers may be one or several. Initially, 
it is assumed that the central Government functions as a 
single policy-maker, but at a later stage it will be neces-
sary to examine the means by which a co-ordinated 
policy can be achieved when decisions are decentralized. 
(ii) The aims of any type of policy represent in 
various ways the ultimate objectives which a society is 
trying to achieve through a given set of measures. The 
aims of development policy are almost always multiple, 
and they may be either quantitative (e.g., maximizing 
national income), or qualitative (e.g., improving the 
distribution of income among regions). The multiple 
objectives^® of development policy are one of its most 
characteristic features—in contrast, say, to stabilization 
policy—and they often require a more detailed analysis 
to reveal their inter-relations. 
(iii) The means of economic policy consist of the 
measures which the Government may take to achieve 
given aims. They may be quantitative or qualitative. 
Quantitative means (to be called instruments) may 
achieve the goals of policy directly, as by Government 
production and investment, relief programmes, etc., or 
indirectly, through the reactions of firms and consumers 
to taxes, subsidies, exchange rates, and other variables. 
Qualitative means comprise changes in the economic 
structure, such as land reform or anti-trust action, and 
their effect is both more difficult to determine and less 
subject to economic analysis. I will be mainly concerned 
with quantitative means, both direct and indirect. 
(iv) Economic relations describe the structure and 
behaviour of the economy. When reduced to mathemati-
cal form they become equations, which can be. variously 
classified as definitional, technological, behavioural or 
institutional. For policy analysis, the variables in these 
equations can be classified as instruments, over which 
the Government has some control; targets, which repre-
sent the aims of and restrictions on policy; data, which 
Tinbergen, J., On the Theory of Economic Policy, chapters 
1-4, and Economic Policy: Principles and Design, chapters 1 and 
2. Since Tinbergen is mainly concerned with stabilization policies, 
I have made some modifications in his definitions to fit develop-
ment policy better. A more general approach to policy is given 
by R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and 
Welfare, to which reference is made below. 
15 More properly, some of these objectives should be considered 
as restrictions on the choices available, as indicated below. 
are taken as given; and uncontrolled (or irrelevant) 
variables. These distinctions will be clarified in Part II. 
(v) An economic model consists of a set of economic 
relations. All economic analysis is based on some kind 
of model of the economy, although the relations may be 
stated in terms of functions whose properties are only 
specified in a general way. The model of a well-function-
ing laissez-faire economy, which is widely used as a basis 
for policy analysis, is of the latter type. 
(vi) Directives for action are derived by using a 
given economic model to analyse the possibilities for 
achieving stated goals. These guides may be in the form 
of targets, priorities, prices, or other magnitudes which 
make possible specific choices by those who execute 
policy. Sometimes the instrument which the Government 
controls appears as a variable in the model used—e.g., 
the level of electric power production—^but more often 
the magnitude taken as a policy guide must be translated 
into a more directly usable form by the agencies which 
execute policy. (For example, a development programme 
may require a certain amount of Government revenue, 
but the tax rates required are to be determined by the 
fiscal authorities.) 
These concepts are quite general in nature. Some fur-
ther comments may be useful as to their applicability to 
the analysis of development policy. 
1. The nature of development aims 
Df the ultimate aims which may be achieved by eco-
nomic means, the following are most commonly taken as 
the goals of development policy:^® 
(i) Maximum income (or production or expendi-
ture) per capita over time. 
(ii) Improved distribution of income by regions and 
social classes. 
(iii) Reducing the risk of fluctuation in income due 
to crop failures, variation in export markets, etc. 
(iv) An acceptable limit to unemployment. 
The last of these, reduced unemployment, may logically 
be included as part of an improved distribution of in-
come, but a number of countries recognize full employ-
ment as a goal in itself apart from its effect on the 
distribution of monetary income. 
Since consumer choice is recognized as a separate ob-
jective in democratic societies, the maximizing of income 
over time must be subject to the condition that con-
sumers' choices are satisfied at any given level of income. 
In practice, this involves translating aggregate consump-
tion into its components at foreseeable levels of income 
and relative prices, and taking these demands as goals 
for a programme of production. (In theory a more ac-
ceptab e procedure would be to maximize income subject 
to specified demand functions, but a practical technique 
for doing so is not available.) The consumption goals 
arrived at in this way should not be confused with the 
ultimate aim of maximizing welfare, for which they 
serve as an approximate representation, subject to re-
vision in the process of working out an optimum pro-
gramme. 
Factor supplies constitute a second set of restrictions 
on the programme, whether or not we consider employ-
ment or balanced payments to be separate goals. Because 
1® Other goals of social action, such as freedom and democracy, 
will be taken as given. 
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of the ambiguity in the common usage of the terms 
"objectives", "goals" and "targets", I will use the neu-
tral term "restrictions" (which has a precise technical 
meaning in linear programming) to describe all limita-
tions on the size and composition of a development 
programme. Each such restriction, whether on inputs or 
outputs, can be identified with an equation in an econo-
metric model. 
2. Instrument variables 
The relations between the actions of a Government 
and the instrument variables affected by these actions 
may be more or less direct. The interest rate on the 
government debt can be directly controlled by the state, 
as can the income tax rates or the amount of steel pro-
duced by a government-owned plant. Other instrument 
variables, such as the wage rate or the amount of private 
investment which may result from tax exemption, can 
only be controlled approximately and within definite 
limits. Nevertheless, it is convenient to treat all variables 
that the government may influence as potential instru-
ments and later introduce qualifications as to the nature 
of this influence. One result of such qualifications is that 
several instruments may be required to achieve a given 
result because one cannot bear the full weight of the 
action needed. 
3. The choice of analytical model 
The choice of model depends on the goals of policy, 
the instruments to be considered, and the information 
available. To insure consistency, the values of the instru-
ment variables must either appear in the models used or 
must be derivable from them. In aggregate models, 
where the only variables are national income and its 
components, levels of production and imports in particu-
lar sectors are not uniquely determined, and policies 
depending on particular values of these variables cannot 
be evaluated. This defect is remedied in input-output 
analysis, but this model contains no explicit indication 
of the effect of prices on the levels of production and 
investment. Prices must either be introduced in supple-
mentary sector analyses, or in the more general frame-
work of linear programming, if they are to be used as 
instrument variables. 
4. The consistency of targets and instruments 
In general, consistency requires that there be at least 
as many instrument variables, representing various pol-
icy measures, as there are restrictions on the programme. 
If there are fewer, the system is "over-determined" and 
there will in general be no feasible solution. If there are 
more instrument variables than restrictions, some choice 
of instruments is possible.^'^ 
The implications of these principles may be illustrated 
by some examples. In the classical view of policy, with 
its model of a competitive economy and policy of laissez-
faire, the economic objectives of the society may be 
taken as stability in prices and in the balance of pay-
ments. The classical policy instrument is the interest 
rate. Employment is an "irrelevant variable" in Tin-
bergen's terminology, and the objective of stability may 
be achieved at the expense of imemployment. If full 
employment is added as an objective of policy, then at 
least one additional instrument—such as the level of 
government expenditure—must be added, and often fur-
ther instruments are needed because the values required 
of the first two instrument variables may be unrealistic 
in practice.^® 
When the objectives of economic development are 
added to those of stabilization, the number of restric-
tions on the economy is increased. The possibility of 
inconsistent policies becomes greater, and hence the 
greater the need for an explicit analysis of their impli-
cations. This is the main function of a programme. 
Before trying to define this function more concretely, 
however, I will first survey the instruments commonly 
used for implementing development policy. 
C. The choice of policy instruments 
There has been little systematic analysis of the relative 
merits and defects of the policy instruments available to 
under-developed countries. Since control of international 
trade is administratively simpler than many other types 
of policy, there has been a tendency to rely heavily on it 
as a way of influencing the pattern of domestic produc-
tion, without recognizing the drawbacks to exclusive 
reliance on this set of instruments. Colonial areas have 
been forced to devise other measures, since protection 
was denied to them, but they have rarely pursued over-all 
development policies. The need for a greater variety of 
measures to promote development has now been widely 
recognized, but there is still inadequate consideration of 
the range of alternatives available. 
In its need to change the pattern of resource use over 
a relatively short period of time, the promotion of de-
velopment resembles (in lesser degree) the problem of 
mobilization for war. The suitability of various instru-
ments for the latter purpose has been widely discussed, 
and the experience of the United States and other coun-
tries has been analysed in some detail.i® A similar study 
of the actual effects of development policies is needed 
before very firm recommendations can be made to the 
under-developed countries, but some general comments 
may be in order. 
1. Characteristics of instruments^'^ 
Policy instruments may be classified in various ways: 
by the sectors of the economy on which they operate, by 
their use of prices or quantities as variables to be 
manipulated, by the extent to which they can be effec-
tively controlled by the government, by the effect that 
they have on private incentives and freedom of choice, 
etc. In table 1 representative instruments are classified 
according to the extent of their application (general 
versus specific) and their mode of operation (through 
prices or quantities). The general instruments act on 
broad aspects of the economy—^the money supply, the 
government budget, investment, consumption—and are 
These statements apply to a linear model and correspond to 
basic principles of linear programming although they were inde-
pendently demonstrated by Tinbergen. 
18 See Tinbergen, J., Economic Policy, Chap. 4, for further dis-
cussion of this case. 
i®See, for example, Galbraith, J. K., "The Disequilibrium 
System", American Economic Review, June, 1947; Scitovsky, 
Shaw and Tarshis, op. cit., chaps. 2 and 3 ; Chester, D. N. 
(editor), Lessons of the British War Economy. 
20 An excellent discussion of the characteristics of measures for 
controlling resource allocation under different institutions is given 
in Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, chapters 
14 and 15. The effectiveness of instruments of control is dis-
cussed further in Part III. 
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Table 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Price Variables Quantity Variables 
Area of policy Instrument Variables affected* Instrument Variables affected 
Monetary interest rate (1) level of investment (2) cost of production open market operations 
(1) money supply 
(2) prices 
Fiscal 
personal income tax (1) consumption and saving (1) national income 
corporate income tax (1) profits (2) investment 
Government expenditure (2) price level 
1 s 1 
Foreign Trade exchange rate general tariff level 
(1) cost of imports 
(2) price of exports 
(3) balance of payments 
exchange auctions exchange rates 
o 
Foreign Investment taxes on foreign profits level of foreign investment foreign loans and grants (1) investment resources (2) exchange supply 
Consumption general sales tax consumption social insurance, relief, other transfers (1) consumption (2) income distribution 
Labour wage rates 
(1) labour cost 
(2) profits and investment 
(3) labour income 
emigration and immigration labour supply 
Production 
taxes and subsidies (1) profits and production Government production level of production 
price control (2) investment Government research and technical assistance cost of production 
Investment interest rates (1) profits 
Government investment capital rationing level of investment 
tax exemptions (2) investment by sector 
restrictions on entry (1) prices and profits (2) level of investment 
o 
s 'sí ^ 
Consumption specific sales taxes consumption by commodity Government services (health, education) (1) consumption (2) income distribution 
c ^ 
Trade 
export subsidies (1) price to consumer (2) profits on domestic production import auotas and nrohibitions (1) level of imports 
tariffs (1) profits and investment exchange controls (2) domestic prices 
Labour wage subsidy (1) labour cost and use (2) profits and investment labour training supply of skilled labour 
Natural Resources taxes and subsidies (1) cost of production (2) rate of exploitation surveys, auxiliary investment, etc. rate of development 
Ol 
ON 
' All taxes affect Government revenue and saving in addition to the variables cited. 
widely used in developed and under-developed countries 
alike. The specific instruments are applied differentially 
to individual sectors of the economy, as illustrated by 
subsidies, tariffs, or Government investment. 
To achieve a given effect on production, or use of any 
commodity, there is a choice between controlling a price 
and controlling a quantity. In this respect, tariffs are 
an alternative to quotas, differential interest rates are an 
alternative to capital rationing, and subsidies to private 
producers are an alternative to production by the gov-
ernment. These measures differ in their effects on prices 
and consumer choices, in administrative convenience, in 
the predictability of their results, and in other respects. 
A choice between quantity and price variables as instru-
ments must therefore be made by balancing the advan-
tages and disadvantages in each case. 
Some of the main issues of economic policy are con-
cerned with the choice between general and specific 
instruments and between using prices and quantities as 
control variables. There is a strong case to be made for 
using general instruments rather than specific ones. The 
rates of interest, taxation, and exchange are the orthodox 
means for exerting Government influence in a laissez-
faire economy. Their immediate objectives are stability 
in prices and the balance of payments and the prevention 
of unemployment. Growth is left to free market forces. 
The manipulation of interest rates and exchange rates 
allows market forces in each sector to determine where 
expansion or contraction of production and consumption 
will take place. These instruments therefore interfere 
less with the choices of producers and consumers than 
do measures which discriminate by sector. They also 
require a less detailed analysis for their use and do not 
substitute Government judgement of what is desirable 
for the action of market forces.^^ 
The need for specific instruments to supplement gen-
eral measures derives from the deficiencies in the price 
mechanism^^ which apply primarily to specific sectors of 
the economy. When these factors prevent the achieve-
ment of a satisfactory rate of growth, the problem is to 
devise policy measures which will improve on the work-
ing of the competitive economy without losing the 
advantages of private initiative and the automatic adjust-
ment of the price system.^ ® 
In designing policies for specific sectors, there is an 
argument for using price rather than quantity instru-
ments which is based on reasoning similar to the case 
for general over specific instruments. Taxes and sub-
sidies distort the choices open to producers and users of 
a commodity less than do allocation systems or other 
quantitative restrictions and hence are conducive to 
greater flexibility and over-all economic efficiency. Fur 
thermore, the administrative requirements for price in-
tervention of this type are generally less than for 
quantitative controls. 
Despite the general case in favour of using the price 
system, there are several situations in which quantitative 
measures may be needed: 
21 The case for relying primarily on market forces to promote 
development is given in Bauer and Yamey, Economics of Under-
developed Countries, 1957, Part 11. 
22 See Part I, Section A. 
23 See, for example, United Nations, Measures for the Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Countries, chapter 9. 
(i) When it is necessary to limit consumption of an 
essential commodity in short supply (e.g., imported 
goods), the tax needed to bring about a given reduction 
in use might result in such high prices that the burden 
of the reduction would fall on lower income groups. In 
this case, price controls and rationing may be preferable 
on welfare grounds. 
(ii) Where a minimum increase in production is 
essential to production in other sectors—as in the case 
of power, transport and various auxiliary facilities—the 
price needed to ensure adequate private investment may 
be too high or the response of private investors too un-
certain. In this case, quantitative measures, such as 
Government investment, may be more efiicient because 
the cost to the society is less or the outcome more pre-
dictable. 
(iii) In general, where controls are needed for only 
a short period, as in the case of temporary shortages, it 
may be desirable to allocate supplies to more essential 
uses rather than upset the general price structure and 
distort investment decisions by allowing prices to rise. 
Quantitative measures are also likely to have more pre-
dictable effects in this case. 
In these examples, it is the dynamic elements in the 
situation and the deviation from a desirable income 
distribution which provide the principal arguments for 
using quantitative measures of control. 
2. Specific measures for investment allocation 
Although the specific measures listed in table 1 affect 
both current production and the allocation of investment 
resources, it is the latter aspect that is crucial for the 
future course of development. The various instruments 
affect investment decisions through the availability and 
cost of primary inputs (labour, natural resources, im-
ported commodities); through the supply of inputs from 
other sectors (raw materials, overhead facilities); 
through the demand for output (sales taxes, export sub-
sidies) ; through profits (taxes, subsidies); and through 
measures directly related to the process of investment 
(interest rates, capital rationing, restrictions on entry, 
direct Government investment). There is therefore a con-
siderable variety of choice between quantity and price 
instruments and among measures more or less directly 
related to a particular investment. 
The a priori arguments concerning some of the prin-
cipal measures for influencing investment decisions run 
somewhat as follows: 
(i) Measures of protection. As indicated earlier, 
protective devices are perhaps the most common instru-
ments for influencing the pattern of investment. For this 
purpose, tariffs are generally preferable to quantitative 
restrictions—quotas, prohibitions, exchange controls, etc. 
—for reasons already indicated. Quantitative restrictions 
prevent competition with domestic producers regardless 
of price, raise prices to users and limit demand, and 
require an elaborate administrative mechanism and de-
tailed economic analysis to be effective.^^ Quotas also 
involve a loss of revenue to the Government, as com-
pared with the use of tariffs, unless the profits of im-
porters can be recovered through taxes. 
For these and other reasons, elaborate quantitative systems 
have recently been dismantled in several Latin American coun-
tries—^Argentina, Brazil, Chile, etc. 
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The cases where quantitative measures may neverthe-
less be needed derive from the principles given in the 
previous section. In cases of extreme shortage of foreign 
exchange, tariffs (or devaluation) may be too uncertain 
in their results and quotas or exchange restrictions may 
be adopted as emergency measures. 
The effect of quantitative restrictions on investment in 
domestic substitutes for imports or in sectors using im-
ported commodities is generally less certain than that of 
tariffs. Allocations are subject to variation according to 
the amount of exchange available, and the profitability 
of domestic production is harder to determine than in 
the case of a tariff. 
As instruments for inducing investment in new types 
of production, subsidies may be preferable to either 
quantitative restrictions or tariffs because the price is 
not raised above the level of world prices. Total demand 
is therefore greater and using sectors are not penalized 
in export markets. The cost of this technique in Govern-
ment expenditure must be weighed against its benefits, 
however. 
Protection from foreign competitors is only one factor 
in the expansion of domestic production. Also required 
are entrepreneurs, capital, skilled labour, raw materials, 
etc. When some of these are lacking, the restriction only 
serves to reduce imports and raise prices to consumers. 
Trade restrictions are therefore a rather uncertain 
method of directing investment unless combined with 
other measures affecting factor supply, and they fre-
quently have undesirable secondary effects.®® 
(ii) Government investment versus incentives to pri-
vate investment?^ Although the arguments concerning 
trade restrictions are based mainly on economic consid-
erations, the choice between Government investment and 
incentives to private investors involves social and politi-
cal factors to a large extent. In countries that do not have 
strong ideological preferences for either private or Gov-
ernment enterprise, the usual approach is to rely on 
private investment except in cases where it cannot be 
expected to work in the public interest (e.g., monopoly) 
or in which its performance has been demonstrably de-
ficient. Since the reaction of investors to various incen-
tives (tax reduction, guaranteed markets, low interest 
rates, etc.) is subject to considerable uncertainty, such 
incentives are more likely to be adequate when a general 
objective is to be achieved—e.g., import substitution, 
increase of industrial employment—^than when increases 
in output in specific sectors are required. Because of this 
uncertainty, the extent to which reliance on private in-
vestment is desirable can be determined only by an 
actual trial of specific measures. 
Another alternative for securing investment in given 
sectors when tax incentives are thought to be inadequate 
or too costly to the treasury is the intervention of a 
Government agency as entrepreneur but not as a long-
term producer. This may be done through development 
corporations, which sell their investments to private en-
25 See Nurkse, R., Problems of Capital Formation in Under-
developed Countries, chapter V, "Gjmmercial Policy and Capital 
Formation". 
2® There is actually a whole series of choices ranging from 
Government ownership and operation thr9ugh Government con-
tracting, public utility regulation, and subsidization. See Dahl 
and Lindblom, op. cit. pages 9-11. Here I indicate only some of 
the principal alternatives used in the under-developed countries. 
terprises as they become profitable, or through mixed 
corporations, in which the role of the Government de-
clines as the enterprise becomes established. 
The assumption underlying all these measures is that 
it is bad for the Government to continue permanently as 
a producer in most fields. There is a widespread view 
(shared by the present writer) that the lack of incentives 
to efficiency in Government operations makes private 
operation preferable even where conditions are not 
favourable to the initial undertaking of the investment 
by private enterprise. In the absence of more objective 
evaluations of the experience with Government and pri-
vate enterprise in various countries, it is impossible to 
support this conclusion empirically, and it is by no 
means universally held among democratic Governments. 
In countries such as India, for example, an attempt is 
made to ascertain the relative merits of public and pri-
vate investment in specific fields rather than starting 
from this premise. Even in these cases, however, the 
sectors that are chosen for Government investment are 
limited in number and characterized by specific struc-
tural features (economies of large scale production, im-
portance of the product, tendency to monopoly, etc.).®^ 
The possibility of attracting foreign investment adds a 
further element to the problem. To the argument against 
Government investment must be added the loss of ad-
ditional investment resources, while the argument against 
private foreign investment must include the removal of 
profits from the economy and the future burden on the 
balance of payments. A purely economic evaluation 
would probably weigh the value of the additional in-
vestment resources and managerial talents more heavily 
than the cost of obtaining them (particularly where 
there are unemployed labour and natural resotirces be-
cause of lack of these factors), but the decision is infre-
quently made on purely economic grounds. 
3. Quantitative analysis and choice of instruments 
The preceding discussion has been entirely in quali-
tative terms, which at best leads to the establishment of 
certain cases to which particular policies apply. The 
identification of an actual situation with the relevant 
case often depends on the results of quantitative analy-
sis. Such factors as the extent of the excess demand for 
imports, the future amount of unemployed labour, the 
magnitude of the shift in resources needed in particular 
sectors, and the importance to the rest of the economy 
of a given investment, can only be determined from such 
an analysis. The initial study of development possibilities 
should be designed to permit a choice of policy instru-
ments in different fields. Once this has been done, the 
long-term programme can be formulated in more specific 
terms which take account of the instruments chosen. 
The importance of a quantitative analysis for the 
choice of policy instruments will be determined in part 
by the presence or absence of the following factors: 
(i) Economies of scale in production; 
(ii) The possibility of imports and exports; 
(iii) The use of the product in other sectors of pro-
duction; 
(iv) The predictability of demand. 
See United Nations, Soroe Problems in the Orgcmhation and 
Administration of Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field, 
(ST/TAA/M/7) United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1954, 
II.H.1, chapter 1. 
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In the production of consumer goods, the main objec-
tive of the development programme is likely to be a 
certain degree of substitution of domestic production for 
imports, but the choice of sector can be left to market 
forces. Quantitative analysis may be needed to determine 
the amount of employment and exchange saving which 
should be aimed at in the consumer goods industries, but 
not to determine the choice of sector.^ ® 
At the other extreme, the amount and distribution of 
investment in overhead facilities must be determined en-
tirely from a quantitative analysis of future production 
because the alternative of imports is not available and 
output is needed to permit investment and production in 
other sectors. In some cases the choice between public 
and private investment will also depend on the amount 
of output required. 
Choices among policy measures in the intermediate 
goods sectors are more affected by the outcome of the 
quantitative analysis than are those in consumer goods 
because demands derive from the planned outputs of the 
using sectors. Economies of scale are also more preva-
lent, and there is thus more interdependence among 
investment plans in earlier and later stages. While im-
ports provide alternative source of supply for many 
intermediate goods, some investments will not be under-
taken unless there is a domestic supply of materials 
available. To ensure the carrying out of several inter-
connected projects, Government intervention in some 
form is likely to be necessary because the risk to private 
investors would be too great. Investments centring on 
steel production—ore, transport, power, iron and steel, 
fabricating—^provide a good example. Once the initial 
investments have been made, however, most of them will 
prove suitable for private ownership and operation. 
The advantage to the economy—in terms of the social 
productivity of the total investment—of inter-related 
projects of this type cannot be accurately determined 
from a partial analysis of each investment taken sepa-
rately because the profitability of one may understate its 
contribution to the total. This dynamic type of external 
economy^® (as opposed to the technological external 
economies of static analysis) can only be taken account 
of adequately in the framework of an over-all analysis. 
D. Types of development programme^^ 
A development programme is an analysis which pro-
vides a basis for designing and carrying out development 
policy. There is, however, no sharp distinction between 
programming and policy making, since each influences 
the other. The main function of a programme is to make 
different policies consistent with each other. Ideally, it 
should go further and help to select the best policies and 
the best means of carrying them out. The decision to 
28 This statement is not true where economies of scale are im-
portant, as in the case of automobile production, because then 
the profitability of investment depends on an estimate of the 
quantity that would be demanded at the expected level of income. 
29 See Scitovsky, T., "Two Concepts of External Economies", 
Journal of Political Economy, April, 1954, pages 143-151. 
®®The nature of development programmes actually used by 
various countries has been described in a number of United 
Nations studies, many of which are listed in the bibliography. 
Alternative approaches are discussed in ECLA, Analyses and 
Projections of Economic Development (E/CN.12/363) , and 
ECAFE, Economic Development and Planning in Asia and the 
Far East (E/CN.11/412) , with reference to problems in Latin 
America and South-East Asia. 
make a development programme does not constitute an 
endorsement of increased Government intervention, or 
of any other particular set of policy instruments, there-
fore .3i 
The nature of the analysis contained in a development 
programme is determined in part by the information 
available and in part by the instruments which are being 
considered. For simplicity, three general types can be 
distinguished, which I will call aggregate programmes, 
sector programmes, and over-all programmes. A few com-
ments on each of these may be useful as in introduction 
to the discussion of analytical techniques in Part II. 
(i) Aggregate programmes consist mainly of national 
accounts analyses and projections of other magnitudes 
such as industrial production, labour force, average pro-
ductivity, etc. These projections are often combined 
with a more detailed analysis of certain aspects of the 
economy, such as the balance of payments, the sources 
of Government revenue, etc. 
Programmes of this kind were used by most Western 
European countries during their period of post-war re-
covery as a guide to the use of general policy instru-
ments afifecting investment, employment, and the balance 
of payments. The technique of making such programmes 
has reached a high degree of perfection in the work of 
the Netherlands Planning Bureau.®^ In the Western 
Hemisphere, Puerto Rico has prepared a long-term pro-
gramme of this kind each year since the war to guide 
its development policy. 
Aggregate programmes provide a fairly adequate basis 
for the use of general policy instrimients, but they do 
not furnish a check on the consistency of the results in 
specific sectors nor on the balance of payments. They 
are more likely to be adequate when the composition of 
production and consumption does not change too much 
as income increases, and when the market mechanism 
works well in directing investment and production de-
cisions. From this point of view, the reconstruction of 
the European economies was easier to analyse than the 
pattern of growth of the under-developed countries of 
Asia and Latin America. 
(ii) Sector programmes are analyses of the demands 
and investment prospects in individual branches of pro-
duction. Their main function is to determine the relative 
priority of investments within the sector. Investment 
programmes for the whole economy (or for all resources 
controlled by the Government) are sometimes con-
structed by merely adding up the high priority projects 
in each sector. 
The sector approach is generally recognized to be in-
adequate as a basis for development policy because it 
does not provide a test of the consistency of the de-
cisions made in each sector, nor a way of comparing 
high priority projects in one sector with those in an-
other. It has nevertheless been the principal basis for 
development policy in Latin America®® and in most 
31 The development programmes of India, Italy, and Puerto 
Rico (se« bibliography) may be mentioned as representing quite 
different approaches to development policy, each of which makes 
use of an over-all analysis. 
See Scope and Methods of the Central Planning Bureau, 
The Hague, 1956. 
The need for more over-all analysis of development in Latin 
America, regardless of the policy instruments used, has been 
argued in ECLA, Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic 
Growth, and in several more recent studies. 
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under-developed countries until quite recently. The de-
fects in the sector approach are less serious in primary-
producing economies than in those which have reached 
a high degree of industrialization and hence have a 
greater amount of inter-dependence among the various 
sectors. 
(iii) Over-all programmes combine the elements of 
aggregate programmes and sector programmes in vary-
ing degrees. The analysis may start from over-all projec-
tions or from sector analyses, but in the final result they 
must be reconciled. It is only by some check of this kind 
that the consistency of the simpler models used in the 
two partial approaches can be tested. 
Over-all programmes combining aggregate and sector 
analyses have been prepared in several countries of 
Europe (e.g., Norway, Netherlands, Italy) and South-
East Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, Philippines).®^ In Eu-
rope, the main purpose of the sector analysis is to check 
the consistency of the over-all analysis, since Government 
intervention on a sector basis is limited, but in South-
East Asia the programmes are intended to co-ordinate 
specific investment policies affecting a number of sectors. 
In Latin America, the ECLA studies of Colombia and 
Argentina have a similar purpose although they are 
more illustrative in nature. 
The need for over-all development programmes is most 
acute when large structural changes are required to 
References are given in the bibliography. 
establish or restore a process of balanced growth. Large 
balance of payments deficits, unemployment, bottlenecks 
in over-all facilities, and lack of growth may each be 
evidence of such conditions.®® These conditions may of 
course be merely symptoms of an excess or deficiency 
of total demand, and the diagnosis of structural dis-
equilibrium must try to identify the problems which 
would exist if inflationary (or, less often, deflationary) 
forces were offset. The design of policy in such circum-
stances is likely to call for an over-all analysis, however, 
whether the policy measures selected are general or 
specific in nature. 
Development policy should include measures to in-
crease the volume of specific resources available, es-
pecially the level of saving, as well as their allocation 
among alternative uses. The first type of policy relies 
more on general than on specific instruments and thus 
depends less on the establishment of a programme, and 
to a large extent the two aspects of policy are separable. 
Since I am mainly concerned with the relations between 
programmes and policies, I will take up only the allo-
cation problem in my subsequent discussion. 
35 Practically all of the countries which have made use of over-
all development programmes appear to have done so because of 
the existence of one or more of these factors. An additional 
cause may be regional imbalance, which in the case of Italy has 
led to a special regional development programme of the south. 
Regional balance is a subsidiary concern of most countries having 
development programmes, especially the balance between rural 
and urban development. 
II . THE FORMULATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
Despite the widespread use of development pro-
grammes as a guide to policy-making, there has been 
relatively little study of the techniques by which they 
are actually formulated. The official publications which 
summarize the analyses provide only limited guidance 
for such a study, since they are primarily intended to 
explain development policy to the public and are not 
usually burdened with the theoretical aspects of pro-
gramming. Even when one goes beyond the published 
documentation, however, it appears that the practice of 
programme formulation has not yet been reduced to a 
very systematic basis.®® 
A development programme must be at the same time 
detailed enough to permit judgements about individual 
projects, and comprehensive enough to determine 
whether the results are consistent with the various over-
all restrictions. This is true even when Government in-
tervention is limited to certain sectors of the economy 
because allowance has to be made for the probable 
responses of the uncontrolled sectors and their need for 
resources. Since it is not feasible to construct a single 
model of the economy which satisfies all of these require-
ments, the formulation of a development programme 
proceeds on a trial-and-error basis in which parts of the 
analysis are done separately and then tested for con-
sistency with the various restrictions and objectives of 
policy. 
®®The programmes previously referred to all contain some in-
dication as to the methods followed, and personal discussions 
with planning officials in these countries also support this con-
clusion. 
The analyses leading up to an over-all programme are 
made initially at different levels of generality, of which 
it is useful to distinguish at least three: (i) project 
analysis; (ii) sector analysis; (iii) aggregate analysis, 
the nature of the last two has been indicated in the 
preceding section. Project analysis is essentially a pro-
cess of preparing technological information in a con-
sistent way; projects can then provide the basis for a 
study of a whole sector of production—electric power, 
steel, etc. This is an essential first step in sectors in 
which production does not now exist or in which pro-
duction will be increased by different methods than 
those now used, but it will not be discussed here.®^ 
The central analytical problem in formulating a de-
velopment, programme is the relation between the project 
and sector analyses on the one hand and the aggregate 
analyses on the other. These analyses must satisfy the 
following three conditions: 
(i) Consistency, which refers to the balancing of 
demand and supply, both for produced commodities and 
for primary factors (labour, capital, foreign exchange, 
and natural resources) of which the initial stock is 
given. 
(ii) Efficiency, which consists of making the best 
choice among alternative programmes in the light of the 
aims of the society. 
(iii) Workability, which consists of translating the 
analysis into guides for policy that are adequate for the 
actual execution of the programme by various agencies. 
The preparation of projects is taken up in ECLA, Manual 
on Economic Development Projects (E /CN.12 /426 ) , 1957. 
60 
The requirement of consistency has already been dis-
cussed above. If the restrictions are formulated as equa-
tions, consistency can be tested by whether or not the 
values of the variables (instrumental and other) satisfy 
these equations. Some restrictions cannot be formulated 
in this way, however, and the consistency of the result 
with some established criterion—such as a desirable 
income distribution or the allowable rate of inflation— 
can only be tested in more qualitative fashion. 
The problem of achieving the maximum efficiency in 
a programme will be the main concern of this section. 
It has so far only been discussed in a context of partial 
equilibrium analysis, from which conflicting "criteria" 
for determining investment priorities have been estab-
lished. The main difficulty with this approach is that it 
ignores the requirement of consistency, which must be 
imposed simultaneously. 
The third condition, workability, means that the analy-
sis must be extended to include the effectiveness with 
which various alternative measures can be carried out 
and that the concept of efficiency must be interpreted in 
the light of the results which can actually be realized 
under various alternative policies. By way of illustration, 
an analogy may be drawn to the choice of machinery 
for a factory. One machine may have a high output per 
unit of capital and labour input but may also require a 
high level of co-ordination with other activities in the 
factory to obtain this output. If this co-ordination can-
not be achieved, a simpler machine having a lower 
output per unit of input may turn out to be more efficient 
in terms of its actual contribution to total output. 
Workability can only be determined from experience 
under similar conditions although some indication of 
workability can be gained from the experience of other 
countries. Some comments on this subject will be made 
in the final section of this paper. In general, however, the 
workability of a set of policies cannot be evaluated except 
in qualitative terms and by the use of judgement rather 
than formal analysis. 
The present section will discuss the contribution that 
the recently developed techniques of mathematical pro-
gramming can make to the formulation of development 
programmes. The advantage of this approach is that it 
simultaneously takes account of the requirements of con-
sistency and efficiency. The insight which the method-
ology of programming provides into the nature of this 
problem may, at the present stage of statistical know-
ledge, be more important than the empirical results. 
A. An empirical approach to programming 
Present techniques of establishing development pro-
grammes all use some form of trial-and-error method for 
reconciling the several parts of the analysis in the light 
of the three criteria just discussed. The formal pro-
gramming methods which have been developed in recent 
years offer the possibility of achieving this reconciliation 
in a more efficient way. More important, however, they 
provide tests of the efficiency of any given programme 
and indicate how it can be improved.^® This is not true 
of the more intuitive methods now used for development 
programmes. 
38 The need for a formal programming technique for this pur-
pose has been stressed by Dagmar Frisch in a number of memo-
randa. See, for example, Generalities of Planning, Oslo, 26 
February, 1957. 
The objection usually made to the use of formal 
programming methods in the analysis of development is 
the lack of adequate data for their application. More 
properly, this is a limitation to any form of analysis and 
does not handicap a systematic approach to program-
ming any more than an unsystematic one. 
One of the obstacles to the ready adoption of more 
systematic programming methods is the fact that they 
have been presented in a rather abstract mathematical 
form whose relation to the pragmatic methods now used 
is not readily apparent. In this section, therefore, I will 
start from the techniques of testing consistency and 
efficiency which have been proposed for development 
programmes and try to show the modifications needed to 
ensure that the process will lead to the optimum pro-
gramme. In so doing, I will stay as close as possible to 
established procedures so that the importance of the 
additional steps needed and the nature of the formal 
programming approach will be more clearly revealed. 
I. Formulating a trial programme 
In most development programmes, there is a consid-
erable discussion of priorities, but little explanation of 
how they are to be applied in a consistent programme. 
The Indian Second Five Year Plan, for example, lists 
four objectives—increasing national income, rapid in-
dustrialization, expansion of employment, reduction of 
inequalities in income—and derives from these a num-
ber of priority sectors for investment.®® These competing 
claims have been reconciled in the final plan, but the 
process of' securing consistency has not been explained. 
Much the same comment applies to most published 
programmes. 
In its pioneering study of the techniques of program-
ming,^" the Economic Commission for Latin America 
outlined in some detail the steps needed to arrive at 
consistent sector projections on the basis of an initial 
estimate of the growth in national income. A rather 
similar approach was used by the present author and his 
collaborators in a projection of the structure of the 
Italian e c o n o m y T h e steps in this procedure can be 
outlined as follows: 
(i) To make initial projections of the growth in 
national income, the supply of resources (labour, do-
mestic saving, foreign investment, etc.) and the balance 
of payments. 
(ii) To determine the composition of final demands 
for consumer goods, investment goods, and exports on 
the basis of expected domestic demand and foreign 
demand. 
(iii) To make a tentative selection of investment 
projects in each sector, based on the partial criteria of 
contribution to national income and the effects on the 
balance of payments. 
(iv) To formulate a trial programme composed of 
levels of production and imports consistent with the 
preceding estimates, using the input-output method or 
some approximation to it. 
(v) To determine the total uses of scarce factors— 
labour, capital, foreign exchange, and specific resources 
39 Second Five Year Plan, 1956, chapter 2. 
ECLA, Analyses and Projections of Economic Development, 
I. An Introduction to the Techniques of Programming; see also 
the ECLA studies of Colombia and Argentina. 
41 H. Chenery, P. Clark and V. Cao Pinna, The Structure and 
Growth of the Italian Economy, 1953. 
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—^required by the trial programme and compare them 
to available supplies of each. 
(vi) To revise steps ( i ) , (ii) and (iii) in the light 
of the excess demands for factors of production and 
repeat the process. 
In practice, this procedure is rarely carried beyond 
one or two revisions, however, and it provides no way 
of determining how close the result is to the best pro-
gramme available. 
The logic of the first five steps, culminating in a trial 
programme, will now be illustrated by means of an 
example (table 2 ) . I will then take up the revisions 
necessary to secure an optimum programme. To show 
the problem in its simplest form, I include only two 
commodities and two factors of production and ignore 
the possibility of importing and exporting.^® For each of 
*2The latter problem will be considered at length in section C. 
the two final commodities, three possible production 
techniques or projects are assumed in order to provide 
a variation in factor proportions. These are written in 
the form of "activities" as used in linear programming, 
to facilitate the discussion in section B. Inputs are indi-
cated by a minus and outputs by a plus sign, the activity 
level Xy being taken as the net output produced (joint 
products are excluded). Activity A3, for example, indi-
cates that to produce 1 unit of commodity 1 by this 
technique requires .5 units of commodity 2, 6.0 units of 
labour, and .3 units of capital.^® It is assumed that each 
technique can be operated at any scale with constant 
costs. 
43 The example is taken from H. B. Chenery and P. G. Qark, 
Interindustry Economics (to be published by J. Wiley), chapter 
4. The programming concepts are further discussed there. The 
capital input is positive for reasons given below. 
Table 2 
EXAMPLE 1: CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Production Activities 
Market 
Inputs and Outputs Industry 1 Industry 2 Restrictions Prices 
Ai A2 A3 A4 A5 Ae 
(1) Commodity 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 —0.2 —0.5 —0.8 100 1.00 
(2) Commodity 2 0 —0.25 —0.50 1.0 1.0 1.0 50 1.00 
(3) Labour —12.5 —7.5 —6.0 —15.0 —5.0 4.0 2000 .08 
(4) Capital 1.10 . 1.25 0.30 1.00 2.50 0.60 Minimum 
The steps leading to a trial programme can be carried 
out as follows: 
( i ) and (ii) Estimate final demands and factor sup-
plies. The "restrictions" in table 2 indicates the quanti-
ties demanded (plus) or the supplies available (minus). 
The magnitudes are derived from separate projections of 
national income, foreign demands, and labour supplies.^* 
The amount of savings and foreign investment to be 
expected over the given period is also estimated. I have 
assumed that the problem is approached through the 
minimization of capital needed to achieve the assumed 
increase in income (final use), and that the output 
targets will be adjusted upward or downward at a later 
stage as indicated by a comparison of the capital re-
quired to the investment resources available. 
(iii) The choice of investments. Since I have rided 
out the choice between imports and domestic production 
for the time being, the only choice to be made is among 
different investment possibilities in each sector, each 
technique having different requirements for the two 
factors (labour and capital) and for inputs from the 
other sector. 
A variety of methods has been suggested for making 
the choice among investment alternatives when market 
prices do not provide a reliable guide, but almost all of 
them involve making corrections for the fact that some 
factors are overvalued.^® The methods which have the 
best theoretical justification consist in computing the 
For simplicity I assume present capacity to be fully em-
ployed and consider only increases in demand and capacity, but 
excess capacity can easily be taken into account in this procedure. 
45 The various approaches are surveyed in ECLA, Manual on 
Economic DevelopmeiU Projects, 1957, Part IL 
contribution of each investment possibility to the na 
tional income, valuing inputs and outputs at their oppor-
tunity costs rather than at their market prices wherever 
possible. Since labour tends to be overvalued and capital 
and foreign exchange undervalued in under-developed 
countries, the principal corrections consist of using a 
somewhat lower price of labour (based on an estimate 
of the marginal use from which it would be withdrawn) 
and valuing commodities which move in trade at the 
price of imports, converted at an estimated equilibrium 
exchange rate. ITie prices used will be called accounting 
prices, following Tinbergen. The return to capital com-
puted thus may be called the "social profit", and the 
social profit per unit of investment the social marañal 
productivity (SMP) of the investment.^® 
The social marginal productivity criterion as applied 
to data in the form of activities can be stated symboli-
cally as follows:^'' 
2) 
6) (1) 
(SMP) , = W I + W ¡I = 1 • • • 
kj (] — 1 . . . . 
46 This approach has been developed in A. E. Kahn, "Invest-
ment Criteria in Development Programs", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February 1951, 38-61; H. B. Chenery, "The Appli-
cation of Investment Criteria", id., February 1953; J. Tinbergen, 
The Design of Development, 1956, chapter III. The fallacy of 
using simpler criteria such as capital/labour or labour/output 
ratios is shown in the first two articles. The use of long-run 
equilibrium prices for labour and foreign exchange was suggested 
in the last two. A good summary of the case for using "accounting 
prices" is given by J. Tinbergen, pages 23-25. 
4TFormula (4) in Chenery, op. cit., reduces,to this form if 
(direct and indirect) imports are treated as a separate input and 
valued by the equilibrium price for foreign exchange; the price 
for the output of commodities exported or substituting for im-
ports is determined in the same way. 
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Where: 
Pi and P[ are the estimated accounting (equilibrium) 
prices of commodity output or inputs i, and labour, 
respectively; 
Uij, Ij, kj, are the input coefiicients of commodity i, 
labour, and capital per unit of output of activity j, with 
signs as in table 2. 
Since there is no way of determining the accounting 
prices in advance with any accuracy, it is necessary to 
revise them in the light of the results of the first trial 
programme. For example, we might start by using the 
market prices in example 1 as a first approximation to 
equilibrium prices, which would lead us to choose pro-
duction activities 2 and 5 (trial a in table 3 ) , which 
have the highest SMP in each sector. On the other 
hand, we might assume an opportunity cost for labour 
of 0 as a first approximation (trial b in table 3 ) , 
which would lead to a choice of activities A3 and A4. 
Since some of each of commodities 1 and 2 is required, 
it is necessary to choose at least one investment in each 
industry, even though the SMP in one may be much 
lower than in the other. 
Table 3 
SOLUTION TO EXAMPLE 1 BY REVISING ACCOUNTING PRICES 
Marginal product of investment (SMP) 
Accounting 
Trial pnces Industry 1 Industry 2 
Pi P2 Pi 1 2 3 4 5 6 
a 1.0 1.0 0.08 0.12* 0.07 — 0.04* 
b I.O 1.Ó 0.0 0.9 0.60 1.67® 0.80* 0.20 0.33 
0 1.0 1.0 0.05 0.34 0.30 0.67* 0.05 0.10* 0.0 
d 1.0 1.0 0.046 0.39 0.32 0.75» 0.11* 0.11* 0.02 
e 0.82 1.0 0.046 0.22* 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.27* 
f 0.82 1.0 0.035 0.35 0.25 0.37* 0.31 0.16 0.38* 
g 0.82 1.0 0.038 0.32* 0.23 0.32* 0.27 0.16 0.32* 
QUANTITY SOLUTION 
Production levels Excess 
Trial Capital Labour demand 
' 'I 3=6 K L (1^2000) A P : 
a 143 86 393 1500 —500 —.08 
b 122 111 14S 2400 +400 +.05 
c 167 133 383 1667 - 3 3 3 —.004 
d 146 51 73 276 2000 0 0 
e 140 50 184 1950 —50 —.011 
f 233 167 170 2067 + 6 7 +.003 
g 80 100 100 178 2000 0 0 
' Most profitable activities (included in current solution). 
(iv) Formulating a trial programme. Once a choice 
of sources of supply for each commodity required has 
been made, the activities selected can be used in an 
input-output system to determine the amount of produc-
tion in each sector. (In an actual application of this 
approach, some commodities would be both produced 
and imported in many sectors, and the proportions of 
imports to domestic production would also have to be 
fixed.) In example 1, if we choose A2 and Ag for a trial 
programme, the corresponding input-output system is: 
1.0 X2 — 0.5 Xb = 100 
— 0.25 X2 + 1.0 X5 = 50 
where Xy is the output of activity j, the solution for pro-
duction levels is: X2 = 143, Xg = 86. 
(v) Factor use. The solution for production levels 
serves to determine requirements for capital and labour: 
L = 7.5 X2 + 5.0 X5 = 1,500 
K = 1.25 X2 + 2.5 X5 = 393 
The complete statement of this trial programme is given 
as trial a in table 3. Since there are 2,000 units of labour 
available, 500 will remain unused. This indicates that 
the initial assumption of the market price for labour 
(.08) overstated its opportunity cost and that a lower 
price should be taken. 
2. Improving the trial programme 
Improvements in the trial programme can be deter-
mined by putting the problem in linear-programming 
form and applying the simplex method. This will be 
done in the next section. Since this procedure may not 
be feasible in practice, however, I will first determine 
the extent of the improvement in resource allocation that 
results from making revisions in the price system and 
applying the marginal productivity criteria already used 
in drawing up the trial programme. It will be shown 
that, if pursued far enough, this approach leads to the 
same result as the simplex method. 
The following tests, derived from general equilibrium 
theory, must be satisfied by an efBcient allocation of 
resources.^® 
See, for example, Scitovsky, Shaw and Tarshis, loc. cit. 
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(1) Demand must equal supply for: 
(a) Commodities produced; 
(b) Factors of production, unless their price is zero 
(in which case excess supply may exist). 
(2) Capital must be allocated to the most productive 
of alternative uses. 
(3) Prices: 
(а) Commodity prices must equal the cost of the 
inputs used to produce them (i.e., profits in excess of 
the marginal productivity of capital must be zero); 
(б) Factor prices must be equal to their opportunity 
costs. 
The first condition must be met by any feasible pro-
gramme, and if the second and third are not met, there 
may be á possibility of improving on the trial pro-
gramme. 
The steps leading to the first trial programme only 
necessarily satisfy ( la) and (2) . The other criteria can 
be applied in various ways. If changes in prices are used 
for this purpose, they may all be varied simultaneously 
or criteria (3a) and (36) can be applied in either order. 
I will follow the latter procedure, which seems closer 
to the approaches in use, and in a first stage will revise 
the price of labour and then the commodity prices in a 
second stage.^ ® 
Stage 1: Revise the price of labour until its demand 
equals its supply. Since the price of labour affects the 
marginal productivity calculation, if it is raised suffici-
ently a less labour-intensive activity will appear more 
profitably and vice versa. A programme consistent with 
the resource limitations (16) can therefore be arrived at 
by varying the price of the resource (labour) and repeat-
ing the steps given for trial a. If there is an access de-
mand for labour the price must be adjusted upward, if an 
excess supply it must be lowered (unless it is already 
at zero). 
Since there is a large excess supply of labour in trial 
a the price is lowered to zero for trial b and the calcu-
lation is repeated. A3 and A4 are now the most profitable 
activities, and the resulting solution requires 2,400 units 
of labour, constituting an excess demand of 400 above 
the 2,000 available. We must now raise the price of 
labour by enough to cause one of the other activities to 
become more profitable. By experimentation (e.g., rais-
ing the price by .01 units at a time) it can be found 
that at a price of labour of .05, A5 is slightly more 
profitable than A4, as shown in trial c. However, the 
solution for the new combination, A3-A5, results in an 
excess supply of 333 units of labour. 
We have now found a range of prices for labour 
(0 — .05) over which the choice of activity in industry 
1 (A3) is unaffected, and the choice in industry 2 
changes from A4 to A5, with a corresponding shift from 
an excess demand to an excess supply of labour. The 
solution which uses exactly 2,000 imits of labour must 
therefore involve the use of both A4 and As in industry 
2, which will only be efficient if they are equally prof-
This order is selected because it follows the intuitive method 
of successive approximations suggested in previous references 
(Tinbergen, Chenery) and seems more readily understandable. 
From a mathematical point of view, it might be better to revise 
all prices together, as in the "gradient methods" of Arrow and 
Hurwicz ("Gradient Methods for Constrained Maxima", Opera-
tions Research, May, 1957). 
itable. This condition of equal profitability can be used 
to determine the opportunity cost of labour in industry 
2 (and hence in tiie whole economy): 
(BMP) 4 = (SMP)5 
= 0.04^ 
The price thus determined is the lowest which will not 
lead to excessive demand for labour with existing com-
modity prices when criterion (2) is applied. 
The corresponding quantity solution is given by solv-
ing the following system of 3 equations in 3 unknowns 
(X3, X4 and Xg) which constitute trial d. 
1.0 X3 — 0.2 X4 — 0.5 X5 = 100 
—0.5 X3 + 1.0 X4 + 1.0 X5 = 50 
—6.0 X3 — 15.0 X4 — 5.0 X5 = 2,000 
X3 = 146.4 
X4 = 50.5 
X5 = 72.6 
L = 2,000 
K = 276 
By using 3 activities, we have arrived at a solution 
which uses exactly 2,000 units of labour. It is clear that 
this is an improvement over trials a and c, the other 
feasible trials, because the use of capital is substantially 
reduced. 
Stage 1 is terminated by trial d because conditions 
( l a ) , (16) , (2) and (36) are all satisfied. 
Stage 2: Revise the commodity prices and repeat 
stage 1. In the final iteration of stage 1, the marginal 
productivity of capital was .75 in industry 1 and .11 in 
industry 2. This indicates that the market price of com-
modity 1 overstates its value in relation to commodity 2 
because equilibrium prices should be based on an equal 
return to capital in each use. If we set the SMP of 
capital in the two sectors equal to each other and define 
P)t in this way, we can use equation (1) to solve for the 
equilibrium prices: 
P, = + l¡Pi + ¿ A (3) 
Since there are four prices to be determined and only 
three activities, it is necessary to take one price as given 
and determine the other three in relation to it. In linear 
programming solutions by the simplex method it is 
customary to use the criterion (capital) as the basis of 
the price system, but it is more in keeping with the SMP 
approach to allow the productivity of capital to vary 
and use one of the outputs as the numeraire. I therefore 
take P2 = 1.0 and calculate the other three prices from 
the three simultaneous equations corresponding to 
equation (3) : 
A3: Pi — 0.5 P2 — 6.0 Pi — 0.3 Pfc = 0 
A4: —0.2 Pi + P2 — 15 Pi — 1.0 Pi = 0 
As: —0.5 Pi + P2 — 5 Pi — 2.5 Pfc = 0 
The result is: 
Pi = 0.82 
P2 = 1.0 
P = 0.046 
Pft = 0.146 
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With the new lower price for commodity 1, the rela-
tive profitability of the activities is aifected. Using the 
price of labour from trial d for the next iteration, we 
find Ai and Ae, which had not previously been chosen, 
to be the most profitable activities. Revising the price of 
labour in the light of the excess demand in trials e and 
/ as before, we arrive at a solution for the given com-
modity prices which includes activities Ai-Ag-Ag. The 
SMP in each activity is .32. Since this solution g satis-
fies all 3 conditions—no excess demand for labour, 
capital used in the most profitable way, and equal pro-
ductivity of capital in each industry (no excess pro fits) 
—it is the optimum progranune which we have been 
seeking. (It might have been necessary to repeat stage 2 
a number of times to reach the optimum point in a 
larger system, but it can be shown that the procedure 
outlined here will converge to the solution which mini-
mizes the use of capital.) 
It should be noted that in the present example the 
economy of capital use resulting in stage 1 from using 
the true opportunity cost of labour rather than its mar-
ket price amounted to (393—276) or 117 units. In stage 
2, revising the prices of outputs to eliminate excess 
profits gave an additional reduction of 98 units. What 
the relative importance of these two types of revision in 
the price system would be in practice can only be esti-
mated by experimentation with actual data in a realistic 
model, but the limited experiments already made sug-
gest that the changes in commodity prices will have an 
important effect in some sectors.®® 
In the above example I have illustrated the types of 
change in prices and choice of investments that result 
when the requirements of feasibility and efficiency are 
applied simultaneously. Alternate applications of these 
two tests in an empirical approach has been shown to 
lead to the optimum result in the example chosen al-
though the method may not always be very efficient from 
a computational point of view. For purposes of com-
parison, I will now illustrate the solution to the same 
problem by the simplex method. 
B. Economic rationale of the Simplex method of 
solution?^ 
1. Concepts 
The development of linear programming as a tool of 
empirical analysis starts with the discovery, by Dantzig, 
of the simplex method for determining optimum solu-
tions,®^ Since then, the application of this technique to 
a variety of problems has suggested different formula-
tions and methods of solution. The relationship of the 
programming approach to the classical analysis of re-
source allocation is discussed in a recent book by 
Í Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow.®® 
The simplex method is commonly thought of as merely 
a technique for carrying out mathematical operations 
50 The results of comparisons of this type in a 14-sector model 
are given in H. B. Chenery, "The Role of Industrialization in 
Development Programs", American Economic Association, Pro-
ceedings, May, 1955. 
51 This section is concerned with the rationale of computation 
and may be omitted by the reader who is only interested in the 
nature of the results achieved. 
52 G. B. Dantzig, "Maximization of a Linear Function of Vari-
ables Subject to Linear Inequalities", in Activity Analysis of 
Production and Allocation, T. Koopmans, ed., 1951. 
^^ Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, 1958. 
leading to a solution to a certain kind of optimizing 
problem. In studying approximate techniques for the 
analysis of resource allocation, however, the rationale of 
the adjustment process as well as the final solution are 
of economic significance. 
Linear programming makes use of the following 
concepts: 
(i) An activity is any possible transformation of 
inputs into outputs. It is represented mathematically by 
a column of coefficients (vector), with outputs positive 
and inputs negative. The production activities of example 
1 illustrate this form. Transportation, sales, storage, 
imports, exports, and a variety of other economic func-
tions can also be represented as activities. 
(ii) The activity level defines the intensity of use 
of an activity. In inter-industry systems, the level of • 
output (gross or net) is most conveniently taken as the 
activity level, as in example 1. The amount of each 
input used or produced in the activity is calculated by 
multiplying the activity level by the input coefficient. 
Xfj — atjXj 
(iii) The restrictions in a linear programming sys-
tem are the constant terms, Bj, in a set of equations 
of the form: 
Bi (4) 
In inter-industry models, the restrictions consist of the 
final demands of input-output analysis, which have posi-
tive signs, and of factor supplies, which are negative. 
(iv) The criterion function is any function of the 
activity levels which enables us to state a preference for 
one solution over another. It may written: 
(5) 
In inter-industry analysis, the criterion function may be 
taken either as the value of the national product (to be 
maximized) or the total use of a factor of production, 
such as capital (to be minimized). In general, any 
problem can be formulated in either way, but the mini-
mizing form is often simpler, 
(v) A programme is a set of activity levels. If the 
activity levels satisfy the restraint equations (4 ) , they 
constitute a feasible programme or solution. 
(vi) The optimal programme is the feasible pro-
gramme which maximizes or minimizes the criterion 
selected. 
(vii) A basic solution is one in which there are only 
as many positive activity levels as there are restraints. 
(viii) A disposal activity consists of the non-use of 
some of the available resources or the overfulfilment of 
one of the required outputs. By the use of disposal 
activities, it is possible to replace the inequalities of (4) 
with equations. 
2. Solution to example 1 
Example 1 can be put in the form of a linear pro-
gramming problem by adding a disposal activity for 
labour (A7) with activity level X7: 
(o) To minimize capital required: 
C = 1.1 Xi + 1.25 X2 + 0.3 X3 + 1.0 X4 
+ 2.5 X5 + 0.6 Xs - f 0 X7 
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(b) Subject to: 
1.0 Xi + 1.0 X2 + 1.0 X3 —0.2 X4 —0.5 X5 
— 0 . 8 X e = 100 
- 0 . 2 5 X2 — 0.5 X3 + X4 + Xb + Xe = 50 (5) 
—12.5 Xi — 7.5 X2 — 6 X3 — 15 X4 
— 5 Xs — 4 Xe — X7 = —2000 
and X j ^ 0 (/• = 1 . . . 7) 
The last restriction, that activity levels should be non-
negative, is obvious from an economic point of view but 
is necessary mathematically to prevent nonsensical 
solutions. 
The simplex method uses the three tests of an optimal 
programme that were given in the previous section, 
but they are applied in a different order. It considers 
only basic solution—in which there are as many positive 
activity levels as restraints—because it has been shown 
that the optimal solution must be a basic solution.®^ The 
simplex method therefore starts with a trial solution 
which satisfies all of the equations in the model, such as 
trial a in table 3. The prices corresponding to this set 
of activities are then determined. Only after this has 
been done is the second criterion—the allocation of 
capital to the most efficient uses—applied. 
This version of the simplex method can be stated in 
four steps, comparable to those of the SMP approach: 
See Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, op. cit., chapter 4, for 
a good discussion of the method of solution. The procedure 
followed here, which uses prices, and its applications to the 
present example, are given in Chenery and Clark, Interindustry 
Economics, Chapter 4. The solution to the problem of maximizing 
national income is also given there. 
(i) Choose a feasible basis and determine the corre-
sponding quantity solution. Assume that we start from 
the same trial a as before, which was a combination of 
activities A2 and AB. TO make this a basis it is necessary 
to add the disposal activity for labour, A7, since other-
wise the third equation would not bé satisfied. The first 
basic solution is then: 
X2 = 143 
X 5 = 8 6 
X 7 = 5 0 0 
These figures are recorded as trial a in table 4. 
(ii) Determine the "shadow prices" corresponding 
\to the basis. "Shadow prices" may be defined as the 
J set of prices which result in zero profits in each activity 
J in the solution. Algebraically, they are determined by 
solving the following set of simultaneous equations, one 
corresponding to each activity in the basis: 
SíayPí — IjPi — cy = 0 ( 6 ) 
t The concept of "shadow price" is thus the same as that 
I of "equilibrium price", defined by equation (3) above, 
if the price of capital is taken as unity. In the simplex 
procedure, a new set of shadow prices is determined for 
each trial while in the SMP procedure a new set of 
equilibrium commodity prices is only computed at the 
end of each stage.®® 
85 A distinction is made here between shadow prices and ac-
counting prices. The former have a precise mathematical meaning 
as equilibrium prices corresponding to a given set of basic activi-
ties. Accounting prices serve the same purpose of evaluating the 
activities available for the solution, but only in equilibrium 
(e.g., in trials d and g) are they equivalent to shadow prices. 
Table 4 
SOLUTION TO EXAMPLE 1 BY THE SIMPLEX METHOD 
Quantity solution 
Trial Xg x^ X5 Xg x ^ Capital Labour 
a 143 86 500 393 1500 
b 118 71 8 240 2000 (i) 
c 124 68 14 231 2000 
d 131 14 36 180 2000 
e 80 100 100 178 2000 
Shadow prices 
Trial = 1) (P2 = 1) 
Pi P2 Pi P . Pi P2 Pi P . 
a 2.14 3.57 0 1.0 0.60 1.0 0 0.28 
b 5.20 6.63 0.306 1.0 0.79 1.0 0.046 0.15 (ii) 
c 3.24 3.76 0.141 1.0 0.86 1.0 0.038 0.27 
d 2.03 2.52 0.074 1.0 0.81 1.0 0.029 0.40 
e 2.60 3.16 0.120 1.0 0.82 1.0 0.038 0.32 
Social profitability 
Trial "'s 7 
a 1.04 0 0.06 2.14* 0 1.26 0 
b 0.28 0 —0.25 0 0 0.65* —0.31 (iii) 
c 0.38* 0 0.22 0 —1.07 0 —0.14 
d 0 —0.41 0.02* 0 —1.37 0 —0.07 
e 0 —0.34 0 —0.16 —1.24 0 —0.12 
* Activity to be added in next iteration. 
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The price solution corresponding to the first basis is 
determined by solving the following equations of the 
form of ( 6 ) : 
(A2) Pi — 0.25 P2 — 7.5 P, — 1.25 = 0 
(As) — 0.5 Pi + P2 — 5 Pi — 2.5 = 0 
(At) - P; = 0 
From which: Pi = 2.14 
P2 = 3.57 
P, = 0 
(iii) Determine the profitability of the activities out-
side the basis and add the most profitable (if none is 
profitable, the optimum solution has been reached). The 
gross profit of an activity is defined as before as the 
difference between the value of its output at the given 
prices and the cost of its inputs excluding capital. 
Z¡ = SayPi — IjPi ( 7 ) 
The net (social) profit, tt), is equal to gross profit minus 
direct use of capital or 
= Z, - c,- (8) 
Since the assumption of zero profits was used to deter-
mine the price system, all basic activities—A2, As and 
A7—have wj = 0 by definition. If any excluded activity 
has positive profit, it indicates that adding it to the 
solution would reduce the amount of capital required. 
The logic of this test is the same as that of the SMP 
procedure except that equilibrium prices of the trial 
jasis are used for all inputs. 
The profits on each activity in example 1, using the 
prices of the first basis, are shown in line a of table 4. 
The most profitable activity, A4, is chosen to form the 
new basis for the next iteration, (in the simplex pro-
cedure, activities can only be changed one at a time in 
order to maintain a feasible programme.) 
(iv) Determine the activity to be replaced. If it is 
profitable to add A4 to the solution at all, it is profitable 
to increase its activity level until one of the activities 
in the old basis becomes zero and the solution again 
consists of only 3 activities at positive levels. In the 
present example, the disposal activity A7 drops out and 
the new basis is composed of A3, A4 and A5.®® The pro-
cedure is then repeated for this new set of activities. 
The complete solution to example 1 by the simplex 
method using prices is summarized in table The fact 
5® The activity which drops out is found by determining the 
effect on each basic activity of increasing the level of the new 
activity while maintaining a feasible solution (see Dorfman, 
Samuelson and Solow, op. cit., chapter 4 ) , The possibilities are 
limited in the present example because it is necessary to have at 
least one activity in each industry in each basis. 
Starting from the same point, it takes five trials to arrive at 
the optimal solution, as compared to seven trials by the SMP 
approach. Each trial in the latter method is somewhat simpler, 
however, because only the quantity solution to the input-output 
system is required and shadow prices are only determined at the 
end of each stage. It would require further experimentation to 
determine whether the SMP approach is computationally as 
efficient as the simplex method in other cases. For purposes of 
comparison to table 3, the prices are given with Pg = 1-0 as well 
as in the conventional form in which the price of capital is equal 
1.0. It may be observed that, while the first and last trials are 
the same as in table 2, the intermediate points are entirely dif-
ferent. This is because the simplex method goes from one 
feasible basis to another and changes only one activity at a time, 
while the SMP and other gradient methods adjust prices on the 
basis of excess demand and can change several activities. 
that the prices in the last trial are the same as in the 
solution by the SMP method (when converted to a 
comparable basis with P2 as numeraire) enable us to 
interpret the accounting prices of the optimum solution 
as shadow prices. 
The theorems underlying the simplex method provide 
the justification for the conditions that were added to 
the more intuitive SMP approach in order to make it 
lead to an optimum programme. Although the necessity 
of these conditions is derivable from general equilibrium 
theory, the linear programming analysis shows that they 
are also sufficient to identify an optimal solution. 
C. The problem of import substitution 
After expected demands and factor supplies have been 
established (steps (o) and {b) in the procedure outlined 
in section A ) , there are two principal types of choice to 
be made in arriving at the optimum development pro-
gramme. One is the choice of techniques of production 
(or alternative projects) in each sector, which has been 
discussed in the last two sections. The second is the 
choice between satisfying demands from domestic pro-
duction or from imports, which in turn involves an 
increase in exports. The real choice in the latter case is 
then between expanding exports and expanding produc-
tion for home consumption. This second type of choice 
is commonly known as "the problem of import substi-
tution". 
In my opinion, the solution to the problem of import 
substitution is at once the most important and most 
difficult aspect of development programming. It can 
rarely be avoided by sticking to the existing pattern of 
imports and exports because the demand for imported 
goods tends to outrun the increase in national income 
for a variety of reasons (the change in the composition 
of consumption as incomes rise, the increase in invest-
ment and demand for imported investment goods, the 
development of new products by foreign producers, etc.). 
The proper balance between investment in import sub-
stitutes and in exports must periodically be reassessed 
in the light of supply and demand conditions for exports 
as well as the possibility of economically producing 
goods for which formerly the local demand may have 
been too small. 
Only under the best of circumstances is the problem 
of import substitution solved in an ideal way by the 
working of free-market forces. For this to happen the 
exchange rate must reflect the future demand for and 
supply of foreign exchange resulting from the changes 
now going on in the economy in order to provide an 
accurate guide to present investment decisions. In ad-
dition, capital, labour and entrepreneurs must be avail-
able for the sectors in which investment would be most 
desirable, whether in exports or in import substitutes. 
Under free markets, these conditions are much more 
often satisfied in the export sectors (by foreign capital) 
than in the production of import substitutes. Countries 
in which the growth of exports has not kept up with the 
demand for imports have therefore been particularly in-
clined to take measures to direct investment into fields 
which they consider most desirable. In many cases the 
proper working of the market to direct investment has 
also been seriously impaired by inflation and balance-of-
payments deficits and by the short-run measures taken 
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to control them. The present market price of foreign 
exchange and the prices of commodities for which im-
ports are restricted then become a very imperfect guide 
indeed to investment decisions. 
1. A programming model for import substitution 
The methods of linear programming already discussed 
can be used both as an analytical basis for the choice 
of import substitutes and as a guide to empirical re-
search. As compared to the problem of choosing among 
technological alternatives, the empirical possibilities of 
using this technique in the analysis of import substitu-
tion are somewhat better because a comparison can be 
made between imports and production by existing tech-
niques, for which data are already available.®® 
®8The approach which will be outlined has been tested on an 
empirical model distinguishing fourteen sectors of production, and 
the empirical obstacles to large-scale studies do not seem too 
great. See H. B. Chenery and K. Kretschmer, "Resource Allo-
cation for Economic Development", Econometrica, October, 1956; 
and H. B. Chenery, "The Role of Industrialization in Develop-
ment Programs", American Economic Review, May 1955. 
A programming model (example 2) designed to show 
the nature of the choice between domestic production 
and exports is given in table 5. To simplify the expo-
sition, no alternative production activities are included 
although in principle it is perfectly feasible to combine 
this model with the type illustrated in example 1. The 
example contains four productive sectors instead of the 
previous two, since the difiSculty of the analysis stems in 
part from the indirect ways in which foreign exchange 
enters the cost of production. 
In example 2, production activities are indicated by 
Xy, their activity level, and are the same type (i.e., no 
joint products) as in example 1. Export activities are 
designated Ey, have inputs of 1.0 unit of a domestic 
commodity (measured in domestic prices), and produce 
the number of units of foreign exchange indicated by 
the export price. If we use the existing exchange rate for 
this calculation, an output coefficient of less than one 
indicates that world prices (net receipts) are less than 
the domestic price. Import activities follow a similar 
rationale. They produce one unit of output and use for-
eign exchange equal to their c.i.f. cost delivered to the 
country (less any domestic inputs). 
Table 5 
EXAMPLE 2 : PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Activities 
Inputs E, M, M j Xg M , 
ResCriC' 
tiOTU 
(1) Finished goods —1.0 0.8 I.O 
(2) Agricultural products —1.0 —0.3 0.9 1.0 
(3) Basic materials —1.0 —0.1 —0.1 0.7 1.0 
(4) Services —0.2 —0.1 —0.1 







(6) Capital 0 0 0 0.7 0 2.0 0 1.8 0 0.55 Minimum 
Example 2 differs in several important respects from 
the input-output model on which it is based; 
(a) Imports and production are separate variables 
whose proportions are to be determined by an optimizing 
solution; 
(b) Exports are variables rather than being fixed in 
advance; 
(c) The foreign exchange (and labour) restrictions 
are incorporated in the model.®® 
2. Solutions to example 2 
This type of model can readily be solved by the 
revised simplex method discussed in the last section. The 
8» This example is taken from Chenery and Clark, Interindustry 
Economics, chapter 11, which contains a more extensive discus-
sion of the problem and the simplex method of solution. Labour 
has been omitted here for simplicity. 
solution is summarized in table 6. The first basis con-
tains no exports, and imports of commodity 3 are made 
only to the extent of the available foreign exchange. 
This is the solution of maximum autarchy. The oppor-
tunity cost of foreign exchange (2.95) is determined by 
the capital cost of producing conmiodity 3, for which 
imports are partially substituted.®® In subsequent trials, 
imports replace production of commodity 3 entirely, and 
the shadow price of foreign exchange (in terms of capi-
tal) is determined by the resources needed to produce 
exports. The marginal productivity of capital therefore 
rises, since capital is withdrawn from the sector where 
it is least productive (X3) and devoted to exports, with 
the necessary readjustments in other sectors. 
) P + = 
2.66 
= 2.95, since 1.1 units of foreign exchange 
1.1 are required for a unit of inputs. 
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Table 6 
SOLUTION TO EXAMPLE 2 BY SIMPLEX METHOD 
Í, Quantity solutions ^ 
Trial Ml Xs M2 Xs Mg X4 El E2 K 
a 400 0 250 0 113 22 196 0 0 1101 
b 400 0 394 0 0 115 194 0 83 1070 
c 524 0 291 0 0 122 215 99 0 1068 
ÍP — Shadow prices ^ f 1.0) Shadow prices (Pfc — 
Trial P i P2 Ps P4 P / P i P2 P3 P4 P / P . 
a 0.79 0.88 0.90 0.21 1.00 0.34 2.33 2.59 2.66 .61 2.95 1.0 
b 0.89 1.00 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.395 2.27 2.54 2.29 .61 2.54 1.0 
c 0.90 l.OI 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.40 2.26 2.54 2.26 .61 2.51 1.0 
Profitability (Pfc=l-0) 
Trial El E2 E3 X i Ml X2 M2 X3 M3 X4 
a .33 .37" —.53 0 —.62 0 —.66 0 0 0 
b .02» 0 —.26 0 —.28 0 —.20 —.26 0 0 
c 0 —.03 —.25 0 —.25 0 —.17 —.28 0 0 
» Activity to be added. 
Table 1 
SOLUTION T O EXAMPLE 2 BY REVISING ACCOUNTING PRICES 
Quantity solutions 
Trial X i Ml X2 Ma X3 M3 X4 El E2 K 
a 0 320 544 0 0 94 127 0 385 1159 
b 524 0 291 0 0 122 215 99 0 1068 
c 524 0 291 0 0 122 215 99 0 1068 
(V Accounting prices V = 1.0) 
Trial P i P2 P3 P4 P / P» 
a 1.00 1.10 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.35 
b 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.39 
c 0.90 1.01 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.40 
Marginal product of investment 
Trial Export sector Import substitutes 
El E2 E3 X i M l X2 Ma X3 M3 X4 
a 0.14 0.35» 0.25 0.28 0.35» 0.40» 0.35 0.30 0.35» 1.63» 
b 0.40» 0.39 0.30 0.52» 0.40 0.39» 0.37 0.34 0.40» 0.39» 
c 0.40» 0.39 0.30 0.40» 0.36 0.40» 0.37 0.34 0.40» 0.40» 
® Activities in solution. 
This type of problem can also be solved by the SMP 
approach using accounting prices, as outlined in section 
A of this part. In following this method, it is necessary 
to specify the alternatives with some care, and also the 
meaning of the SMP of import activities. Since all ex-
ports are alternative ways of earning foreign exchange, 
under perfect competition one will be the most profitable 
under any set of prices and will be chosen.®^ The pro-
ductivity of investment in the most profitable export 
sector therefore determines the SMP that should be 
assigned to importing, with correction made for differ-
If the unrealistic assumption of elastic export markets is not 
made, a similar iterative procedure can be used in which exports 
from each sector are made up to the point at which marginal reve-
nue equals marginal cost (see Chenery and Kretschmer, op. cit . ) . 
The principal difference from the present example is that exports 
will be made from several sectors rather than only the most profitable. 
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enees in import prices and domestic (accounting) 
prices.®^ 
The result of the SMP calculation is shown in table 
7. Trial a uses accounting prices equal to import prices 
in all sectors, with the price of foreign exchange equal 
to 1.0. The productivity of investment in the most profit-
able export sector (0.35 in E2) 'determines the SMP in 
the import sector by the formula given in footnote 62. 
On this basis, imports are more profitable for commodi-
ties 1 and 3 and domestic production for commodity 2 
(there is no choice for commodity 4, which must be 
produced domestically). The quantity solution for this 
choice of activities shows a use of 1,159 units of capital. 
(Trial a corresponds to the end of the first stage in 
example 1 because the assumption of an elastic export 
demand permits the foreign exchange restriction to be 
met exactly in all cases.) 
In trial b (stage II) the accounting prices are revised 
to equal the shadow prices from trial a. The largest 
change comes in commodity 4, for which the market 
price had been used in the absence of an import price. 
The two imported commodities continue to have prices 
determined by the price of foreign exchange, which is 
held constant. With these new prices it is shown to be 
profitable to export commodity 1 instead of commodity 
2 and to produce commodity 1 instead of importing it. 
A recalculation of prices (trial c) shows that this is the 
optimum solution, which is verified by a comparison to 
the result of the simplex method; the accounting prices 
now are identical with the final shadow prices of the 
simplex method. 
®2The logic of this procedure is illustrated in the following 
example calculation. I assume prices for trial a as shown in table 
7, in which foreign exchange has a value of 1.0 and the im-
portable commodities have prices determined from the import 
activities. 
(i) The SMP of domestic production in sector 2 is calculated 
as in example 1: 
022^2 = 0.9 X 1-1 == 0.99 
a32P3 = —0.1 X .9 = —0.09 
«42P4 = —0-1 X 1.0 = - 0 . 1 0 
Social profit = 0.80 
¿2 = 2.0 
(SMP) ; — 0.40 
The SMP of other domestic production activities is determined 
in the same way. 
(ii) The SMP of exports from sector 2 is determined by using 
the value of the foreign exchange earned as the value of the 
output of the domestic production activity: 
Value of foreign exchange = 0.9 X 1-0 = 0.90 
Social profit = 0.71 
K2 - 2.0 
SMP of E2 == 0.355 
(iii) The SMP of exporting commodity 2 and importing 
commodity 3 is determined by carrying step (ii) one step 
further and using the value of the imported commodity as the 
value of output for Xg. Activity Xg produces 0.9 units of com-
modity 2, which is converted by E j into 0.9 units of foreign 
exchange, which is converted by Mg into 1.0 units of commodity 
3. The resulting productivity to be assigned to any import sector 
( i ) is given by the formula: 
(SMP of exports) (Price of commodity i ) 
In practice, the over-all approach of linear program-
ming is probably more important in analysing import 
substitution than in the choice of alternative techniques. 
In the latter case, the greatest improvement is likely to 
come from the estimation of the true opportunity cost of 
labour in terms of capital. For the problem of import 
substitution, the crucial relationship is the opportunity 
cost of foreign exchange in terms of capital. Of the two, 
the opportunity cost of labour can be better estimated 
by cruder methods than can the cost of foreign ex-
change. Furthermore, direct comparisons of import sub-
stitutes to exports are more difficult than are comparisons 
among alternative techniques for producing the same 
good. On both grounds, an over-all analysis is more ur-
gently needed in the foreign trade sector. 
The solution to example 2 suggests a practical pro-
cedure which can be fol owed when data are not avail-
able for a complete programming model. In sectors 
where imports and exports are possible, world prices 
provide a convenient basis for accounting prices, and 
if the price of foreign exchange is kept equal to 1.0, 
these prices will not change unless domestic production 
substitutes completely for imports. An examination of 
the export sectors, using these accounting prices for 
inputs, provides a basis for estimating the marginal 
capital cost of earning foreign exchange (marginal pro-
ductivity of capital in this case), which can then be 
used to choose between imports and domestic produc-
tion. The end of this first stage should, in a more real-
istic example, provide a fairly close approximation to 
the final solution. The main source of difficulty is likely 
to be the fact that export demands are not perfectly 
elastic and that the price of capital determined in this 
way will have to be adjusted for the level of exports. 
The further improvements introduced by revising 
commodity prices will affect only industries using com-
modities that are entirely produced domestically®®— i^n 
this case commodities 2 and 4. In practice, there are 
only likely to be important changes in the products of 
localized industries which are not easily transportable. 
It should therefore be possible to arrive at a structure 
of accounting prices after one or two trials which is not 
far from the optimum. Furthermore, changes in these 
prices will always be downward since they are passed 
on the price of imports, so that the error can be allowed 
for to some extent in the fabricating sectors where they 
are most important. 
D. Relations between over-all and partial analysis 
The previous discussion has shown the interdepend-
ence of investment decisions in the several sectors of the 
economy and their effect on the equilibrium set of prices. 
I will now take up the usefulness of these results in 
formulating more adequate criteria for partial analysis 
and in the more detailed study of sector programmes. 
A number of partial criteria have been proposed for 
comparing alternative investment possibilities in the ab-
sence of an over-all analysis.®*' These are designed to 
remedy some of the defects in the existing price struc-
ture and to take account of external economies which 
SMP 0 + Mj -
(Foreign exchange input into Mj) 
0.355 (0.9) ^ „ 
(0.9) = 0-355 for M3. 
In table 7, substitution of domestic production of commodity 
1 for imports only became profitable when this change in import 
prices was made. 
These criteria are summarized in the ECLA Manual on Eco-
nomic Investment Projects, part II. 
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are not reflected in market prices. Some of these criteria 
are stated in terms of returns to single factors (the 
productivity of capital or labour), while others relate 
total benefits to total costs (the benefit-cost ratio). The 
estimate of social benefits is sometimes made through 
corrections to prices, sometimes in terms of "indirect 
benefits". 
If it is possible to carry out the adjustments leading 
to an equilibrium set of prices, these several approaches 
will give the same results. This can be shown from the 
preceding calculations. The SMP approach uses a single-
factor test of the net value attributable to capital,®® 
while the simplex method can be restated as a benefit-
cost ratio. This form is shown in the last line of table 8. 
Here the output and inputs are valued at the shadow 
prices of the optimum solution to example 1 (from table 
4) , and the benefit-cost ratio is the ratio of the value of 
output to the cost of inputs. In equilibrium, when the 
price of capital is 0.32, Ag is the most profitable invest-
ment and its ratio is 1.0 (corresponding to zero profit). 
If the equilibrium price of capital is not known, how-
ever, this result does not necessarily follow, and either 
of the other alternatives may appear the most advan-
tageous even though equilibrium prices are used for the 
output and all the other inputs.®® 
Table 8 
A COMPARISON OF PARTIAL CRITERIA FOR 
INVESTMENTa 
Investment alternatives 
Price A4 As A6 
Value of output (1.0) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Materials purchased (0.82) 0.16 0.41 0.65 
Labour cost (0.038) 0.57 0.19 0.16 
Social profit 0.27 0.40 0.19 
Capital required 1.0 2.5 0.6 
(1) Productivity of capital 0.27 0.16 0.32 
(2) Benefit-cost ratio 
(i) (Price of capital = 0.05) 1.28 1.38 1.18 
(ii) (Price of capital = 0.15) 1.13 1.03 1.11 
(iii) (Price of capital = 0.32) 0.95 0.72 1.00 
a From table 3, industry 2, prices of trial g. 
W. Galeson and H. Leibenstein ("Investment Criteria, Pro-
ductivity, and Economic Development", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Aug. 1955) have criticized the SMP approach as being 
static and not taking into account the difference in saving rates 
which may be produced by different projects because of different 
profit levels. To the extent that this factor cannot be offset 
through tax policy, it can be included in a programming model 
by measuring the savings attributable to each type of production 
and valuing them at the productivity of capital. A more balanced 
analysis of the problem of valuing present versus future income 
is given by O. Eckstein, "Investment Criteria for Economic De-
velopment and the Theory of Intertemporal Welfare Economics", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1957. 
®®At equilibrium prices, the simplex criterion (social profit) is 
zero for all activities of the optimal programme, and negative for 
others. It follows from the algebraic relation of social profit to 
the benefit-cost ratio and the SMP of capital (or of any other 
factor or intermediate product) that, at equüibrium prices, all 
of these measures must be equal to unity for all activities in the 
optimal programme, and less that unity for others. However, even 
at equilibrium prices, these measures do not necessarily give the 
same ranking for non-optimal activities. 
The productivity-of-capital measure does not sufifer 
from this defect because it uses only the prices of other 
inputs but not that of capital. It is therefore more 
accurate for partial analysis if a better initial guess can 
be made as to the prices of labour and other inputs than 
of the true productivity of capital. When this is not true, 
it is easy to construct examples in which the benefit-cost 
ratio gives results that are closer to the optimum solu-
tion. (See, for example, trial c in table 3, in which the 
SMP test is further from the correct evaluation than 
benefit-cost because the prices of inputs are too high.) 
The choice of a criterion for partial analysis must 
therefore depend on the accuracy with which various 
prices can be estimated.®^ 
The use of equilibrium prices also makes it unneces-
sary to make estimates of secondary benefits, as is the 
practice of the United States Bureau of Reclamation in 
its evaluation procedures.®® The existence of under-
employed (or overpriced) resources will be adequately 
taken into account by the lower opportunity cost given 
to these factors and the higher profits in projects which 
use them. Indirect benefits result from the use of other 
than equilibrium prices, and they disappear when proper 
future prices are substituted.®® 
It is unlikely that formal methods of programming 
can be applied in a very detailed model of the whole 
economy. At best they can be used to determine the 
proper accounting prices for some of the principal 
inputs-labour, capital, foreign exchange, and a few in-
dustrial materials—and to revise sector programmes. 
For the latter purpose, accounting prices are very im-
portant, since they make it possible to decentralize the 
analysis while maintaining the consistency of the results. 
If the same set of accounting prices is used in all sector 
programmes, it is possible to revise the latter after the 
first trial has been made by changing the price assump-
tions, as in the methods illustrated above. The use of the 
same prices for labour, capital, and foreign exchange is 
particularly important in the formulation of sector pro-
granames, and even this degree of consistency would 
bring about a considerable improvement in resource al-
location in many cases. 
E. Summary 
The main lines of my discussion of the rationale of 
programming can be simimed up as follows: 
(i) The main analytical problem in formulating a 
development programme is to find a solution which is at 
once consistent with the expected demands and resource 
limitations and efficient in its use of resources. Methods 
currently used in drawing up programmes do not ensure 
that the best use is made of resources. 
Tinbergen, The Design of Development, chapter 3, and J. 
Ahumada, "Preparación y Evaluación de Proyectos de Desarrollo 
Económico", Trimestre Económico, July, September 1955 have 
both advocated a form of benefit-cost ratio using equilibrium 
prices in preference to using the productivity of capital, but the 
above analysis does not support their conclusion. The issue is not 
a matter of theory, however, since with perfect price estimates 
the two would give the same results. 
®8 A criticism of this procedure along similar lines is given in 
J. Margolis, "Secondary Benefits, External Economies and the 
Justification of Public Investment", Review of Economics and 
Statistics, August, 1957. 
®®The use of future prices to evaluate investment is not 
always adequate when there are economies of scale, and it may 
be necessary to calculate the total investment required by sdtema-
tive feasible programmes. 
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(ii) The techniques of linear programming suggest 
ways of extending the social marginal productivity 
criterion for investment allocation in order to secure 
both consistency with the various restrictions and maxi-
mum efficiency of resource use. A comparison of this 
approach to the simplex method for solving such prob-
lems shows that the same criteria are applied in each 
case but in a dififerent sequence. The final result is there-
fore the same, but the route by which it is attained is 
different. The comparison also shows that there is no 
theoretical reason to prefer either the productivity-of-
capital approach or the benefit-cost approach to partial 
analysis since they will both give the same result if 
properly applied. In the absence of complete informa-
tion, however, there may be reasons to prefer the former. 
(iii) Of the choices made in setting up an invest-
ment programme, that between exports" and domestic 
production is both the most difficult analytically and the 
most important, since it determines the future pattern 
of development. The linear programming framework is 
peculiarly suited to the analysis of this problem. It 
should clarify thinking on this subject even when it can-
not be applied empirically in great detail. The principal 
contribution of the programming approach is to de-
termine an equilibrium (shadow) price for foreign 
exchange rate at this level until the results of the devel-
opment programme as well as existing structural dis-
equilibria. Since it will often not be feasible to set the 
exchange rate at this level until the results of the 
development programme have been accomplished, the 
use of the equilibrium price instead of the current 
exchange rate in evaluating investment proposals is 
desirable. 
(iv) The prices which emerge as a by-product of the 
programming analysis, either by the simplex method or 
the SMP approach, should also have value as a means 
for decentralizing both analysis and policy. They pro-
vide a consistent basis for sector studies of resource 
allocation, which are an essential supplement to any 
over-all analysis, and which can in turn improve the 
over-all results. Their role as variables for policy guid-
ance will be considered in Part III. 
n i . T H E EXECUTION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES''® 
All economic policies have two essential aspects. 
First, they require calculations as to the ways in which 
social goals can be achieved; secondly, they must pro-
vide for sufficient control of the responses of the various 
participants in the economic process to bring about the 
desired result. The first of these functions, the making 
of rational calculations, was taken up in Part II. Some 
problems raised by the second will be considered here. 
The market mechanism has the great advantage of 
performing both these functions automatically. Prices 
serve as guides to rational calculation, as rewards for 
efficiency, and as a punishment for mistakes. A policy 
which is not guided by the market mechanism must 
specify not only the method of calculation which is to 
be used but also the controls which may be substituted 
for those of the market. 
A development programme is primarily a technique 
for rational calculation. It has been shown above that 
for certain allocation decisions, particularly those in-
volving large changes in the structure of the economy, 
this kind of calculation may point the way to substan-
tially larger increases in output than would the calcula-
tion of the market mechanism. To achieve this possibility, 
however, it is necessary to have a control mechanism 
which does not suffer too much in comparison to the 
working of market forces. Among the elements required 
are adequate incentives, information, and flexibility. The 
execution of development policies often falls short of 
expectations for lack of each of these elements. This 
failure is largely attributable to the fact that develop-
ment plans^^ are not always designed with the needs of 
''OThe framework of this discussion is derived from that of 
Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit. 
The term "development plan" is used here to include both 
the analysis (which I have called a programme) and the set of 
measures by which development policies are carried out. This 
follows common usage in countries having such plans. The term 
"programme" is sometimes used in this broader sense, but I have 
preferred the narrower definition, given above, which indicates 
the distinction between analysis and execution. 
execution in mind, so that they are not adequate as 
control devices whatever their merits in pointing out 
potential improvements. 
One of the common weaknesses of development plans 
is their statement in terms of targets, which require 
centralized control if they are to be achieved. In the 
present section, I will investigate the possibilities for 
decentralization and greater flexibility which are pre-
sented by a greater use of prices. The basic problem is 
to offset the defects in the market mechanism as a cal-
culating device without losing its advantages as a control 
mechanism. 
A. Decentralization and co-ordination 
As in the analysis of efficient resources allocation, it 
is useful to begin the study of control mechanisms by 
recalling how this function is performed by the free 
market. In the ideal case of perfect competition, prices 
act to clear the markets for both factor supplies and 
commodities produced through the signals which they 
provide to, individual producers and consumers, each 
guided by his own interest. The only need for an agency 
of centralized control is to make markets more perfect 
and see that the participants follow the rules of the 
game—i.e., to prevent Uie exploitation of monopoly 
power, disseminate information, etc. Market prices are 
at once the means for determining how much of each 
good will be produced, what techniques of production 
will be used, and how incomes will be distributed. 
Prices provide such a powerful means of co-ordinating 
the actions of individual decision makers that they have 
been advocated as the most rational control device for 
socialist economies. The well-known Lange-Lerner^^ rules 
for the operation of such an economy would require the 
managers of state enterprises to act like perfect com-
petitors—to expand production until marginal cost 
equals price—^while the co-ordinating agency manipu-
T2See Abba Lemer, The Econoirdcs of Control, New York, 
1944. 
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lates prices so as to clear the market. A host of practical 
objections can be raised to this suggestion, but it con-
tains an idea which is worth pursuing as an alternative 
to target setting in sectors where Government interven-
tion of some kind is neededJ^ 
1. Functions of co-ordinating and operating agencies 
Development policy is carried out by governmental 
agencies which are given authority to intervene in speci-
fied ways in the process of resource development and 
resource use. Tn the United States, the Bureau of Recla-
mation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal 
Power Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
the extension service of the Department of Agriculture 
are examples of agencies which have this type of func-
tion. In Europe, the National Coal Board in the United 
Kingdom, the Monnet Plan organization in France, and 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy exemplify agencies 
for carrying out development policy. 
The examples just given from the more advanced 
countries all illustrate a type of development agency 
which is concerned with levels of production and invest-
ment in particular sectors of production. Some of them, 
such as the TVA and the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, are 
concerned with regional development, involving several 
types of production. The under-developed countries fre-
quently have development corporation responsible for 
a range of sectors in addition to more specialized agen-
cies of this type. Although some of the agencies listed 
are also in charge of current production, they all have 
responsibilities for some aspects of the long-term devel-
opment of a given sector or region of the economy. 
There is a second type of operating agency which has 
an important role in the execution of development policy 
although it typically deals with particular resources rather 
than with particular sectors of the economy. Thus special-
ized credit institutions, exchange control authorities, 
ministries of health and education, etc., are also concerned 
with improving the quality of resources or with control-
ling their allocation. 
In the under-developed countries, the importance of 
both of these types of development agency is generally 
greater than in the advanced countries. A larger propor-
tion of investment is made directly by the Government, 
and the extent of government influence over the re-
mainder through tariíF policy, exchange control, etc., 
tends to be greater whether there is an over-all develop-
ment policy or not. In most under-developed countries, 
therefore, the main question is not whether the Govern-
ment should intervene in the process of resource alloca-
tion but how it can control its various forms of interven-
tion to make them more effective. 
One of the greatest deficiencies in the execution of 
development policies is lack of co-ordination. Co-ordina-
tion is less important in a country like the United States, 
where the Government only intervenes directly in a limi-
ted number of sectors and where the penalties for lack of 
co-ordination are not serious because of the wealth and 
diversity of the economy. It is also less needed at the 
The problem of control in an under-developed economy is 
different from that considered by the theorists of either perfect 
competition or socialism. Since the economy does not start from 
a position of equilibrium, in which resources are optimally used, 
policy cannot be carried out through control mechanisms which 
are desiened merely to maintain eauilibrium. 
opposite extreme of primitive economies with little inter-
dependence among sectors and relatively few choices. 
In countries in process of industrialization, such as most 
of those of Latin America, however, the need for co-ordi-
nation is particularly acute. 
In the present section, I will take as given the institu-
tional framework of a number of semi-autonomous 
operating agencies and consider possible forms of co-
ordination to make development policy efifective. The 
minimum objective of co-ordination is consistency in the 
actions taken by the various agencies in the sense defined 
earlier. Ideally, coordination should also lead to some 
changes in the institutional structure and the selection of 
better policy instruments. In any case, a co-ordinating 
agency is required with some degree of authority over 
the actions of the operating agencies. 
Within this institutional framework, the procedure for 
executing policy must specify the division of functions 
between the central co-ordinating body (which I call the 
Planning Board) and the operating agencies, the form of 
the directives from the Planning Board to the operating 
agencies, and the establishment of specific guides to action 
by the latter. 
The first phases of a rational procedure have already 
been discussed in principle from the point of view of the 
Planning Board. They involve (i) a mechanism for com-
paring alternative types of investment, and (ii) the selec-
tion of policy instruments based on the analysis. In this 
first stage, the operating agencies provide information on 
the alternatives available, either in the form of sector 
programmes (based on general policy guides provided 
by the Planning Board) or as raw material (projects) 
from which such programmes can be constructed. Operat-
ing agencies may also provide information on the eifect 
of certain instrimients—e.g., tax incentives—on their 
sectors, and perform other specialized studies—of alterna-
tive production techniques, manpower requirements, etc. 
The exact division of labour between the Planning Board 
and the research staffs of the various operating agencies 
is not important at this stage, since the essential problem 
is to prepare a co-ordinated programme based on the 
best available information.'^^ As this is a basic political as 
well as economic decision, it will normally have to be 
ratified by the cabinet and perhaps by the legislature be-
fore the next steps can be taken. 
The next stage is the preparation of a set of rules to 
guide the actions of individual agencies, which may col-
lectively be called an operating programme. The latter 
differs from the long-term programme in covering a 
shorter period of time (one or two years), in taking the 
instruments of policy as given, and in using variables 
more closely related to the policy instruments chosen. 
The Planning Board contributes to the preparation of an 
operating programme by issuing policy guidance and by 
co-ordinating the work of the operating agencies. This 
guidance may take the form of targets, priorities, or 
prices. The choice among them is discussed in the next 
section. These policy directives provide the link between 
the long-term programme and the first drafts of the sev-
eral operating programmes. The Planning Board then 
T^The procedure to be described assumes that an over-all pro-
gramme is desirable as a basis for co-ordination. Where interven-
tion is limited to a few sectors, a less complete analysis may be 
c l l f f l p ip t l t 
co-ordinates these programmes to the degree necessary to 
make them consistent with each other and with the long-
term programme. Typically, this process takes place in 
connexion with the preparation of the Government's 
annual budget, and political control of the result is exer-
cised in parliamentary debate on the budget.'® 
The final stage is the execution of policy by the operat-
ing agencies through lending, taxing, investing, allocating 
foreign exchange, etc. Since planning is never perfect, an 
essential function of the operating programme is to guide 
the several agencies when they must deviate from the 
anticipated course of action. It is at this point that cen-
tralized control runs the risk of bogging down in a maze 
of detail. The operating programme must anticipate de-
partures from quantitative targets and must provide for 
them. The process involves a continuous exchange of in-
formation between the operating agencies and the Plan-
ning Board in order to ensure consistency among the 
changes made by various agencies. While these objectives 
are never entirely achieved, it is worth considering 
methods of improving performance in this field. 
2. The form of co-ordination'^ 
Whatever the institutional structure established, the 
form of the directives given by the Planning Board to 
the operating agencies (and its ability to enforce them) 
will determine the extent to which decentralization is 
actually achieved without loss of efficiency in the pro-
gramme. Three "pure" forms of co-ordination can be 
distinguished: 
(i) Bargaining, in which the Planning Board acts pri-
marily as an arbiter among the agencies claiming scarce 
resources; 
(ii) Target setting, in which the operating programme 
takes the form of quantitative production goals set by the 
Planning Board; and 
(iii) Price setting, in which the operating directives 
take the form of accounting prices. 
Actual operating programmes combine all three of 
these features to some extent. Bargaining predominates 
when the operating agencies are strong and the central 
authority weak and when there is little over-all analysis 
to go on. The bargaining process then centres on the 
preparation of the annual budget, and short-run con-
siderations are likely to predominate. I will not try to 
analyse this form of co-ordination further, but will dis-
cuss the other two methods in their pure forms and then 
in possible combinations, such as priority systems. 
(a) Target setting. When the policy directives from 
the Planning Board consist of targets for production, 
consumption, imports, etc., the range of choice left to the 
operating agencies is at a minimum. The agency can 
only decide among alternative ways of achieving the as-
signed level of production, for example, within the factor 
Since some of the most effective types of control are em-
bodied in the annual appropriation of government funds, the 
participation of the agency responsible for long-term policy (the 
Planning Board) in the review of the annual budget is essential 
to efficient execution of development policy. The inevitable con-
flicts between long-run and short-run goals can only be reconciled 
in this way. The implementation of a long-run programme re-
quires coordination of a much wider range of government activi-
ties than public expenditures and taxation, however. 
T® This analysis draws considerably on Dahl and Lindblom, 
op. cit., chapter 14, which is, however, mainly concerned with 
wartime planning. 
supplies allocated to it. Some method of evaluating those 
limited alternatives is required, and market prices will 
normally be used in the absence of other information. 
The, operating programme in this form can only be 
adjusted to take account of the difference between plan 
and performance by changes in targets. Unless these 
changes are made promptly and efficiently by the Plan-
ning Board, the agencies affected are likely to make their 
own revisions, which may not be consistent. Prices will 
tend to fluctuate widely when there is only quantitative 
planning, or alternatively they may be kept constant by 
government decree. In either case, they do not provide 
the best guides to investment decisions. Consumer choices 
are also distorted, which makes calculations of future 
demand more difficult. 
(b) Price setting. Although there is some experience 
in Soviet planning and in wartime planning in the 
democracies with targets as control devices, there is no 
similar example of a Government which has tried to 
guide the decisions of Government agencies primarily by 
administrative determination of prices. We might expect 
that this method would provide some improvement over 
the free price mechanism if it were well executed, but 
that it would suffer from some of the same defects. 
Under a "pure" price system each sector agency would 
try to invest in all projects which appeared profitable at 
the accounting prices set, using the same prices to choose 
the best technique of production. It would be remarkable 
if the Planning Board were able to calculate future prices 
so accurately as to just clear the market for investment 
funds, foreign exchange, and other scarce factors. Fre-
quent changes in price are a feasible way of adjusting 
production and consumption, but they are not so effective 
in regulating investment plans, whose influence is only 
felt over a longer period. 
Despite the impracticability of a programme consisting 
only of accounting prices, the theoretical advantages of 
the price mechanism point the way toward combinations 
of prices and quantity controls which should be an im-
provement on both. 
(c) Priorities. Priorities are one of the most popular 
control devices because of their relative simplicity in 
operation. This simplicity is achieved at the expense of 
considerable ambiguity as to their real nature and diffi-
culty in relating them to an over-all programme. The 
essential feature of priorities is that rankings are given 
to different categories of use, and that scarce commodities 
are allocated to different uses according to their ranks. 
The ambiguity of priorities derives from the fact that 
additional amounts of the same commodity—steel or 
electric power—have declining value to the economy and 
should, in principle, receive successively lower priorities. 
The analytical basis for a rational priority system is 
therefore very complicated. 
Priority systems eliminate the need for quantitative 
targets at the expense of considerable uncertainty as to 
the amounts of resources to be allocated to the lower 
priority sectors. Priorities have therefore worked well 
mainly in cases where some uses (e.g., military produc-
tion) were clearly much more important than others, and 
where not too many commodities were allocated (e.g., 
the Controlled Materials Plan in the United States, which 
allocated only three metals because more elaborate 
schemes had proved unworkable). 
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Priority systems for carrying out development pro-
grammes have arisen mainly from the lack of over-all 
analysis and from existing structural disequilibria. It is 
administratively simpler to concentrate on a few high 
priority sectors, which often are those that have been 
neglected in previous prograrmnes. A marked tendency 
to alternate between giving high priority to industry and 
to agricultural can be discerned in the recent history of 
many countries—the Soviet Union, India, Turkey, Argen-
tina, Mexico, to mention only a few. Broad priorities of 
this kind indicate the previous failure to achieve a bal-
anced advance, in which scarce resources have the same 
marginal productivity in all uses. 
If used in conjunction with accounting prices, priorities 
could provide a useful simplification of the mechanism 
of evaluation to permit more decentralized control. The 
basis for the priority system in a development programme 
should be the contribution which a given use makes to 
the main objective of the programme: the increase in 
national income. The importance of other objectives 
(e.g., reducing a payments deficit) could be measured by 
assigning them appropriate prices. Each sector agency in 
charge of production would be asked to establish pri-
orities for the various resource uses (projects) under its 
control, using the accounting prices indicated to it by 
the Planning Board. These priorities would then be made 
the basis of allocations of government investment funds, 
foreign exchange, and other resources under government 
control. 
The rationale of this procedure is given by the solution 
to the examples in Part 11 A, in which the SMP indicates 
the priority within the sector. To the extent that account-
ing prices can be adjusted toward the long-run equi-
librium values, the result would tend to approximate a 
pure price-setting approach, since the SMP would also 
tend to be equated among sectors. The imperfections in 
accounting prices and changes in underlying conditions 
would require allocations of some resources, for which 
demand currently exceeds supply, however. Consistency 
would be achieved by allocating commodities which 
were temporarily in short supply (at the established ac-
counting prices), but future changes in allocations and 
prices would be designed to eliminate such shortages. 
The scope for initiative and decision by the sector 
agencies would be much greater under this system because 
they would not have targets prescribed for them, except 
in potential bottleneck sectors (power, transport, cement, 
etc.). Discrepancies between demand and supply of most 
other commodities could be made up by imports or 
variations in stocks. 
In summary, under a control system designed for de-
centralization, accounting prices would be the main type 
of guidance provided by the co-ordinating agency, and 
jriorities (based on marginal uses in each sector) would 
je used only when accounting prices did not have the 
effect of clearing the market. Except in a few sectors, 
quantitative targets would be established by the sector 
agencies in the light of the profitable investments avail-
able to them. Quantitative checks would only be needed 
to assure that future supplies of commodities required to 
be produced locally were consistent with future demands. 
The opportunity cost assigned to foreign exchange, capi-
tal, and labour would be the principal means of achiev-
ing balance in foreign trade and securing full em-
ployment. 
B. Revision of policies and programmes 
The proper relation between the long-term programme 
and the directives comprising the operating programme 
depends on the existing economic situation and the na-
ture of the control devices adopted. When the supply of 
foreign exchange provides a cushion against shortfalls in 
execution, for example, the relation need not be so close 
as when the balance-of-payments limitation is more re-
strictive. 
The discussion of control techniques in the operating 
programme suggests that more attention should be given 
in long-term programmes to the effects of structural 
change on equilibrium prices. Since targets do not pro-
vide the best control devices for many sectors, the long-
term programme would be a more useful guide to 
execution if it put less emphasis than is customary on the 
setting of targets and more on the determination of 
opportunity costs and accounting prices. These cost and 
price relationships may be expected to change over time 
as the market expands, resources are developed, and over-
head facilities are installed. Anticipation of these changes 
would lead to a better assessment of comparative advan-
tage in a dynamic setting and reduce the need for controls 
in the future. 
My previous discussion of programming may have 
given the impression that if the design of development 
policy is not yet on a scientific basis, it may be in the 
near future. This is far from being the case. Formal 
analysis does provide an indispensable framework for 
policy, but even "purely economic" decisions must be 
based as much on intangible factors, such as the ex-
pected reactions of producers and consumers to various 
measures, as on econometric studies. When development 
programmes are first drawn up, these qualitative judge-
ments are likely to be particularly important because the 
formal analysis will be deficient in many respects. In fact, 
I would hazard the guess that the most that can be ex-
pected of the first programme in any country is to estab-
lish machinery for analysis and co-ordination which in 
time may have a beneficial effect on the use of resources. 
Since it takes time and experience with a particular 
society to devise an effective development policy, plans 
should err initially on the side of making smaller changes 
and adopting less drastic measures until the initial re-
sponse to various instruments can be evaluated. It is, for 
example, much easier to proceed from free enterprise 
to tax incentives to government investment than it is to 
reverse the process, and the more indirect measures have 
a better chance to work if there is not the immediate 
threat of more drastic intervention. Whatever policy is 
adopted initially, however, the evaluation of the effective-
ness of the instruments used is an essential—but often 
neglected—step toward better policy in the future. 
Once a policy is in operation, conditions are likely to 
be much more favourable for securing the information 
needed for adequate analysis than they were at the outset. 
The operating agencies themselves are an important 
source of such information, and the projects submitted 
to development banks and similar agencies are often the 
most accurate indication of production costs and capital 
requirements for different types of production. Similarly, 
the response of demand to increases in income and price 
changes can be determined more accurately as the plan 
proceeds. 
Since the structure of the economy is constantly being 
changed and the information for analysis is constantly 
being improved, the revision of programmes and policies 
must be thought of as a continuous process. The existence 
of a programme in operation makes this procedure much 
easier than the drawing up of the first programme because 
the range of alternatives to be considered is normally less. 
Efforts can therefore be concentrated on refinement of 
the analysis, the study of alternative instruments, and im-
proved methods of co-ordination. 
One important aspect of the process of revision should 
be a study of the effects of deviation from the programme 
set up originally. Among import substitutes, for example, 
there may be a wide range of investments which show 
approximately equal returns, and the choice among them 
would not be of great significance to the total outcome. 
In other sectors the opposite may be true, since the 
establishment of a certain type of production may be 
critical to the development of other sectors. This type of 
"sensitivity analysis" is very useful in deciding on the 
choice of policy instruments and the extent to which 
co-ordination among sectors is needed. 
Finally, a word may be added on the subject of time. 
Economists have not been notably successful in predicting 
the rate at which expected changes will take place because 
their tools of analysis are based more on the conditions 
of equilibrium than on the process by which equilibrium 
is established. While this is a serious defect, it need not 
be so damaging in the case of development policy as it is 
in the control of the business cycle, where the timing of 
policy measures is crucial. In fact, I would argue that it is 
much more important to have a clear idea of the nature 
of the changes in the structure of the economy that will 
be required by economic development than of the speed 
at which these changes will take place. An overestimate 
of the rate of growth may cause investment to be made 
too soon, with consequent under-utilization until the an-
ticipated level is achieved, but this waste of resources is 
less serious than that resulting from investment in a 
sector in which the economy does not have a prospective 
comparative advantage. A mistaken analysis of the proper 
pattern of growth may lead to protection and high prices 
for a long period, while an error of even 40 or 50 per 
cent in estimating the rate of growth is usually wiped out 
in a few years. A development programme can therefore 
serve its main function of guiding the direction of re-
source allocation even if it does not turn out to be a good 
forecast of the rate of growth; deficiencies in the latter 
respect can be partially overcome by a constant compari-
son of plan and realization. It is much harder to shift 
resources from one sector of the economy to ' another, 
however, than it is to slow up or accelerate the rate of 
production and investment. 
The study of economic policy for the under-developed 
countries is still in its infancy. It requires a reexamina-
tion of the body of economic theory and policy which 
has grown up in the more advanced countries in order to 
avoid both inappropriate analogies and the disregard of 
relevant experience. The development programme appears 
to be a promising innovation to guide the type of govern-
ment intervention needed to promote economic growth 
in a democratic society. 
So far, discussion of development programmes has 
stressed the improvement in resource allocation which 
they offer and has tended to ignore the problems of co-
ordination which they raise. The more effective use of 
development programmes will be promoted by an ap-
preciation of their main function as a co-ordinating de-
vice and by a more realistic assessment of the means 
available for this purpose. 
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